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 بسم رب العلم والعلماء
..وعلى آله الطيبين الطاهرين قرأ وبنون والقلم وما يسطرونوالصالة والسالم على من بعث با  
هذه هديتي إلى تلك البقعة . لوالكم لما كان هذا العمل المتواضع.. إلى اشتياقي أمي وأبي وإخوتي
إلى .. الذين غمروني بحبهم إخواني بنات وأبناءإلى . لها وألهلها القريب المظلومة نسأل هللا الفرج
إليكم جميعاً جزيل .. إلى أصدقائي وكل من دعمني خالل هذه الرحلة الطويلة.. زوجات إخواني
والفرح الشقاء والقسوة  تعلمت من..  تعلمت مما مضى. بدايةال هذه ليست إال. الشكر والعرفان
إلى فـ . من أي وقت مضى وهاأنذا أقوى وأكثر صالبة ..تعلمت أن ال أستكين أو أستسلم.. والسعادة
 ..إلى الحرية قريباً .. إلى لـ إلى سـ إلى طـ إلى يـ إلى نـ
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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis explores the relationship between sports media and politics in Bahrain in 
2011 when Bahrainis gathered at the Pearl Roundabout to protest for greater 
freedom, equality, and an end to the Al-Khalifa regime during the wave of national 
protests in the region that is now known as The Arab Spring. It argues that sports 
media in particular was used as a propaganda tool by the Al-Khalifa family regime 
to suppress the protest. This thesis addresses two research questions: how did the 
pro-regime sports media frame the uprising in Bahrain and what strategies were 
used by the Al-Khalifa regime to politicize the sports media? A quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis was conducted of the sports media coverage in two 
sports newspapers and two television sports programmes in the period between 
March and May 2011 when demonstrations spread across Bahrain, sports activities 
were suspended and martial law was introduced following a general national strike. 
The content analysis identified three main frames that the pro-regime sports media 
employed to define the uprising: the characterization frame, the consequences 
frame, and the unpatriotic frame. Also identified were three accompanying 
strategies that helped implement the frames: vilifying the demonstrations, 
glorifying the Al-Khalifa family, and a third double edged strategy undermining the 
protesters while simultaneously praising the supporters of the ruling family. These 
strategies were supported by a number of techniques including the use of sources, 
the use of images of the protests, and the use of visual and audio content. This 
thesis concludes that the sports media was used as a propaganda tool by the Al-
Khalifa family regime in Bahrain to suppress the 2011 uprising, to name and shame 
the protesters, and to preserve the status quo.  
Keywords:  
Sports media, The Arab Spring, Bahrain, the Al-Khalifa family, framing, 
propaganda 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Inspired by the demonstrations that swept the Middle East and North Africa, 
which the world's media described as The Arab Spring, Bahrainis took to the streets 
on February 14, 2011 in protests against the Sunni Al-Khalifa family. The protesters 
demanded political reforms including the introduction of a constitutional monarchy 
and a fair distribution of the country's wealth. Reports showed that thousands of 
families received monthly government aid that did not cover their basic needs 
(Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2004; UNDP 2012). The Al-Khalifa family has 
had political control of Bahrain since 1783 and maintained it even during the period 
of British colonization. The unsuccessful uprising in Bahrain raised concerns among 
other regimes in the Gulf States and their American ally as toppling the regime in 
Bahrain would threaten the U.S. interests in the region.  
In solidarity with the Bahraini people, sports figures and other athletes joined 
the protest march on February 22, 2011. This "Athletes' March" was an unexpected 
move by sports figures since it was the first time that they had become directly 
involved in politics. The Athletes’ March was only a small part of the larger national 
uprising directed against the Al-Khalifa regime The regime's reaction to the 
demonstration is indicative of the kind of political repression in Bahrain.   
Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf States to imprison sports figures, 
athletes and sports journalists because of their political views. As a result of their 
participation, a number of sports figures, sports journalists, political activists, 
teachers, university students and trade unionists were detained and tortured. Some 
lost their jobs or were suspended from playing for their teams. For example, Abdulla 
Alawi, a Shiite sports journalist, was forced to resign from his job at Al-Bilad for his 
participation in the uprising. He was then detained for more than 70 days without 
trial (Reporters Without Borders 2011). His colleague Faisal Hayat, also a Shiite 
sports journalist, was detained for about 84 days without trial, A'ala Hubail, a top 
scorer in the 2004 Asian Cup, and his brother Mohammed Hubil were arrested whilst 
training with their club following their participation in The Athletes' March (Fox 
2011). Mohammed Adnan, runner-up Asian Footballer of the year in 2009, was 
forced to leave the country and move to Australia after being accused of organizing 
The Athletes' March (Alahrani 2011).  
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The Bahrain Press Association report (2011) counted the dismissal and the arrest of 
more than 12 sports journalists among 129 local journalists who were targeted for 
their participation in the protests.   
While the local media in Bahrain covered the uprising from the first week, 
the sports coverage in newspapers and television remained focused on the sports 
events themselves until these events were suspended in Bahrain in March 2011 
because of the ongoing political unrest. At that point, journalists and television 
presenters had to rely on international sources for sports news. The lack of explicit 
acknowledgment of the impact of the protests on sport in Bahrain or commentary by 
sports journalists and sports celebrities was indicative of the level of control that the 
Al-Khalifa regime had on sports media and on the media in general. Consequently, 
there was little opportunity for anti-regime news coverage in any media in Bahrain 
since it is been controlled, funded, or monitored by pro-regime agents. 
However, on April 4, 2011, Bahrain Sports channel aired a programme that 
was called With the Event that explicitly discussed the uprising and its consequences. 
This programme was considered a breakthrough in the sports media coverage of the 
uprising because it criminalized the protesters and called for the suspension and 
arrest of all those who were involved in the demonstrations. It was these sports media 
events that encouraged writing this thesis, which examine the involvement of sports 
media in politics by questioning how the 2011 uprising in Bahrain was framed and 
what strategies were used by the Al-Khalifa regime to politicise the sports media, 
particularly during the first three months of the uprising between March and May 
2011. 
 This thesis sheds light on the political role of sports media during a critical 
period in the history of Bahrain when the regime employed the sports media and pro-
regime athletes to whip up nationalistic and patriotic sentiments in order to enhance 
the political and the social standing for the benefit of the royal family. According to 
Peter Beck (1982), during the 1920s and 30s, the German Nazi regime, the Italian 
Fascists and even the English used sports competitions as a propaganda means to 
create a sense of sporting "war" against other national teams. In Argentina, for 
instance, the former military government exploited the country’s hosting of the 1978 
World Cup to create a sense of patriotism to counter foreigners and domestic 
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opposition; both were referred to as the enemy. The military government's sense of 
patriotism was further enhanced by Argentina winning the 1978 World Cup: 
For the junta it was clear: the victory articulated 
the excellence of the nation and the importance of 
staying together, like the national team, against 
all kinds of enemy. Football was defined as a 
privileged arena as far as patriotism was 
concerned. (Tomlinson and Young 2006, p. 141)  
The popular appeal and wide-spread cultural impact of sport are two of the main 
reasons why sport attracts the interest of political regimes eager to find opportunities 
to propagandize their ideology. Sport attracts private interests keen to exploit profit 
margins associated with the popularity of televised and sponsored sport events. For 
instance, according to the British Broadcasting Corporation, 51.9 million (90% of the 
United Kingdom population), watched at least 15 minutes of coverage of the London 
2012 Olympic Games (BBC 2012). This was the biggest national television event 
since the beginning of the current measuring system. It also surpassed two other 
major events in the United Kingdom: The Diamond Jubilee that was watched by 69% 
of the population and Kate and William's Royal Wedding that was watched by 61% 
of the population. In a report released by the International Olympic Committee 
(2012), statistics show that the coverage of the Olympics reached 3.6 billion people 
across more than 500 television channels around the world. This shows the power of 
sport competitions in reaching more than half of the world's population.   
Success in sporting events is often used to divert attention from national 
political or economic crises. For instance, the three playoff matches between Algeria 
and Egypt in the qualifying round of the World Cup in 2010 was quickly politicized 
by the competing nations. Politicians, sports figures and the media from both 
countries escalated the patriotic competition until it reached what was called a 
"Soccer War" (Kujawsky 2009). As a journalist of the New York Times commented 
in an article titled "This Time Egyptians Rioted Over Sport, Not Bread", Egypt was 
swept away with nationalistic fever during the playoffs against Algeria which was 
temporarily united during the games despite its internal political tensions:  
From the start, the Egyptian government sought to 
exploit the games with Algeria for political reasons, 
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political analysts said. State radio broadcast 
nationalist songs. Streets were filled with young men 
selling Egyptian flags. The president's son Gamal 
Mubarak, who is often talked about as a possible 
successor to his 81-year-old father, attended the two 
games with other high-ranking party members. 
(Slackman 2009). 
 The media in Egypt and Algeria reported that several of their national team 
supporters died during the "Soccer War" although this was later revealed to be false 
(Montague 2009; Slackman 2009). Ambassadors from both countries were 
withdrawn from embassies as a result of the "Soccer War". Even the Egyptian 
president of the time, Mohammed Hosni Mubarak participated in escalating the 
tensions. He insisted in a parliamentary speech that "Egypt does not tolerate those 
who hurt the dignity of its sons" (BBC 2009). He went on to qualify what could 
almost be interpreted to be a call for action to support the nation's football team 
against the competing nation's sports fans: "We don't want to be drawn into 
impulsive reactions. I am agitated too, but I restrain myself". In this speech, Mubarak 
simultaneously mobilized sport as a national propaganda tool and portrayed himself 
as a fellow sports fan to his people.                                                                                 
 It is fairly common in media coverage of political disputes in Gulf States 
countries to go beyond the strictly sports issue and to transform into a political issue.  
The regimes of these countries do not hesitate to use sport and sports media to put 
pressure on each other. For instance, as early as 2014 Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates forced their journalists to give up their positions at the Qatari 
television channel, Bein Sport, after a political dispute with Qatar (Al Jazeera 2014). 
This dispute which was over the Qatari support to the Muslim Brotherhood included 
the withdrawal of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and 
Bahrain from Qatar. Evidence of official pressure can be found in a Tweet from the 
Saudi columnist Mohanna Alhubail, who writes for Qatari newspapers and Al 
Jazeera Arabic website: "I have received a call from the Deputy Minister of 
Information Dr. Abdullah Al-Jasser informing me politely about the leadership's 
decision to stop my writing in Qatar" (Alhubail 2014). In another event, Qatar was 
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also threatened of being penalized and banned from hosting regional sports 
tournaments (Arabian Business 2014).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Tweets from the Saudi journalist Muhanna Alhubail about instructions to stop dealing with the 
Qatari media  
 
The 2011 uprising in Bahrain attracted international media attention about the 
relationship between sports and politics and responsibilities regarding human rights 
in sport competitions (Deedes 2012; Gibson 2014). Bahrain was supposed to host the 
Grand Prix in March 2011 but the race was cancelled as a result of the political 
turmoil. A year later, the question was raised once again about whether Bahrain 
should host the Formula One race after its violation of human rights during the 
uprising. Many observers argued that ignoring the human rights violations would 
give the green light to the Bahraini regime to continue its "crackdown" on dissidents. 
As British politician George Galloway stated: "There is blood on the tracks and 
anyone who drives over them will never be forgiven" (The Guardian 2012). 
However, in the same paper the Crown Prince of Bahrain, who had brought the 
Grand Prix to Bahrain for the first time in 2004, claimed that cancelling the race 
"would just empower extremists". The Crown Prince's statement showed how the Al-
Khalifa family dismissed anyone who opposed the political status-quo in Bahrain as 
"extremists". On an international level, the British opposition leader Ed Miliband 
voiced his concerns and stated that:  
Sport and politics generally shouldn't mix, but ... 
what kind of signal does it send to the world when 
this grand prix (sic) is going ahead, given the 
concerns there are, given the violence we have seen 
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in Bahrain, given the continuing issues around 
human rights? (Wilkinson 2012). 
Despite this event, the Grand Prix went ahead in Bahrain in April 2012. While the 
regime had insisted on hosting the race in an attempt to prove to the world that the 
state in Bahrain was stable, the race had the unexpected result of bringing more 
international attention to the daily protests being held all over Bahrain. Since it was 
believed that the Formula One management supported the Al-Khalifa's autocratic 
rule, the protesters redoubled their efforts to underline the link between this major 
sport event and the suppression of the uprising and any political opposition in 
Bahrain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Graffiti calling for boycott of the race in one of the Bahraini cities (Bahrain Watch 2014) 
 
Figure 2 shows an example of political graffiti on a wall in Bahrain calling 
for the boycott of the Grand Prix. It shows Bernie Ecclestone, the president and CEO 
of Formula One Management and Formula One Administration driving a Formula 
One car besides the King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa. The car spouts tear 
gas on protesters instead of exhaust fumes. The tires of the car drip blood, 
presumably from running over protesters, and the text underlining the drivers states 
"Is not on our blood".   
The use of English instead of Arabic in this graffiti indicates that the 
anticipated audience was the international media rather than local protesters. The 
demonstrations against the Formula One sought to raise awareness among the 
Bahraini people about the way the regime's insistence on hosting the race was part of 
its public relations campaign. Given the lack of opportunities to voice opposition in 
the tightly controlled media of Bahrain, the walls of local cities became the 
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alternative platform for protesters along with the more high-risk banners and 
participation in street marches and protests. Figure 3 below shows an example of an 
Arab/English language banner pitched at both local and international media 
coverage. The Arabic text states " حرين تطحن أجساد الشعبالفورموال في الب " can be translated 
as "Formula One crushes the Bahraini people's bodies". 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A poster calling for boycott of the Formula One during a protest event 
(The Guardian 2012)  
 
British journalist Brian Dooley in an article titled "Bahrain Is Becoming Even More 
Repressive Because of the F1 Race" highlighted the way that the Formula One 
season was used by the royal family to hide the un-democratic situation:    
Bahrain's rulers are invested financially and 
psychologically in the F1. It brings international 
prestige to the tiny kingdom, where the ruling family 
keeps tight control of power and the King's uncle has 
been the unelected prime minister for over 40 years. 
(Dooley 2013) 
Despite the international media recognition of violations of human rights in Bahrain 
and the use of Formula One for political purposes, there was no serious action taken 
by the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (the International Automobile 
Federation).  
 The use of sport in politics in the Gulf States countries continued. In March 
2015, a coalition of several Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and supported by the 
United States launched a war on Yemen. Sport and sports figures again engaged in 
the war by carrying banners, chanting national slogans during games, performing 
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tifos in stadiums by crowds, or encouraging public opinion to "support the sacred 
mission". In one case a Saudi air force pilot wrote an encouraging message to an 
injured football player on a missile that he intended to launch on Yemen. While the 
previous examples show a strong tie between sport and politics in all Gulf States 
countries, is argued in this thesis that the connection is particularly strong in Bahrain, 
as can be seen through targeting of sports figures and athletes and the excessive 
involvement of sport and sports media during the 2011 uprising.  
 
1.1 The 2011 uprising in Bahrain  
Although anti-regime protests had been occurring for about a decade before 
2011, the demonstrations during 2011 were the biggest protest events in the history 
of Bahrain. In 1992, two hundred national figures signed a petition calling for 
political reform and a new election, but the former Prince of Bahrain, Sheikh Isa bin 
Salman Al-Khalifa (1961-1999), father of the present King, rejected the opposition's 
demands. Weeks later, the Prince established a Consultative Council with thirty 
members appointed by the Prince himself. The opposition strongly refused the 
Prince's move. In 1994, another petition was signed by 20,000 activists and citizens. 
In response to the growing movement, the regime arrested and exiled some of the 
opposition leaders. This led to general unrest and there were protests in many cities. 
These protests resulted in death, injury and the arrest of thousands of people 
(Peterson 2004; BBC 2013).  
In 1999, the ruling family announced the death of the Prince Sheikh Isa bin 
Salman Al-Khalifa and his son Prince Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa took over the 
throne. About a year later, the new Prince established a committee for National 
Reconciliation, endorsing a new constitution and a re-election of the parliament in 
2002 (Joyce 2012, pp. 109-111). The opposition rejected the new constitution and the 
"manipulated election" accusing the regime of reducing the powers of the parliament 
as outlined in the 2002 constitution. As a result, they boycotted the elections (Joyce 
2012, p. 113).  
On February 14, 2011 people from different areas organized demonstrations 
that began in what was called the "Day of Rage" (Khatib and Lust 2014, p. 190). 
Seven people were reportedly killed in the first few days of the uprising including 
two activists, Ali Mushaima and Fadhel Al-Matrook and hundreds were injured or 
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arrested (Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2011a). The death of Ali Mushaima and 
Fadhel Al-Matrook ignited the protests across Bahrain which led to rallying in the 
Pearl Roundabout, a public space located only a hundred meters from the Council of 
Ministers' building, the Financial Harbour and the main shopping malls of the capital 
city Manama. The heart of the Pearl Roundabout was a large stone monument with 
six beams representing the six regional Gulf States. The beams join together to hold a 
giant stone pearl that represented unity. Protesters occupied the area around the Pearl 
Roundabout. They set up camps, food trucks and platforms for protest speeches with 
the intention of staying until political reform was negotiated. Foreign reporters were 
on site, particularly during the first weeks, perhaps because this Bahraini protest 
coincided with the wave of similar pro-democratic upheavals in the region. In an 
article for The New York Times, Ayesha Saldanha, described the Pearl Roundabout 
sit-in as she experienced the "carnival atmosphere" during the rally:  
There were electric generators, stalls with food and 
tea ('freedom tea' read one sign), an area to find lost 
children, a 'media center' where journalists could get 
information and projections of TV feeds onto 
screens and even onto the Pearl Monument." 
(Saldanha 2011).  
However, within three days the Bahraini Special Forces attacked the sleeping 
protesters, killing four and injuring hundreds. According to the Human Rights Watch 
report (2011a) of the incident which took place during the early morning of February 
17, 2011, even doctors and paramedics who endeavoured to treat the wounded 
protesters were targeted. After clearing the area, military forces surrounded the Pearl 
Roundabout for two further days and prevented the protesters' from returning. Thus 
"The Pearl Roundabout had become, after the bloodshed, a symbol of protest" 
(Sharmila 2012). A television report on February 19, 2011 from the Al Jazeera 
English Channel showed the protesters returning to the Roundabout chanting anti-
regime slogans: "With our soul and blood we will redeem you Bahrain” (Al Jazeera 
English 2011a). 
 The ruling family began to feel its loss of control and called for urgent 
military support from Saudi Arabia and other neighbouring countries. Over 1500 
troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were sent to Bahrain on 
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March 13, 2011 to assist the local police in its crackdown of the uprising. The 
assistance came once the regime declared a state of emergency. On March 15, the 
Bahraini Security Forces supported by the Gulf States troops attacked the protesters 
at the Pearl Roundabout for the second time. Within two days, the Bahraini forces 
had taken control and expelled the protesters (Tran 2011). A day later, the regime 
demolished the Roundabout and removed the Pearl Monument to prevent people 
from returning to it or using it as a focal point for protests. Although a junction was 
built over the site, it was not opened to public access and the area is still surrounded 
(as of December 2, 2015) by security forces as a measure to prevent the Bahraini 
population from rallying. According to unofficial records, more than 160 people have 
been killed since February 2011 and thousands detained or injured (Shuhdaana 
2014).  
 This Pearl Roundabout protest was the culmination of a series of protests that 
the opposition movement in Bahrain had been staging for many decades. A report 
from the BBC, which can be found in the BBC televisions archives, points out that 
even in 1956 the pro-democracy leaders had demanded a stop to what they called 
"one man rule" (Ibnkan 2012a). The movement led by the Committee of National 
Union CNU negotiated with both the Al-Khalifa regime and the British who were a 
colonizing presence in the region at the time to allow it to become the legitimate 
voice of opposition for the Bahraini people. However, the regime and the British 
refused to negotiate with the opposition (Al-Naqeeb 1989, p. 138). Subsequently, 
some of the CNU leaders were arrested and three of the leaders were accused of 
attempting to assassinate the Prince of Bahrain, Sheikh Salman Al-Khalifa, and were 
exiled to the island of Saint Helena (Joyce 2012, p. 25).  
 
14 Feb Beginning of the uprising  
15/16 Feb Killing of the two activists Ali Mushaima and Fadhel Al-Matrook 
17 Feb First attack on protesters at the Pearl Roundabout  
19 Feb Return of the protesters to the Pearl Roundabout  
21 Feb Organizing The Athletes' March 
13 March  Gulf States troops sent to Bahrain 
15 March National state of emergency declared  
16 March Second attack on protesters at the Pearl Roundabout  
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17 March Attack on Salmaniya Medical Complex  
17 March Arrest of opposition leaders  
18 March Demolition of the Pearl Roundabout  
1 April Demolition campaign of Shiite mosques   
3 April Closure of Al-Wasat newspaper 
4 April Broadcast of With the Event programme  
5 April Arrest of medical staff 
6 April Beginning of explicit coverage in newspapers 
11 April  Broadcast of Special Event programme  
31 May The call of the king for a national dialogue  
           Figure 4: A table of the main events of the uprising in March, April and May 2011    
 
1.2 Sport and the Al-Khalifa family  
Bahrain has been ruled by the Al-Khalifa regime since 1783. The family 
originally came from the central region of the Arabian Peninsula (Abdulla and Zain 
Al-Abidin 2009) and is part of the Sunni minority. Overall, Bahrain has a population 
of 1.2 million (46% Bahraini and 54% non-Bahraini) with the majority of the 
population being Muslim (approximately 81%) and the rest Christian, Jewish, Hindu, 
Baha'i and other religions (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). Muslims in Bahrain 
are divided into a Shiite majority and a Sunni minority. While there are no official 
statistics about the exact proportion of Shiites in Bahrain, reports estimate the 
percentage of Shiites as being between 70% and 75% (Bahrain Center for Human 
Rights 2006; Aldosari 2007; Fuller 2011; Erlich 2013).  
Since the Sunnis are the minority elite, with a stranglehold on economic and 
political power, the Shiites have a strong belief that there is systematic discrimination 
against them. However, while the majority of the detainees arrested during the 2011 
uprising were Shiite, the first person arrested was Mohammed Al-Buflasa, a Sunni 
citizen who served in the Bahraini Defence Force. Al-Buflasa spoke in the Pearl 
Roundabout and was arrested by his colleagues in the Bahrain Defence Force 
(Human Rights Watch 2011b). Thus, as the opposition argues the conflict in Bahrain 
is political rather than sectarian (Erlich 2013).  
The Al-Khalifa family effectively controls the media in Bahrain. It is not 
surprising that the media was biased in its coverage of the 2011 uprising. At the 
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beginning of the uprising, most media coverage described the protesters in benign 
terms. For instance, in a news article published in Al-Bilad (2011a), the Prime 
Minister of Bahrain described two people who were killed during the demonstrations 
as "our sons". Two days later, as the regime realized that the protest was gaining 
momentum, the demonstrations were described in a Ministry of Interior statement 
more negatively as a "riot" (Al-Bilad 2011b). The media as a whole reflected a pro-
regime shift in attitude towards the protesters. Two years after the 2011 uprising, the 
opposition continued to be described in the pro-regime media as groups who were 
supported by foreign powers. For example, a columnist in Al-Watan described 
protesters as "magi" who worked for the Islamic Republic of Iran (Al-Modhaki 
2013) 
The close relationship between the royal family and sport in Bahrain is 
striking. Al-Khalifa's members not only occupy senior positions of sport in Bahrain 
but their activities are closely followed by the local sports media. For example, 
Sheikh Nasser bin Hammad Al-Khalia leads the Bahraini Olympic Committee and at 
the same time occupies military positions. The most recognizable figure is 
unquestionably Sheikh Nasser, the fourth son of the Bahraini King Hammad bin 
Salman Al-Khalifa. He was born on May 8, 1987 and graduated from Sandhurst 
Royal Military Academy in 2006. When he was only 23 years old, he was appointed 
as Chairman of the Supreme Council for Youth and Sports.  
The other significant and overlapping sport and military positions he occupies 
include: leader of the Royal Endurance Horse Riding Team, Commander of the 
Royal Guard, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Royal Charity Organization and 
he is a member of the Economic Development Board (Bahrain News Agency 2011; 
Nasseralkhalifa 2014). For the Al-Khalifa family members, senior positions in sport 
are as important as military positions.  
The Al-Khalifa family is the main player in the Bahraini sport scene. The Al-
Khalifa family direct 18 of 26 sports federations. Figure 5 shows some of the royal 
family members who are at the helm of the major federations. The influence of the 
Al-Khalifa family on sport has allowed its members to use sport as a vehicle for its 
own propaganda to control the nation. For instance, sporting success is generally and 
deferentially attributed to "the wise leadership" of the King, the Prime Minister and 
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the Crown Prince as if they were the main cause of success rather than individual 
athletic prowess.  
After being appointed the President of the Bahraini Olympic Committee, Sheikh 
Nasser bin Hamad has been considered to be one of the main reasons for Bahrain's 
sporting success. The President of the Athletics Federation Sheikh Talal bin 
Mohammed, for instance, announced that the wins of Bahraini athletes in an Asian 
competition were the result of the "great support" offered by Sheikh Nasser (Al-
Watan 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 5: An overview of the senior positions in sport occupied by royal family members  
 
Al-Khalifa family members' sport activities receive special media coverage. 
Sporting activities of the royal family members, particularly those who are close 
relatives of the king, occupy prime place in the sports pages. For instance, Figure 6 
shows an official news article that covers an Endurance Race of the Crown Prince 
Cup. The article is accompanied by two photos of the king's son Sheikh Nasser bin 
Hamad Al-Khalifa (left and centre) and one other photo (right) of The Crown Prince 
Sheikh Salman bin Hamad with his brother Sheikh Khaled bin Hamad. Using 
photographs of the same figure is normal when the news covers senior sports figures 
such as Sheikh Nasser or his brother Sheikh Khaled bin Hamad Al-Khalifa. The text 
of the article and pictures would have been sent to the local newspapers by the media 
office of Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa and it would have been published 
without editorial changes, as is typical of "official news" stories. Official news 
articles that rely on official sources or pro-regime figures are also sent by sports 
federations and clubs.    
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             Figure 6: An example of an official news article (Akhbar Al-Khaleej, April 12, 2011)  
 
 Official stories sent by the regime’s media office to be published in local 
newspapers are not just about the ruling family members; they also cover sport clubs 
and federations. All official news is sent to the local newspapers via email or fax.  
An item about a senior figure such as Sheikh Nasser must be published in the 
foreground or at the top of any local sports page in the next day's issue with its 
photos and captions in exactly the same way as they were contained in the email or 
in the fax. Editors are expected, given their source, to always prioritize these stories. 
In contrast, the news about small sports club activities may not be published at all, or 
published at the bottom of the page, because the placement of news articles depends 
on the perceived importance of the sport figure. Usually, sport pages are divided into 
seven to eight columns.   
 It is worth noting (see Figure 6) that the official news article of Sheikh Nasser 
and his brothers occupied eight columns and almost three-quarters of the page. It is 
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common that Al-Khalifa family members share their greetings or praise through 
official stories as can be seen in the example of Sheikh Nasser in the article which 
has the commentary " رعاية درة ناصر بن حمد يشيد باستعدادات االتحاد الملكي لسباق كأس ولي العهد ب 
 which can be translated as "Expressing "أعرب عن تقديره لدعم سمو ولي العهد للقدرة..البحرين
his Appreciation for the Support of His Highness the Crown Prince for Endurance 
Riding Sport: Nasser bin Hamad Praises the Royal Federation Preparations for the 
Crown Prince Cup Race Sponsored by Durrat Al Bahrain". 
 While politics was normally not explicitly foregrounded in Bahraini sports 
media, using sports media for political purposes during the first months of the 2011 
uprising became what can be called an "official policy". Figure 7 shows a news 
article covering a football match in the month after the suppression of the Pearl 
Roundabout protest and when sport activities were resumed in mid-April. The 
accompanying photograph shows the Al-Hidd team players holding a banner before 
their match started in which is written in Arabic " يناد  ومنتسبيه والعبيه والثقافي الرياضي الحد 
 في الرشيدة وقيادتنا لمملكتنا مخلصين أوفياء جنوداً  يكونوا أن هللا يعاهدون الكرام الحد مدينة أهالي وجميع
 which can be translated as "Al-Hidd Cultural and Sports Club; its "والضراء السراء
Players, Members and all Distinguished People of Al-Hidd City Pledge to God to Be 
Faithful and Loyal Soldiers to our Kingdom and our Leadership Through Thick and 
Thin". This explicit reference to the political situation and the team's political 
allegiance breaches paragraph 14 of International Federation of Association Football 
FIFA (2012) Code of Ethics which states that players should "remain politically 
neutral" during play and at public events. Indeed, even the lifting of political banners 
and slogans by spectators breaches paragraph 67 of FIFA Disciplinary Code 
(International Federation of Association Football 2011) which considers political 
slogans improper conduct. Despite this explicit sanction by FIFA against players' 
political interventions, this Bahraini sports team has never been formally 
reprimanded for the pro-regime message. As it turns out, many of these Bahraini 
players were not just involved in the political upheaval, but they also later 
participated in campaigns against their colleagues who demonstrated against the 
regime. 
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Figure 7: A sport news article accompanied by a photograph of players carrying an anti-protesters banner (Al-
Bilad, April 15, 2011)  
 
1.3 The state of Bahrain 
 Understanding the media situation in Bahrain requires an understanding of 
the social, legal and political contexts of Bahrain. Khaldon Al-Naqeeb (1989, p. 100) 
has noted that the tribal families who control the five states in the Persian Gulf 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States of Emirates) live in 
"tribal blocks", or small societies, where each ruling tribe and its immediate 
members share common interests that differ from the interests of the rest of the 
population. This tribal blocks' superiority is enforced both socially and legally. 
Article 1-A of the Bahrain Constitution of 2002, for instance, stipulates the king’s 
person is inviolate and he cannot be questioned about his decisions.  
 Moreover, the constitution states that the regime is a hereditary constitutional 
monarchy so that the throne moves from the king to his oldest son unless he decides 
in his lifetime to appoint another son (Chapter 1, Article 1-B). The king has wide 
authorities to appoint and dismiss not only the Crown Prince, but also the Prime 
Minister and all ministers. 
The Al-Khalifa Sunni family stabilizes its rule by using financial  
endowments. According to Fuad I. El-Khury (1983) in his book Tribe and State in 
Bahrain: The Transition of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State, the ruling 
family has strong ties with some Sunni and Shiite families in which financial 
interests play a significant role in the coalition. While the Al-Khalifa's allies receive 
preferential treatment, Shiite opposition families are forced to pay higher taxes (p. 
67). For the Al-Khalifa family loyalty is not ensured by religion or doctrine. 
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Bahrain has thrived on strong diplomatic ties with the United States and the 
United Kingdom. This has, according to observers, impacted negatively on the 
democratic process as the governments of both the United States and the United 
Kingdom continue to support the Al-Khalifa regime in order to protect their political 
and military interests (Kode 2014; Wearing 2014). The United Kingdom has 
remained on friendly terms with the Al-Khalifa regime since the amicable end of 
British colonial rule in 1971. Although Bahrain is only a small archipelago located in 
the Persian Gulf with a territory of about 717 square kilometres, it has been a "major 
non-NATO ally" of the United States since 2002 (The White House 2002). Bahrain 
hosts the American Fifth Fleet, a naval base that is responsible for naval forces in the 
Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea and part of the Indian Ocean. According to 
observers, the base plays an important role in protecting American interests in the 
region and in turn provides support to the Bahraini regime:  
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have long sought the 
comfort of American security guarantees. The Arab 
Gulf states have never possessed the military ability 
to protect themselves from regional threats and so 
depend on the U.S. (Jones 2011) 
The Al-Khalifa family has enhanced its dominance on Bahrain through alliance with 
local figures including Sunni tribes and Shiite figures, and through their alliance with 
international powers such as the U.S.   
 
1.4 Media in Bahrain 
 The newspapers currently published in Bahrain have been in print for about 
40 years. The British first encouraged the establishment of media outlets in the 
1930s. According to Al-Shaiji (1989), the institutionalization of the press in Bahrain 
began during the First World War when traders who were exchanging letters about 
the war quoted news from Reuters as well as some Egyptian and Indian newspapers. 
Al-Shaiji claims that the British encouraged local publishers in Bahrain to establish 
newspapers to counter the German and Italian propaganda that was targeting the 
Bahraini people. In 1939 Abdullah Al-Zayed established the first print newspaper, 
the weekly the Bahrain Newspaper and a year later the British authority established a 
radio station called Gulf Radio. According to Al-Shaiji, during the Second World 
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War, Bahrain Newspaper was inciting Bahrainis to stand against the Axis powers. 
The newspaper continued to be printed for about five years before ceasing 
publication due to technical problems. However, it was rumoured that the newspaper 
was shut down by the local authority after publishing an article encouraging the 
union of Bahrain with the United Arab Emirates (Al-Shaiji 1989, pp. 103-110). In 
1950, a monthly magazine called Voice of Bahrain was established. The magazine 
stood against colonialism, defended the rights of Arabs and criticized the Gulf States 
regimes. The magazine was shut down by the authorities in 1954 (Al-Shaiji 1989, pp. 
136-137). Another two pro-opposition magazines were also shut down between 1952 
and 1955 (Ezzat 1983, pp. 352-353). 
More newspapers were subjected to censorship during the 1960s until Akhbar 
Al-Khaleej and Gulf Daily News were established by Mahmood Al-Mardi in 1976 
and 1978 respectively (Al-Wasat 2005). Currently, there are five private daily 
newspapers, published in Arabic: Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Al-Ayam, Al-Wasat, Al-Watan 
and Al-Bilad and there are two daily newspapers published in English: Gulf Daily 
News and Daily Tribune.  
When it comes to the official media and according to official information, 
Bahrain started its first radio broadcast in 1940 and its first television broadcast in 
1973. The national news agency, Bahrain News Agency, was launched in 1976 under 
the name Gulf News Agency (Information Affairs Authority 2015). Here Bahrain, the 
oldest magazine in Bahraini media history was established by the Public Relations 
Department (currently known as Information Affairs Authority) in 1957 (Ezzat 1983, 
pp. 192-194).  
At present, there are nine radio channels: General radio, Quran radio, Youth 
radio, Bahrain FM, Songs radio, traditional music radio, English radio, Indian radio, 
and Live Radio. There are also three television channels: Bahrain Television 
(Arabic), Bahrain Television (English) and Bahrain Sports Channel. Television and 
radio channels in Bahrain are owned and directed by the regime. The only sports 
channel in Bahrain is controlled and directed by the regime. During periods of 
increased sport activity, a secondary sports channel is activated to cover the sports 
news, but this is a subsidiary of the main sports channel and does not offer an 
alternative perspective. Overall, sports media in Bahrain is divided into two major 
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categories: television and newspapers. All sport newspapers in Bahrain are liftouts in 
the main newspapers.  
The current ownership situation in Bahrain raises questions about the 
pluralism of local media. Gillian Doyle (2002) defines pluralism within the media as 
the diversity of opinions diverse voices, different political views and independence 
of affiliation. Doyle indicates that pluralism grants the public access to a range of 
content in terms of political opinions and cultural reflection. She argues that without 
an open system of media ownership, a small group may be granted the right to 
control the media (pp. 11-12). In Bahrain, the opposition voice is almost prohibited 
from appearing on the national television.  
 
1.5 The press law 
 Ezzat Ali Ezzat (1983) pointed out that the first press law in Bahrain and in 
the Gulf States was established in 1930 by the British adviser to the government of 
Bahrain. The intent behind the legislation was to monitor journalists. This was 
evident in the provision that "any correspondent who works for a newspaper, or a 
freelance reporter, must record his name and the newspaper he works for in the 
department of the Bahraini government". The penalty for breaking this press law 
could be a fine or imprisonment for a period of 6 months (pp. 111-112). The second 
press law that was established in 1953, granted the local authorities the right to refuse 
to provide press licenses without having to give a reason, and the power to suspend 
and confiscate the property of a newspaper that broke the law. In 1954, another law 
was announced before it was replaced in 1965 by a new press law that was declared 
by the Prince of Bahrain, Isa bin Salman Al-Khalia to become the first law to be 
announced by the royal family itself (pp. 112-114). This 1965 law granted the 
manager of the Information Department the power to suspend the publication of 
newspapers, or to revoke a newspaper license (pp. 116-118). A television report 
produced in 1966 by BBC about the political situation in Bahrain showed that the 
ruling family rejected the concept of freedom of press early (Ibnkan 2012b).  
 The 2002 the Press, Printing and Publishing law replaced the 1965 law. This 
new legislation was ratified by the King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, and 
grants wide powers to his government as represented by its Information Affairs 
Authority. Control of the media is given to the regime with the power to refuse or 
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suspend licenses for media outlets: Article 4 of the law states that "Anyone who 
wishes to establish a printing press, before carrying out any business in it, shall 
obtain licensure for this purpose from the Ministry."  The law also closely monitors 
journalists' work. For example, Article 68 paragraphs (B) and (D) states that a 
journalist can be punished for criticizing the king or for instigating the overthrow of 
the regime. This new level of  regulation encourages self-censorship by both  
journalists and editors. As a 2014 report by the US State Department comments, the 
current press law grants wide control to the regime over media in Bahrain:  
 The government did not own any print media, but the 
Information Affairs Authority (IAA) and other 
government entities exercised considerable control over 
privately owned domestic print media. The government 
owned and operated all domestic radio and television 
stations. (U.S. Department of State 2014). 
Moreover, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (2011) that was 
established by the King of Bahrain reported that the regime, through its control over 
media, launched media campaigns to vilify the opposition (p. 178). A recent example 
of the strict control by the regime is that a new pan-Arab news television channel Al 
Arab owned by the Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal was halted by the regime hours 
after it started airing live from its offices in the capital Manama. While several media 
reports suggested "technical and administrative reasons", other reports cited an 
"offending interview" with an opposition leader (Black 2015; Omran 2015; BBC 
2015; Khalifa and Schreck 2015). With such strict control over the media, anti-
government activists have had to resort to social media to organize their activities 
and to exchange news about the uprising. This use of social media is in line with the 
activities of many opposition campaigns to organize demonstrations in "The Arab 
Spring". However, what is somewhat unusual in the Bahrain context is that the 
regime also incorporated social media into its strategies to crack down on the 
uprising.  
 While other national governments, such as the former regime, attempted to 
block satellite coverage nationally to prevent the opposition from using social media 
to organize protests (Freedom House 2012a), in Bahrain the regime itself used the 
online social networking service Facebook to identify protesters (Welsh 2011). 
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Within days of The Athletes’ March, a Facebook page was set up to post images of 
activists, or sometimes even peripheral participants photographed during the protest 
marches, who were labelled as "traitors". Bahrainis were called on to look through 
the images to see if they recognized their neighbours or colleagues, and then to post 
information about their names, age or work place. Some of those people who were 
identified were sacked from their jobs or detained.  
 Bahrain has one of the best levels of the Internet coverage in the Middle East 
countries and there are a number of service providers including Batelco, a company 
that is operated through the royal family. This, however, does not mean that all 
Bahraini had access to social media or alternative political websites during the 
uprising. According to the Reporters Without Borders report (2012a), the level of 
Internet filtering and surveillance in Bahrain is one of the highest in the world and 
Bahrain was added to the list of "Internet Enemies" in 2012. The regime also targeted 
pro-opposition activists to stop online activities. The online surveillance has 
increased since the 2011 uprising: 
The National Safety Status (emergency law) was 
initiated in March 2011 for two and a half months, 
leading to an intensive punitive campaign against 
bloggers and internet users (among others) that was 
characterized by mass arrests, incommunicado detention, 
torture, military trials, harsh imprisonment sentences, 
and dismissal from work and study based on online posts 
or mobile content. (Freedom House 2012b). 
The screenshot presented in Figure 8 shows an example of a Facebook page that was 
created to target protesters. The page was titled "Together to Unmask the Shiite 
Traitors" with an image of the King, the Bahrain flag, the map of Bahrain and the 
subtitle "The Kingdom remains for Al-Khalifa". The page was soon closed by the 
Facebook management after reports sent by pro-opposition activists but another page 
was later created titled "Together to Unmask the Shiite Traitors 2". Thousands of 
pictures and large amounts of personal information about people who participated in 
the demonstrations or those who attended the Pearl Roundabout were posted and 
made public to facilitate arrest of the protesters who were called "betrayers". 
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Figure 8: A Facebook page that included protesters' personal information. The still 
taken from the Al Jazeera English documentary "Shouting in the Dark" (Welsh 2011) 
      
 The screenshot in Figure 9 shows a photograph sample of the social media 
campaign launched against the protesters. It shows a protester carrying a sign in 
Arabic that states: "الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" which can be translated as: "The People 
Want to Topple the Regime". The photograph was posted on Facebook and 
eventually ticked " اعتقالهتم"  which means "arrested" after the individual in the 
screenshot was successfully identified via social media networks. The protester’s 
name, his job and work place had been identified. In comments on Facebook, pro-
regime users called for the death or imprisonment of those who participated in the 
uprising or those who visited the Pearl Roundabout. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: A photograph of a protester posted in a Facebook page and ticked "arrested". The  
still taken from the Al Jazeera English documentary "Shouting in the Dark" (Welsh 2011)  
 
 Journalists were also the target of pro-regime Facebook campaigns. For 
example, pro-regime Facebook users created a page titled "Nicholas D. Kristof – A 
true Liar of the Media". Nicholas Kristof is an American journalist who was detained 
and deported from Bahrain after reporting about the crackdown and banned from 
entering the country. This page, although no longer active, was created on February 
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22, 2011 only 8 days after the beginning of the uprising. It was posted on April 15, 
2011.  All posts were in English including the following: 
Nicholas D. Kristof is a man of lies, all his news about 
Bahrain is bull.... This makes me think, what about the 
other so called undercover missions he did that brought 
good to the society? probably was all lies as well.. I'm 
glad now I know. Media can never be trusted! specially 
with one as an imbecile as this one! 
There are no official records of the pages that were created by the pro-regime 
activists during this time; however, a pro-opposition online forum listed 106 pages 
and 15 personal accounts on Facebook that were removed by the Facebook 
management in the period between March and July 2011 as a result of an anti-
government activists' campaign (Fajrbh 2011). While there is no evidence to link the 
regime to the publication of these Facebook pages, it was clear from the site visitors 
and comments that ministries and government officials were following the posts to 
gather information about their employees who had participated in the demonstrations 
(Welsh 2011).  
 Most significantly for this present thesis, are many of the edited digital images 
of sports figures and journalists that were shown in the "special" broadcast on 
Bahrain Sports Channel, an official channel owned by the regime, on April 4, 2011. 
Days after the broadcast of these images during a special televised event, the 
identified sports figures were arrested or singled out to be subjected to an 
investigation by their teams and to public prosecution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: A still from the Bahrain Sports Channel With the Event broadcast on 
April 4, 2011 (Bahrain Sports Channel 2011)  
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 After the Pearl Roundabout crackdown, some official figures of the Al-
Khalifa regime appeared in public in the company of those who were believed to be 
the online activists who launched internet campaigns against pro-opposition activists. 
For instance, the Prime Minister of Bahrain, the Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al-
Khalifa, on June 23, 2014 met with Sheikh Mohammed bin Salman, one of the royal 
family members who is believed to be "Mnarfezhom" (the one who jitters them) and 
a Twitter user who led a campaign against the protesters by circling their faces and 
publishing private information about them (Bahrain Mirror 2014). In fact, 
"Mnarfezhom" and other users such as "Hareghum" (the one who burns them), 
"Grandchildren of Omar" and "Grandchildren of Al-Waleed" are anonymous online 
social networking users believed to be answerable to the regime. The real 
personalities of "Mnarfezhom", "Grandchildren of Omar" and "Grandchildren of Al-
Waleed" were revealed after Sheikh Mohammed bin Salman alongside others were 
interrogated for their online activities against some pro-regime figures.  
 While he was not asked about his activities against regime opponents, some 
pro-regime figures sued "Mnarfezhom" for accusing them of planning secret 
activities against the regime (Al-Watan 2014; Al-Wasat 2014; Manama Voice 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: The Prime Minister of Bahrain Prince Khalifa bin 
Salman (left) meets Mohammed bin Salman who is believed to be 
Mnarfezhom (Bahrain News Agency 2014a)    
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  The regime in Bahrain has also been accused of using social media to spy, 
identify and monitor pro-opposition users by sending malicious spy links. As Bahrain 
Watch reported in 2013: 
Since September 2011 or earlier, Bahrain’s Government 
has been targeting anonymous social media accounts, 
apparently in an effort to identify their operators. The 
Government targets accounts using malicious links and 
social engineering. It appears that the Ministry of 
Interior's Cyber Crime Unit is orchestrating the attack. 
(Bahrain Watch 2013). 
Reports from non-governmental organizations have raised concerns about the use of 
special software to crack down on online activists in regional countries such as Saudi 
Arabia.  With the increase of protests against the Saudi regime, Human Rights Watch 
has investigated whether surveillance software was used to identify Shiite online 
activists in this country.  
 According to the Human rights Watch, independent security researchers 
reported on June 24, 2014 that the Saudi government has been hacking into mobile 
phones by creating a malicious application that provides access to the Al-Qatif Al-
Youm (Al-Qatif Today), an Arabic language news and information network of the 
Eastern Province town of Al-Qatif. The report indicates that the spyware enables the 
government to access the phone’s files of applications such as Facebook, Whatsapp 
or Skype, messages, contacts and call history, the phone's email. The report also 
suggest that the spyware can operate the phone's camera or its microphone to take 
pictures or record conversations without the holder being aware (Human Rights 
Watch 2014). This shows that the regimes in both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are 
monitoring, not just the mainstream media, but also online media. While the troops 
of both regimes' were involved in the crackdown on the opposition in Bahrain, the 
human rights organizations reports show that both regimes have used the same 
methods to identify online opposition. 
 
1.6 Significance of this study  
 
 While there is a large body of scholarly works about the role of social media 
during The Arab Spring (Wolfsfeld et al. 2012; Campbell and Hawk 2012; Aday et 
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al. 2012), this thesis focuses on mainstream media, and the sports media in particular 
which has been generally overlooked. Given the importance of sport and sports 
media in Bahrain, this thesis sheds new light on Bahrain’s mainstream sports media 
engagement with The Arab Spring. It does not aim to examine the impact of 
propaganda in its various forms on the people of Bahrain, nor does it examine how 
journalists individually responded to the pressure of politicization of media. Instead, 
this project examines the use of the sports media in Bahrain by the ruling family to 
manipulate public opinion and to stay in power. It is argued that the Al-Khalifa 
regime has used the sports media to suppress the demonstrations by framing them as 
"illegal movements" that aimed to target the country and its people and to frame 
protesters as unpatriotic citizens. Meanwhile, the Al-Khalifa family was framed as 
the only legitimate authorities in Bahrain and their supporters as loyal citizens. This 
project highlights the significance of sports media to the royal family in Bahrain.  
Given the repressive reaction by the regime to the participation of sports 
figures and sports media in the political protest, this thesis examines the link between 
the ruling Al-Khalifa family and sports media in Bahrain, particularly during the first 
three months of the uprising between March and May in 2011. It investigates how 
the uprising was framed by sports media then examines the strategies used by the Al-
Khalifa regime to politicize the sports media during this period of social unrest. 
Content analysis is used to examine sports sections of two mainstream Bahraini 
newspapers, Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad and two pivotal television programmes 
which were broadcast on Bahrain Sports Channel, With the Event aired on April 4, 
2011 and Special Event aired on April 11, 2011, in order to identify how the protests, 
the Al-Khalifa family, the protesters and the supporters of the ruling family were 
referred to in the sports sections of the printed media and the two television 
programmes.   
I am Bahraini, a native Arabic speaker. I am now a research student in exile 
in Australia with no possibility of returning to Bahrain. As a journalist newspapers in 
Bahrain such as Al-Wasat (from 2002 to 2004), Al-Meethaq (from 2004 to 2006), Al-
Watan (from 2007 to 2008) and Al-Bilad (from 2008 to 2010), as well as numerous 
other print, radio and online media outlets in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates. I have a detailed understanding of Bahraini culture and 
society, customs, traditions, language nuances, religious beliefs, political parties, the 
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history of the Shiite /Sunni conflict and the role of the royal family within this 
context. It is hoped that the findings of this thesis will provide future media scholars 
and political scientists with useful primary information in understanding the link 
between sports and politics in Bahrain, and the broad political influences of sports 
media in Gulf State countries. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
 This chapter reviews the literature that informs examination of the impact of 
politics on sports media, with a particular focus on the political uprising of 2011 in 
Bahrain. Studies that examine the link between legacy media, social media, politics 
and uprisings in the Arab World are discussed. The review includes scholarly 
publications, conferences papers, reports, legislations, media reports and a 
documentary. This chapter focuses on six main themes that have a bearing on the 
role of sports media in the Bahrain uprising. The six themes are: the state-controlled 
media and The Arab Spring; social media and The Arab Spring; Arab states regimes 
and the use of social media; sports media and public opinion; sport, human rights and 
politics; and the uprising and foreign influence.  
 
2.1 State-controlled media and The Arab Spring    
 The role of mainstream media during The Arab Spring has received little 
critical attention compared with the role of social media, although some scholars 
have examined the mainstream media modus operandi and how it is affected by the 
relationship between Arab regimes and the nation's media. Chiba Yushi (2012) 
points out that the Arab media have been dominated by its regimes. Tourya 
Guaaybess (2013) notes this relationship, pointing out the importance of analysing 
the coverage of Arab media during The Arab Spring. Djankov et al. (2003) argue that 
countries with state-controlled media are more likely to have less freedom and fewer 
rights for its citizens. As Carlos Lauria (2012) points out in his article titled "State-
Owned Media and the Public Interest", state-owned media outlets are not just 
controlled, but also manipulated by regimes in order to impose their own agendas on 
the public. In this way, Lauria contends, the media end up serving the interests of the 
regimes instead of the public.  
 The uprisings that swept the Arab World have highlighted the role that 
mainstream media can play. Simon Cottle’s (2011) paper written at the beginning of 
The Arab Spring assumed that studying the modus operandi of mass media would 
elucidate the causes for The Arab Spring (p. 650). He offers ten different ways in 
which media and communications networks were involved in The Arab Spring and 
makes some suggestions about how these might be more closely examined. These 
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suggestions include the need to consider the absence of critical media in The Arab 
Spring countries (p. 650), through study of the increasingly complex relationship 
between mainstream media and social media (p. 651), by examination of the use of 
social media to censor and suppress oppositions (p. 653), and by considering how 
social media was used by activists in other countries in similar circumstances (p. 
654). Cottle's essay highlights the complicated relationship between mass media and 
social media and how this relationship contributed in the demonstrations.  
 Omair Anas (2012) suggests that state control of media in the Arab World is 
coming to an end because of the proliferations of satellite channels, industry 
competition, and the proliferation of social media and new communication 
technologies that have helped the emergence of citizen journalism. While Anas cites 
the amendments of the press laws in Gulf State countries as an effort by the regimes 
to engage with media rather than control it, he raises concerns about the future of 
media in the Gulf States countries (where most of what he calls "critical media" are 
based) as the "Arab Spring has not yet touched the political climate" (p. 43).  
 The study by Khalil Rinnawi (2012) explored the use of dominant television 
channels and its impact on the Arab society during The Arab Spring and focused on 
the role of the Al Jazeera channel during the Egyptian uprising. As an Arab native 
speaker, Rinnawi had a full understanding of the language and the social and cultural 
contexts of the situation in Egypt. His article "Cyber Uprising: Al-Jazeera TV 
Channel and the Egyptian Uprising" covers the main evening newscasts in the 
channel and other programmes related to the Egyptian uprising from January 25 to 
February 11, 2011. Following analysis of the narrative and visual features of the 
selected samples, Rinnawi argues that Al Jazeera played a crucial role in 
overthrowing Hosni Mubarak's regime. He points out that Al Jazeera deliberately 
directed in one way or another the protesters toward toppling the former Egyptian 
regime.  
 Studies completed prior to The Arab Spring, particularly those that discuss 
Bahrain's neighbours Egypt (Amin 2009), Jordan (Abu Arja 2000) and Morroco 
(Arab Center for the Development and the Rule of Law and Integrity 2009) indicate 
that the mainstream media in these three countries are controlled by the state through 
a range of different mechanisms including legislation, state ownership of major 
shares in media outlets and publishing houses, and the political appointment of 
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editors-in-chief.  Hussein Amin in his Report on the State Media in Egypt (2009) 
points out that prior to the 2011 uprising in Egypt, the nation's regime had a 
stranglehold on communication lines to the Egyptian people through the national 
mainstream media of radio, television and newspapers. It was this media 
exploitation, Amin argues, that allowed the former Egyptian regime to mobilize 
public support for the regime's political agenda (pp. 6-7). While Amin acknowledges 
that anti-regime media enjoyed some freedom prior to 2011, he also points out that 
the mainstream state-controlled media were successful in distracting the public's 
attention to marginal topics and away from significant political or social issues (pp. 
9-10). Amin ends his report with a number of recommendations for a free media in 
Egypt including eliminating state control of media and reducing censorship on the 
Internet.   
 Amin's recommendations may be usefully applied to nations like Jordan 
where the government's intervention is even more pronounced than it was in Egypt. 
Tayseer Abu Arja (2000) discusses the way in which the regime in Jordan has 
enforced its own agenda on the local print media (pp. 58-60). When their licenses 
were revoked in 1967, the local newspapers were forced to merge into two major 
newspapers that were partially owned by quasi-governmental companies (pp. 65-66). 
This, according to Abu Arja, granted the regime in Jordan the opportunity to control 
the local newspapers. Some ensuing changes to the Jordanian press law in the 1980s 
and the 1990s guaranteed greater freedom to new newspapers, however, according to 
Abu Arja the regime maintained its control of the print media.   
 The Report on the State Media of Morocco (Arab Center for the Development 
and the Rule of Law and Integrity 2009) highlights the importance of developing 
legislations to protect freedom of the media and to improve the media modus 
operandi by fostering the relationship between journalists and media outlets by 
modifying working conditions of journalists, and by improving their training 
programmes. State-controlled media, therefore, has been exploited by the Arab States 
regimes to impose the state agenda on the people and to direct them toward marginal 
issues. It is worth noting that the Arab Center for the Development and the Rule of 
Law and Integrity ACRLI sponsored both the Egyptian and Moroccan media reports 
discussed above, but while the author of the Egyptian report was acknowledged by 
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name, the Moroccan report was issued without an author's name which may indicate 
the author's fear of being targeted for repercussions.  
 Despite the development of new technologies, the media's role as a 
mouthpiece for the Gulf State regimes has not significantly changed. Marwan M. 
Kraidy (2013) points out that the Saudi regime understands the important role that 
media plays as a "key instrument to hold on to power". Muhammad I. Ayish (2013) 
believes that the media in the United Arab Emirates has contributed to an economic 
and social shift. However, he argues that media in this country still represents the 
regime's views both locally and internationally (p. 14). Matt J. Duffy (2013) 
disagrees with Ayish's point of view and argues that the lack of free media in the 
Gulf States has exacerbated social, economic and political problems. Duffy argues 
that media is overlooking essential economic and political issues and points out that 
with independent media, issues such as corruption, discrimination and a lack of jobs 
are more likely to be addressed and redressed (p. 8). Duffy believes that freeing mass 
media would help Arab countries solve economic and social problems as the people's 
voice would be part of social movement.   
 To date there are a very few studies that examine the situation of mainstream 
media, including journalism, in Bahrain. Two in-depth studies of print media in 
Bahrain have focused on the nation's history of journalism since the early 20
th
 
century and both were conducted in the 1980s. The first looked at the rise of print 
media in Bahrain through a larger study by Ezzat A. Ezzat (1983). The Press in the 
Arabic Gulf States and the other was the book by Helal Al-Shaiji (1989) The Press in 
Kuwait and Bahrain From its Inception to the Era of Independence. Both studies 
discuss the technical and legal obstacles for newspapers and magazines that were 
considered the mother of the modern press in Bahrain. However, the studies paid 
little attention to the adversarial relationship between pro-opposition journalism and 
the Bahraini authorities, or to the development of laws that would control the print 
media. Neither Ezzat, nor Al-Shaiji clearly explained the factors that led to the shut-
down of opposition newspapers in the 1940s and 1950s. Ezzat claimed that most 
newspapers in the Gulf States were partially financed by the regimes, including 
newspapers that were considered anti-regime, but she provided no empirical 
evidence to support this claim (pp. 92-94).  
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 In his book Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab 
Politics, William A. Rugh (2004) describes newspapers in Bahrain as "loyalist press" 
(p. 59). Rugh argues that while newspapers in Bahrain are privately owned, they are 
loyal and supportive of the regime. Despite the multiplicity of newspapers in 
Bahrain, Rugh points out that the content is exceedingly similar (p. 66). While there 
is a focus on the role of political media, this present thesis fills the gap about the 
political role of sports media particularly during the protests that swept the Arab 
countries.   
 
2.2 Social media and The Arab Spring  
 Recent scholarly debates have focused on the increasingly political role of 
social media during The Arab Spring as these new non-mainstream platforms have 
become a public sphere in their own right and are at least partially out of the regimes' 
control. While social media are generally seen to have had an impact on mobilizing 
the masses during the unrests, researchers differ in their assessment of the level of 
this influence. Some argue that social media played a significant role (Storck 2011; 
Faris 2012; Breuer et al. 2015), while others argue that its influence is overstated 
(Wolfsfeld et al. 2012; Campbell and Hawk 2012; Aday et al. 2012). 
 In her dissertation, The Role of Social Media in Political Mobilization (2011), 
Madeline Storck focused on the 2011 uprising in Egypt as a case study to examine 
how social media was used to organize and mobilize political protests. She focused 
on three identifiable trends in the use of social media: as an organizational tool, as a 
road to citizen journalism and as a means to generate awareness of the uprising 
locally and internationally. While Storck acknowledges that the protests that brought 
down the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak had actually been ongoing for 
years (p. 19), she does not explain in detail the factors such as poverty and the 
absence of social justice that facilitated the rise of people's anger against the regime 
before the 2011 uprising. David M. Faris (2012) argues that social media 
significantly facilitated the organization of protests against the regimes in Egypt and 
Tunisia. Although Faris notes that there was less internet censorship in Egypt than in 
Tunisia, he argues that social media and blogs raised the awareness of democratic 
and human rights in both societies as well as paving the way for the uprising because 
it was used to share political aspirations and organize the oppositional activities.  
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 Faris points out that the impact of social media on the uprisings was due to 
the work of pioneering digital activists over several years (2012, p. 6). On the other 
hand, Wolfsfeld et al. (2012) insist that social media was not the cause of the protests 
that spread across the Arab World in 2011. They point out that there were other 
principles related to collective action that should be taken into account and suggest 
that the political environment in which social media operate and the increased use of 
social media is more likely to be a reflection of the increase of opposition activities 
than to precede them. Similarly, Campbell and Hawk (2012) argue that the role of 
social media during the uprising in Egypt was exaggerated. In their analysis of the Al 
Jazeera Arabic channel coverage of the Tahrir Square protest in the three week 
period between January, 25 and February 18, 2011, they found that the role of the 
social media was not only simply described as a facilitator element, but was 
represented as "the advent of an Internet revolution". Aday et al. (2012) suggest that 
social media did not play a major role in collective action or regional diffusion 
during The Arab Spring (p. 3). Instead, they argue that social media was used as a 
tool to spread information to the international community more than it was used to 
communicate locally inside the region which made it less important to the actual 
protest. However, Cottle’s (2011) study indicates that social media alongside online 
bloggers and mobile telephony played an important role in bypassing state-controlled 
media (p. 648). 
 Counter to the point of view that plays down the role of social media during 
The Arab Spring, an article by Breuer et al. (2015) argue that social media was an 
important resource for mass mobilizations against the rule of Zine El-Abidine Ben 
Ali in Tunisia. Based on "background talks" with 16 Tunisian digital activists and a 
survey of 437 Tunisian internet users conducted in early 2012, the article argues that 
social media activities allowed a "digital elite" to break the national media blackout, 
provided a medium for protesting groups, enhanced the sensation of the success of 
the revolution and provided "emotional mobilization" by showing the regime's 
violent crackdown against the protesters. The use of social media was also a case 
study for Henk Huijser and Janine Little (2012) who compared the approaches to the 
use of social media in the different political contexts of Australia and Bahrain. 
  Huijser and Little point out that while social media facilitated the mass 
political mobilization in The Arab Spring countries, the use of social media for 
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political purposes is reduced to "special interest groups", or political campaigns in 
Australia. Huijser and Little point out that while social media play a significant role 
in the political life in Bahrain, it is diminished to limited political events in Australia. 
The significant role of social media has led to it being exploited by regimes in order 
to confront the democratic demands of the people.  
 
2.3 The regime's use of social media 
 There is a growing concern that social media is used by regimes to control 
citizens. For instance, in an interview with Russia Today (2011) WikiLeaks founder 
Julian Assange argues that social media and Facebook in particular is "the most 
appalling spying machine that has ever been invented". Assange points out that 
Facebook and other social media are "the world's most comprehensive database 
about people, their relationships, their names, their addresses, their locations and the 
communications". Studies have found that users of social network sites like 
Facebook are aware of the potential risk of their private data being tracked and used 
by strangers. For instance, David J. Houghton and Adam N. Joinson’s (2011) study 
found that users are conscious of the privacy issues even as they share information 
with friends. Similarly, Alyson Leigh Young and Anabel Quan-Haase’s (2013) study 
based on surveys and in-depth interviews with university students in Canada, found 
that the majority of participants took some steps to protect their personal information. 
These two studies emphasize findings of an earlier study by Hoadleya et al. (2010) 
which found that the news-feed or mini feed established by Facebook management in 
2006, actually facilitated access to users' information by others. The risk of private 
information being violated by other parties during using the Internet was addressed 
early. Herman T. Tavani's (1999) articles titled "Informational privacy, data mining, 
and the internet" discussed issues related to user's private information and monitoring 
of users' activities on the Internet. Tavani pointed out early that the Internet was 
considered to be at the time a surveillance medium.  
 Recently, scholars have studied how social media has been used by both 
oppositions and regimes during political uprisings. However, there are only a small 
number of studies that have investigated the use of social media to suppress the 
uprising in the Middle East and North Africa region by the regimes themselves. For 
instance, Alex Comninos (2011) study during the first wave of the Arab Spring 
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uprisings, draws attention to the way that governments quickly filtered online content 
or blocked Internet access. Comninos' reports on how governments and their 
intelligence agencies used social media to identify and locate protesters. Comninos 
explains that activists in Sudan were duped and then arrested by intelligence through 
a fake protesting event that was organized by agents employed by the government (p. 
10). He also discusses how in Tunisia, the regime hacked citizen's social media 
accounts, while in Egypt Hosni Mubarak's regime shut down the Internet for three 
nights to prevent protesters from contacting each other. Comninos argues that the use 
of mobile technologies and social media actually enhances surveillance capabilities 
where there is a link between the mobile operator and the regime (p. 12). In a similar 
vein, Ian Gallagher (2011) claims that the Egyptian police tracked down activists 
through Facebook and Twitter by identifying their names (p. 11). Christopher 
Soghoian, the privacy researcher, suggests in an interview with The Wall Street 
Journal, that Internet users could be stalked or subjected to torture or arrest as a 
result of their data being disclosed by governments (Angwin 2011).  
 In Bahrain, the use of social media to crack down on the uprising was even 
more explicit and effective. According to the documentary Shouting in The Dark by 
May Ying Welsh (2011), Bahraini pro-regime activists used Facebook, among other 
social media platforms to identify and penalize protesters. For instance, Facebook 
pages were created to post images and the personal information about protesters. The 
information was then used by the regime and other ministries to arrest or penalize 
anti-regime protesters. The article of Marc Owen Jones (2012) is significant to an 
understanding about how social media was used to crackdown opponents in Bahrain. 
The article addresses the negative use of social media during the 2011 uprising. 
Jones, whose PhD research project is on the history of suppression and social control 
in Bahrain, points out that social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook were 
used by the Bahraini regime and its supporters as a means of surveillance, censorship 
and propaganda.  
 Jones interviewed online activists from February 2011 to December 2011 and 
found that social media was used to crackdown on anti-regime protesters by trolling, 
naming and shaming, passive observation, intelligence gathering and offline factors. 
Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook (2012) note, also, that the Bahraini authorities have 
employed trolls to attack websites users who criticize the regime. This shows how 
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social media can be used as a double edged sword. While it is a means to overcome 
state-controlled media, it is also taken advantage of by regimes. 
 The way that government's track Internet use and violate the privacy of 
individual users in the name of circumventing potential terrorist acts has raised the 
concern of human rights organizations as they question the methods used to monitor 
and exchange the personal information of individuals. While agreeing that regimes 
have the right to protect their citizens, they insist that protecting the public interest 
should not be at the expense of an individual's privacy. For instance, the Australian 
Human Rights Law Resources Centre's (2010) policy paper addresses the steps that 
should be taken by the Australian government to protect the public's interests. It 
recommends that security monitor laws should be reviewed to ensure that they are 
precise and proportionate to the security threat as well as provide appropriate 
safeguards against abuse. The report insists that civil society organizations play an 
important role in monitoring governments. However, but such organizations are not 
allowed in autocratic countries.  
 The regimes in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have been accused of unregulated 
tracking of Internet users. Reports show that the regime in Bahrain has been using 
software to spy on dissenters and to collect personal information. Media reports 
indicate that private European companies from England and Germany have helped 
the Bahraini regime to violate personal privacy of dissenters (Perlroth 2012; Bahrain 
Watch 2012a; Doward 2013; Clark 2014). These allegations have never been 
discussed openly in the national media of Bahrain although this invasion of privacy 
breaches Article 26 of the Bahrain constitution that guarantees the secrecy of postal, 
telegraphic, telephonic, and electronic communications. 
 
2.4 Sports media and public opinion 
 Sports media is, in the context of manipulation of citizens by dominant 
political entities, a particularly useful subset of mainstream media for distracting the 
public. Toby Miller (2010) points out that live sport is essential to television since 
the early coverage of competitions in the 1930s. Miller indicates that "sport is an 
intensely emotional program-type, but without recourse to close-ups or personal 
verbalization in quite the same way as drama" (p. 94). John Sugden and Alan 
Tomlinson (2007) argue that sports media is not immune to being manipulated to 
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serve the elites who control sport activities in their sphere of influence. Sugden and 
Tomlinson point out that the focus on sport stars and the celebration of sport events 
overlooks the economic and political context in which the sport occurs, and that this 
can be advantageous to those who would manipulate public opinions (pp. 58-59). 
The impact of sports media on its audience is a relatively overlooked topic. One case 
study of the impact of sports media on implicit racial stereotypes is offered by 
Matthew J. Kobach and Robert F. Potter (2013) who explored the connection 
between mediated sports programming and implicit racial stereotypes in the U.S. 
They compared the media portrayal of the achievements of black athletes as "natural" 
to those of white athletes, whose success is more likely to be reported as the result of 
"hard work and intelligence" (p. 1414). This reporting has an influence on the public 
perception of both groups. Kobach and Potter claim that the more a person views 
sports programmes in an average week, the stronger their belief in the stereotypes of 
black athletes as "natural" athletes and white athletes as "clever" athletes becomes (p. 
1422).  
 Similarly, Nereshnee Govender (2010) examined how print media influences 
the public perception of women in sport in her analysis of the South African 
newspaper The Independent on Saturday. Govender analysed the media framing of 
women in the choice of words and visual imagery in sports news reports, finding that 
sport women are regularly infantilized and portrayed in emotional terms. Govender 
concludes that print media lacks objectivity and that this has a potent impact on 
women's socialization into sport (p. 128). According to David Rowe (2003), the 
perception of sports journalism has changed in recent decades from being 
entertainment-oriented to having a social responsibility. Rowe discusses the 
professionalism of sports journalism as it moved beyond the cliché that was the "toy 
department" of the mainstream news media.  
 Rowe explored the other roles for sport journalism, such as engaging in 
investigation, analysis and criticism. He concludes that sports journalism should not 
be excluded from professional standards for media and journalism more broadly, as it 
operates in very similar ways to political, business and economic media departments. 
For Rowe, the main question is not whether sports journalism is the toy department 
but whether sports media editors and journalists are "content to operate within the 
self-imposed and isolating limits that leave it continually open to professional 
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challenge and even contempt" (p. 401). This points to the responsibility of sports 
media practitioners.   
 Mahmood Abo Drees' (2004) master's dissertation is one of a few studies that 
examined sports media in Bahrain. This study of sport departments in Akhbar Al-
Khaleej and Al-Ayam, the only newspapers existed at that time. The study focused on 
the technical and professional obstacles that faced sports newspapers in the period 
between 1997 and 2001. However, the study overlooked the regime's manipulation 
of sports media. Another study of Saudi Arabia sports newspapers indicates that over 
than 26% of the sport columnists are not expert in sports and 63% of them have 
never engaged with sport before practising journalism (Al-Ghiamah 2014). This 
study analysed columns in four popular newspapers for 35 days, finding that less 
than 30% of the columns addressed local sport issues in an objective manner, while 
about 70% used emotional discourse. The findings suggest that sports media is being 
used to manipulate the audience. 
 The shifting perception of sports media raises questions about the use and 
impact of sports media as a political tool during The Arab Spring. Khir Eldeen Awis 
and Atta Hassan Abdulrahim (1998) addressed the potential for political impact of 
sports media in one of the few Arabic studies that discuss the relationship between 
sports media and its audiences. They focused on sports media in Egypt over two 
decades prior The Arab Spring and the advent of social media. Similar to Rowe 
(2003), they argue that sports media is not just for entertainment as it is capable of 
affecting or directing public thoughts and attitudes (1998, pp. 51-52). They found 
that sports media has a significant impact on audience's opinions and their capacity 
to assess information. In other words, the psychological influence of sports media is 
evident as it presents ideas as objective "truth". However, Awis and Abdulrahim did 
not precisely define what this "truth" might be. 
 
2.5 Sport, human rights and politics  
The uprising in Bahrain has provoked debate about the relationship between 
sport and human rights on the one hand, and politics on the other. Following the 
crackdown and then the Bahraini insistence on hosting the Grand Prix in 2012,   
opinion columns and politicians alike have asked the question, should sport mix with 
human rights or politics? Laurie Whitwell (2013) argues that sport has been used for 
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political and nation-building purposes, since the establishment of the Olympic 
Games in ancient Greece. Whitwell argues that the impact of politics on sport should 
not be denied. On the other hand, it is common practice for sports officials to insist 
on the separation of sport and politics. Bernie Ecclestone, the president and CEO of 
Formula One Management and Formula One Administration, made public statements 
rejecting the politicization of his sport, insisting that Formula One did not implicitly 
support or influence the on the national politics of the hosting country (Yoon 2012). 
Michel Platini, the former French football player and the current President of the 
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) also argues that football should be 
distanced from politics (Rainbow 2013).  
Scholars have discussed the consequences of the involvement of politics in 
sport (Tomlinson and Young 2006; Dousti et al. 2013; Bravo and Silva 2014; Merkel 
2014). Historically, sport has regularly been exploited for the benefit of political 
regimes. For instance, Miller (2010) points out that sport was part and parcel of the 
German Nazi regime's television propaganda (p. 94). Also, Alan Tomlinson and 
Christopher Young (2006, p. 141) examined how sporting success was considered 
because of administrative prowess of the military regime in Argentina, where, 
according to Bravo and Silva (2014, pp. 130-131) achievements in sport were 
explicitly paralleled to the war in Chile. Similarly, Dousti et al. (2013) argue that 
until 1979 in Iran, during Pahlavi’s regime, sport reflected the dynastic ideology. 
They claim that the Iranian government and politicians are still involved in sport to 
achieve a wide variety of their political and cultural objectives through this 
connection (p. 165).  
The relationship between sport and national identity has also been widely 
discussed. Udo Merkel (2014) examined the multidimensional relationship between 
sport and national identity in the divided Korean Peninsula. Merkel analysed the 
North Korean regime's identity management and discourses in three different 
contexts: the daily life in the capital Pyongyang, the local sports events, and 
international sports events. Merkel found that sport can enhance the harmony, the 
unity and the celebration of a common cultural denominator between the people of 
two countries which are otherwise at conflict (in this case, North and South Korea) 
(p. 386). Merkel points to the example of the North Korean athletes who credited 
their sporting success in the 2012 London Olympic Games to the love, support and 
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inspiration of their leader Kim Jong-un, and his father and grandfather (pp. 386-387). 
Similarly, athletes and sports figures in Bahrain regularly credit their sporting 
success to the "wise leadership" of the Al-Khalifa regime (Al-Bilad 2012; Akhbar Al-
Khaleej 2012; Al-Watan 2013a and Bahrain News Agency 2014b).  
A number of scholars have discussed the specific sport of football (soccer) 
and politics, arguing that football stadiums are effectively a political forum. Dag 
Tuastad (2014) examined the capacity of football to make an impact on the political 
situation in Egypt and Jordan. Tuastad notes that the main protests in Egypt's Tahrir 
Square in 2011 against the rule of then the president Hosni Mubarak were organized 
by Al-Ahli Club ultras who are a group of loyal football supporters (p. 378). Tuastad 
points out that tens of thousands members of the Al-Ahli ultras played a fundamental 
role in the success of the revolution. In Jordan, Tuastad indicates that football is an 
arena for breaking political taboos such as criticizing the king. He cites football 
matches where Jordanian club supporters chanted political slogans and raised public 
debate about the limits of the king’s powers (pp. 383). In the Egyptian case, Tuastad 
assumes that the protesters represented their sport identity, while it could be argued 
that they participated in protests as Egyptian citizens rather than as football 
supporters. However, Matthew Guschwan (2014) extends Tuastad's argument about 
the political role of football by arguing that the public forum offered by football 
stadiums is a vital political space. Guschwan points out that football is inextricably 
entangled with everyday Italian social and political life, and that stadiums in Italy are 
a space for political expression. Nevertheless, Guschwan acknowledges that there are 
limitations to the stadiums as a political forum because they are not designed for 
group discussion. Therefore, the term "political expression" can only refer to banners 
or "vulgar" chants (pp. 893-894). 
While the scholars referred to above focused on different roles of sport in 
politics, other scholars have explored the link between sport and diplomacy. For 
example, Steven J. Jackson and Stephan Haigh (2008) examined the relationship 
between sport and foreign policy, pointing out that sport plays a strategic role in 
international relationships. They also note that sport has become an important aspect 
of global tourism and what they called the "branding" of cities and nations (p. 335). 
Arguing that the relationship between diplomacy and sport is still relatively under-
theorized, Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Allen Pigman (2014) agree that regimes use 
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international sport events as instruments of diplomacy. They go further to argue that 
sport plays a significant role in diplomatic missions because of the opportunities for 
communication and negotiation that take place during international sport events (p. 
1098). Murry and Pigman argue that understanding the relationship between 
diplomacy and international sport will not only help governments use sport for 
diplomacy more efficiently, but it will also be a significant factor in understanding the 
impact of sport on society (p. 1115).  
In his article "When the Arab World Was Mobilized Around the FIFA 2006 
World Cup" (2007) Mahfoud Amara discusses the elites' agenda to keep their citizens 
locked to their broadcasting domain and market share. Amara argues that the regimes 
sought to slow down the establishment of new television channels that threatened 
their interest. Amara examined the public's reaction to the Arab Radio and Television 
Network (ART) exclusive rights to broadcast the 2006 World Cup Finals in North 
Africa and the Middle East. Amara noted the mass focus by people, media, political 
parties and Arab governments on World Cup while the Arab nations were going into 
a period of social, economic and political crises. This indicated, according to Amara, 
the use of sport and sports media by Arab states to impose regimes' agenda on public 
opinion (pp. 420-421). The argument about using sports media as a political means 
and as a tool of distraction can be linked to the present thesis as it indicates the role 
that sports media plays in politics where the status quo exploit media to mobilize 
public opinion toward their private agenda.  
 
2.6 The 2011 uprising and foreign influences   
Fuad I. El-Khury's Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transition of Social and 
Political Authority in an Arab State (1983) is one of few books that examine Bahrain 
under the rule of Al-Khalifa family. The book explores the transformation of the Al-
Khalifa family from a tribe to a "modern state". Aiming to understand the social and 
political situation in Bahrain, El-Khury explores the relationship between Al-Khalifa 
members and the conflicts between them about resources, the relationship between 
the Al-Khalifa family and other tribes in Bahrain and the relationship between the 
ruling family and the opposition and the people. El-Khury examined the political, 
social and economic shifts of Bahrain from the 18th Century to the 20th century. He 
discusses the causes of the previous unrests in Bahrain such as the pearl divers' 
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movement in 1932, civil unrest in 1934, 1935 and 1938, and the Bahrain Petroleum 
Company (Bapco) unrest in 1942, 1948 and 1965. El-Khury indicated that the 
sequential unrests in Bahrain called for political, judicature and economic reforms 
(pp. 320-323). Despite the importance of the study to researchers who aim to 
examine the history of Bahrain, there is a concern about the book. El-Khury 
acknowledges that he was provided logistical assistance from Al-Khalifa family's 
members to write it (p. 7).  
There are as yet relatively few scholarly publications that examine the protest 
movement, the political context, or the role of mainstream social media and its 
impact in Bahrain. Alfred Stepan et al. (2014) study the uprising in Bahrain and other 
uprisings by offering a three-part ideal-type typology to distinguish between "ruling 
monarchy", "constitutional monarchy" and what they called "democratic 
parliamentary monarchy". The aim of their article is to help researchers who focus on 
boundary changes between different types of monarchies. They point out that the 
rulers in Bahrain, sectarian factors and the royal family's allies, all combined to 
thwart the transfer to democratic parliamentary monarchy (p. 47). The study of the 
Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad by Tooba Khurshid (2011) draws attention to 
the sectarian reasons for the uprising in Bahrain and Syria. Khurshid argues that 
there were strong economic and social circumstances that led Bahraini and Syrian 
people to protest against their rulers, noting that in Bahrain specifically freedom of 
expression is restricted and private print media are constrained by the 2002 press law 
(p. 45).   
Miriam Joyce's recent book, Bahrain from the Twentieth Century to the Arab 
Spring (2012), is one of the few studies to explain the reason behind the unrest by 
reviewing the historical context of the regime in Bahrain, including the British 
colonization and the influence of the United States. She discusses the relationship 
between the regime and people of Bahrain by focusing on the political reasons for 
demonstrations that have occurred since the 1970s. What is missing from this study, 
however, is a consideration of the influence of media in Bahrain or, in particular, a 
closer understanding of the contribution of sports media to the current political 
events.  
On the other hand, a number of scholars have discussed the Saudi's 
intervention in the Bahraini uprising, and America's role and its fear of a democratic 
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regime that may conflict with its interest in the Persian Gulf. For instance, the Saudi-
born social anthropology scholar Madawi Al-Rasheed (2001), argues that the other 
scholars often ignore sectarian strategies used by the House of Saud as a counter-
revolution to create a rift between the Sunni majority and the Shiite minority in Saudi 
Arabia. This strategy was also used, according to Al-Rasheed, by the Saudi regime to 
halt to the democratic movement in Bahrain. However, following the publication of 
Al-Rasheed's article, more commentators have noticed the sectarian factor in the 
Saudi intervention. Brandon Friedman (2012) is one of the earliest scholars to point 
to the Gulf State's fear of the uprising in Bahrain while protesters were still going on 
the Bahraini streets. He believes that the regimes in the Persian Gulf responded to 
what they considered to be an Iranian attempt to exploit the uprising led by the 
majority Shiite in Bahrain. Similarly, Simon Mabon (2012) points out that the 
Bahrain uprising is a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. According to Mabon, 
the conflict between the Sunni ruler Al-Khalifa and the Shiite opposition in Bahrain 
epitomizes the tussle between the Sunni regime in Saudi Arabia and the Shiite 
regime in Iran. Besides this sectarian factor, Mabon claims that Bahrain is considered 
to be of paramount importance because its geostrategic significance in the Persian 
Gulf (p. 95).  
 Other studies have pointed to the strong relationship between the rulers in 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and the influence of this relationship on the uprising. 
Mohammed Nuruzzaman (2013) argues that the Saudi's intervention was not only for 
political and strategic reasons, but also for economic reasons. Nuruzzaman, a lecturer 
in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, at the Gulf University for 
Science and Technology in Kuwait, goes beyond the political and economic reasons 
of the intervention to link it with interior Saudi religious reasons. Nuruzzaman points 
out that the Wahhabi would not allow the Bahraini Shiites to rule the country (p. 
376). Also, the author of Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to Arab 
Uprising, Frederic Wahrey (2013) notes that the regime in Bahrain and Saudi backed 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists to stand up against Shiite MPs in the 
parliament prior the 2011 uprising in Bahrain. 
 On the other hand, Stephen Zunes (2013), as a specialist in Middle Eastern 
politics, has identified three factors for the failure of the uprising in Bahrain: the 
ruthless crackdown on the street movement, the Saudi's intervention, and the U.S. 
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refusal to support the democratic movement. Zunes, who is known for his criticisms 
of the U.S foreign policy argues that, if successful, the uprising in Bahrain could 
have established a promising democratic state. Zunes believes this democracy would 
not necessarily have been anti-American (p. 162). Thomas Ambrosio's (2014) article 
"Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls: America as a Black Knight in the 
Uprising in Bahrain" discusses the hidden role of democratic states to effectively 
underpin autocratic regimes. Ambrosio draws attention to the U.S. government's 
diplomatic and political support for the Bahraini regime's crackdown of the uprising 
arguing that the U.S. patronized the Bahraini autocrat regime to protect its own 
interests (p. 5). 
 While scholars have linked the Saudi fear of the uprising in Bahrain with 
sectarian factors, Toby Matthiesen (2012) gives more depth to the discussion of the 
connection between the 2011-12 protests of the Eastern Saudi Province in Saudi 
Arabia with the uprising in Bahrain. He outlines the historical, family and religious 
ties between Saudi and Bahraini's Shiite populations. Matthiesen, a research fellow at 
University of Cambridge, argues that The Arab Spring and the demonstrations in 
Bahrain clearly contributed to the Saudi Shiite's movement or what he called the 
"Saudi Spring" (p. 629). While Matthiesen acknowledges the benefit of new media 
and its impact on the "Saudi Spring", he argues that personal networks such as 
religious' gatherings were more significant in facilitating the political protest 
movement in Saudi Arabia.    
 Amal Khalaf (2013) focuses on the local angle of the conflict, drawing 
attention to the symbol of Bahrain's Pearl Roundabout protest in terms of a "war of 
ideas" between the regime and the protesters. Khalaf examined the conflict between 
the reality that is controlled by the regime and the virtual reality represented by 
social media where protesters have a greater freedom. While the Bahraini regime 
strongly controls mainstream media, protesters bypass censorship to confront the 
official propaganda by using social media. In this context, the demolition of the pearl 
monument was considered by the regime as removing "a bad memory" (p. 273), 
whereas the flood of videos, images and 'baptizing' the logo of the Pearl Roundabout 
was the protesters' response. Khalaf calls for review of the relationship between "the 
image and the visual's conditions of the existence in the digital universe" (p. 279) as 
she points out that images have become an integral part of any political struggle. 
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Khalaf's article points to the tussle between regimes and protesters in the era of the 
Internet where cyberspace is less-controlled by the regimes. 
  In conclusion, this review of the literature highlights the role that mainstream 
media and, particularly, state-controlled media played during The Arab Uprising 
(Rinnawi 2012; Anas 2012). The review shows that state-controlled media is 
exploited for the benefit of regimes (Amin 2009; Guaaybess 2013). It also discussed 
the scholarly debate about the role of social media during The Arab Spring, whether 
it was significant, and how social media has become a battlefield between regimes 
and protesters (Storck 2011; Faris 2012; Wolfsfeld et al. 2012; Campbell and Hawk 
2012; Aday et al. 2012). The review also shows there was a research focus on the 
role of social media and political media during The Arab Spring, while the role of 
sports media particularly is overlooked during this era. Scholars argue that sports and 
sports media play several political roles (Tomlinson and Young 2006; Whitwell 
2013; Tuastad 2014) and they are not immune to manipulation and exploitation for 
political purposes.   
  Scholars and journalists have examined the political situation in Bahrain in 
light of the uprising, pointing out that Bahrain's allies have had a strong influence on 
the political process (Khurshid 2011; Joyce 2012). While Khalaf (2013) examines 
the uprising in Bahrain from a local angle as a conflict between the regime and the 
protesters in the virtual reality of the Internet, Al-Rasheed (2001), Mabon (2012) and 
Nuruzzaman (2013) focus more on the regional impact in the conflict that 
symbolizes the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While the argument 
about the foreign factors that have helped the Al-Khalifa family to confront the 
protesters is substantial, the ruling family has also employed local power elements 
such as sports media to maintain power. The reliance on sports media as a means to 
repel the political movement in Bahrain shows the significant importance of this type 
of media during social movements.   
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework and news framing  
 
 This chapter introduces Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s 
Propaganda Model (2008) as a theoretical framework. It discusses the five filters of 
the Propaganda Model (PM) and applies them to the Bahraini sports media context in 
order to examine the Bahraini media situation during the 2011 uprising. This chapter 
also discusses the use of news framing by the media and explains the techniques used 
in covering the protest. The chapter then examines the relationship between news 
framing and propaganda and language choice to understand how these techniques are 
employed to serve the elites' agenda.       
 
3.1 Theoretical framework  
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky's propaganda model (2008) was 
developed in the 1980s to explain how media institutions are structured to serve the 
political and economic interests of dominant elites. The five main elements of 
Herman and Chomsky's PM are "ownership" of media, "funding", "sourcing", "flak" 
and "ideology".  
The first filter in the PM is "ownership" of mass media. Herman and 
Chomsky (2008, p. 2) argue that mainstream media outlets are either conglomerates 
or corporations where media work for their proprietors' interests. Thus, the content 
that is broadcast to the public by media outlets may serve the proprietors' agenda. 
When the interests of shareholders of media outlets are compatible with politicians' 
interests, media content that imperils these shared interests could be subjected to 
censorship. This can result in the cover up of information that is in the public interest 
and can also grant corporations the power to shape the public agenda. 
In their critique of the PM, Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang (2004, p. 109) 
explain that the American media are not fully even-handed in their reporting on other 
countries, pointing out that neither the government nor any party in the United States 
fully controls the news. On the other hand, Sheldon Rampton (2007) argues that 
while propaganda remains alive in the Internet era, ownership works differently with 
social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or blogs. Rampton points out that 
media content is not as strongly controlled as it has previously been with mainstream 
media when the PM was introduces for the first time whereas Lang and Lang 
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indicate that there is no one party that controls the media and this invalidates the 
"ownership" filter in the PM. Nonetheless, in the Bahraini case, ownership and 
therefore control of media is clearly observable even in the Internet era. According to 
a report by Freedom House )2013a(, online content is censored under Bahrain's 
Press, Printing and Publishing Law 2002. For instance, the report indicates that since 
2010, the authorities have banned the BlackBerry news bulletin service and blocked 
more than 1,000 pro-opposition online forums and news websites.   
Indicating just how much the Al-Khalifa family controls the mass media, all 
television and radio channels in Bahrain are owned and directed by the regime. 
Additionally, the Press, Printing and Publishing Law 2002 grants the Ministry of 
Information (now known as Information Affairs Authority) the right to reject licenses 
for press houses and newspapers. Rejected press license applicants have the right to 
appeal in the High Civil Court; however, the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) 
that represents the regime retains the power to grant a printing license or reject an 
application even at higher level. The Bahraini authority's moves to control the media 
have drawn criticism from human rights organizations such as Article19 that accused 
the regime of not only controlling media but also systematically attacking activists 
and dissidents. In a 2011 report, Article19 describes how until 2002 Bahrain had only 
two newspapers that were controlled by the Ministry of Information and the 
establishment of Al-Wasat allowed the opposition to run the first independent 
newspaper in the country. Despite allowing for a potentially pro-opposition 
newspaper, independent media and journalists in Bahrain are, according to Article19, 
persistently vilified in the official media as traitors with the accusation that they are 
"receiving funds and instructions from foreign powers" (Article19 2011).    
Article19 notes that the regime has restricted television broadcasting from 
abroad. For instance, the Bahraini channel LuaLua TV that airs from London was 
repeatedly denied permission to broadcast in Bahrain and its satellite was jammed 
within four hours of the launch the channel on July 17, 2011. The channel website 
where viewers could stream the programmes online, was also blocked within Bahrain 
(Beyer 2013). Similarly, film production is also closely monitored by the authorities 
and films cannot be produced without a license.  
As the Press, Printing and Publishing Law of 2002 notes:  
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No movie, reference to a movie or commercial ad shall be displayed 
on a cinematic poster at cinemas unless a license is obtained from the 
cinematic movies and recorded publications control committee 
pointed to in the following article. Recorded publications shall not be 
circulated either before a written permission is obtained from the 
directorate beforehand. The directorate can place the recorded 
publication before the afore-mentioned committee before licensing its 
circulation. (Article 23 of the Press, Printing and Publishing Law 
2002) 
It is clear that the authorities in Bahrain have well established systems in place to 
control or monitor the mainstream media, the Internet and film production which 
allow the authorities to own the media outlets in Bahrain, or control the content.   
The Propaganda Model's second filter "funding" stems from the reliance of 
media on advertising licenses. Media rely on advertising revenue to cover the costs 
of their production. Hence, the news eventually becomes a commodity to serve the 
advertiser. As advertisers target their goods and services to specific consumers, they 
are inclined to advertise during television programs that are compatible with their 
own commercial interests. Herman and Chomsky argue that corporations will rarely 
sponsor programs that are critical of commercial activities that impact on problems 
of environmental degradation, the working of military-industrial complexes, or 
corporate support of Third World authoritarian states (2008, pp. 13-15). As 
mainstream media serve their advertisers' interests, these may conflict with the public 
interest. 
In an interview with Andrew Mullen in 2010, Herman and Chomsky argued 
that the impact of advertising was an even more important force in 2008 than it was 
in 1988 because of the increased competition among traditional media outlets on the 
one hand and between media outlets and the Internet on the other hand. In his review 
of the PM, Joan Pedro (2011) points out that the influence of advertisers may occur 
directly and indirectly. "Media content must conform as much as possible to what 
sponsors are looking for in an outlet to advertise their products" (p. 1881). Statistics 
released by The Arab Media Outlook in 2013 show that more than 65% of Arab print 
media revenue, including newspapers in Bahrain, rely on advertising. The report 
shows that less than 35% of the revenue comes from newspaper circulation (p. 32). 
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Another report shows that the 2012 advertising market in the Gulf States countries 
reached about 5 billion US dollars. The two biggest markets were the United Arab 
Emirates and Saudi Arabia with USD1.5 billion and USD1.42 billion respectively, 
whereas the market in Bahrain reached about USD90 million, including over USD16 
million governmental or semi-government advertising (Salman 2013). These 
statistics show that the Bahraini regime directly controls about 20% of the 
advertising market. They also show that the newspapers in Bahrain take about 70% 
of the total advertising market compared with other media outlets.    
According to Abdullatif Hamza (1960), Salama Mossa (1963) and Awatif 
Abdulrahman (2002) the reliance of Arab media on advertising has led to situation 
where journalists are bribed and the media outlets that are considered pro-opposition 
are penalized by the autocrat regimes. According to Freedom House and Article19, 
media outlets in Bahrain therefore engage in self-censorship to avoid being framed 
by the official media as being anti-regime. Freedom House (2013b) online report 
explains that this self-censorship is a deliberate strategy "to avoid offending 
advertisers that do not want their businesses associated with critical reporting".  
The third filter of the PM is "sourcing" as "the mass media are drawn into a 
symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity 
and reciprocity of interest" (Herman and Chomsky 2008, p. 17). According to 
Herman and Chomsky, mass media outlets have demanding news schedules that 
need to be met. However, in the 1980s media outlets could only afford reporters at 
significant events or where press conferences were held, such as at the White House 
and the Pentagon. Regular news bulletins from these sources filled the news demands 
which led to growing dependence by the media on the official line.  
Another reason for the dependence of media outlets on "official" sources was 
to avoid criticism of being biased or to protect themselves from the threat of libel 
suits. In this way, according to Herman and Chomsky, mass media outlets needed 
material that could be portrayed as being presumptively accurate to maintain the 
image of impartiality (p. 18). Of course, media outlets may also be manipulated into 
following the agenda of "powerful sources" (pp. 22-23). Problematising sourcing as a 
filter, Rampton (2007) argues that in the Internet era there are an increasing number 
of sources other than the "official" line. Rampton gives, as an example, the 
controversial first photograph of flag-draped coffins of American soldiers returning 
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from the recent Iraq war that was taken by a cargo worker in Kuwait. The picture 
was published in the Seattle Times, despite an official sanction against images of 
coffins that would remind the American public of the cost of war. Even more 
challenging to the official sourcing of news, the recent Abu Ghraib photos of 
prisoners were taken by the abusers themselves before being reproduced by news 
media in the public domain. While Rampton believes that the sourcing filter of the 
PM should be reconsidered, he does acknowledge that Tami Silicio, the cargo worker 
in Kuwait, was sacked from her job as a result of the pictures. Thus, although official 
sources may not have the same stranglehold on the news as they did before the 
Internet era, the dominant elites still have power to influence the media content.  
While Rampton considers the control of the source of news as a slightly 
outmoded filter for the Propaganda Model for the USA, this control continues to be 
strong in the Bahraini context. Newspapers continue to receive daily news updates 
from the Royal Court, the Crown Prince's Court, the Prime Minister's Court and 
other ministries. In an unwritten understanding, newspapers in Bahrain are not 
allowed to publish any other news related to the King, the Crown Prince or the Prime 
Minister without permission. During the uprising in 2011, sports news was also 
expected to follow the official line and they did so by publishing official sport news 
about the involvement of many sports figures and athletes in the uprising.  
The fourth filter of the PM is "flak", which involves the negative responses to 
media reporting on television or radio programs. Flak may occur directly or 
indirectly and may take the form of complaints, threats, lawsuits, and penalties.  
According to Herman and Chomsky (2008, p. 24), flak increases "in close parallel 
with business's growing resentment of media criticism and the corporate offensive of 
the 1970s and 1980s". Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2004) has expanded flak to include fear 
of top editors and voices in the right-wing media. Boyd-Barrett also adds the impact 
of powerful voices, such as those of President, Vice-President or the Secretary of 
Defence, on the choice of questions or specific journalists during press conferences. 
He points out that using privileged voices to embarrass journalists who ask "wrong" 
questions or adopt the "wrong" tone is just another form of flak (p. 446).  
While most manifestations of "flak" in the Propaganda Model as envisaged 
by Herman and Chomsky remains at the level of non-physical threats, some aspects 
of flak in Bahrain go beyond this to physical abuse, torture and even death. Bahrain 
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has one of the world's worst records of press freedom, according to the Committee to 
Protect Journalists (2011) report. It cites statistics from 2011 when two Bahraini 
journalists were killed, about 110 journalists were arrested or threatened and twenty 
foreign reporters from media outlets including the BBC, CNN, McClatchy 
Newspaper and CBS were denied entry into the country to cover the uprising.  
Other human rights organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders, 
Human Rights Watch and the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, have similarly 
accused the Bahraini authorities of violating human rights and press freedom during 
the uprising in 2011. These organizations registered hundreds of cases of press 
violations where journalists and bloggers were killed, detained, tortured or sacked 
from their jobs as a result of covering the uprising. Violations against journalists, in 
general and sports journalists in particular have included physical and psychological 
torture, sexual harassment, dismissal from their job and threats to their families.    
Faisal Hayat is one of the Bahraini sports journalists who was jailed and 
tortured for his journalistic activities during the 2011 uprising. He recounted his 
experience to the Bahrain Center for Human Rights:  
…they dragged me to the torture room again, and there they resumed 
beating me on my feet by a hose. Then the executioner asked me: 
"Which hand you write with?" I said to myself: "I won't sacrifice one 
hand, so my both hands should share what will strike them of 
punishment for the act of writing". I replied: "I write with both hands". 
He rushed beating both of them until I felt that I had lost feeling my 
hands. (Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2011b). 
The way that Faisal Hayat and other journalists were treated shows how the Bahraini 
regime responded to criticism by the media. Clearly "flak", the fourth filter of the 
PM, is an ongoing concern in Bahrain where it is aimed at penalizing journalists who 
were involved in the uprising.  
The fifth filter in the PM was presented by Herman and Chomsky as the 
control of mechanism of "anticommunism". While this term was topical in the 1980s, 
it was more recently revised to encompass the broader term "ideology". While the 
PM was originally developed during the Cold War period examined the ideological 
fear of Communism as a clear antagonist to the U.S pro-democratic government, 
Herman and Chomsky did point out that the dominant elites of any nation, through 
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their control of mass media outlets, mobilize a sense of fear towards "enemies" or 
those that threaten their status quo:   
It's the idea that grave enemies are about to attack us and we need to 
huddle under the protection of domestic power. You need something to 
frighten people with, to prevent them from paying attention to what’s 
really happening to them. You have to somehow engender fear and 
hatred, to channel the kind of fear and rage – or even just discontent – 
that’s being aroused by social and economic conditions. (Chomsky et 
al. 1998, p. 42). 
Thus, according to Herman and Chomsky, fear can be used to mobilize the populace 
against an enemy. As the concept is "fuzzy", the ideology can also be used against 
those who threaten the dominant elites' interests (pp. 27-29). In his retrospective of 
the PM, Herman (2000) explains that propaganda campaigns occur only when the 
interests of those controlling and managing the filter are consistent with the 
campaigns.    
The fifth filter of the PM can be seen in operation in Bahrain, as propaganda 
campaigns are used by the Al-Khalifa family regime to manipulate public opinion 
against democracy that would threaten their interests and autocratic control. Pro-
regime figures and journalists routinely attack opposition leaders and protesters, 
calling for the death penalty, imprisonment or exile. For example, a former member 
of the Bahraini parliament Tweeted on August 10, 2012 "teargas will not help with 
the terrorist Iran slaves who want to kill security men  ... Shotgun, live bullets and 
deportation is the medicine they deserve" (Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2013).  
Overall, the Propaganda Model provides an appropriate framework to 
understand how mass media serves political and economic power brokers in a 
particular national context. The PM, however, has its limitations. As Herman and 
Chomsky acknowledged, the PM does not study the effects of the media on the 
public. In their introduction to the recent reprint of the book Manufacturing Consent 
(2008, p. xii) they indicate that the PM does not imply that any propaganda 
emanating from the media is always effective. In addition, in his critical review and 
assessment of the PM, Jeffery Klaehn (2002) points out that the PM does not 
presume that newsroom journalists routinely take mindful decisions that are 
consistent with the interest of dominant elites: "Rather, it assumes that elite media 
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recruit right-minded personnel to fill staff positions. Its overarching concern with the 
broader issue of social class firmly distinguishes the PM from the gate-keeper 
model" (p. 151). 
Other scholars have criticised several aspects of the PM. For instance, Boyd-
Barrett (2004) accepts the basic premises of the PM but believes that it does not 
pinpoint methodologies for determining the relative weight of independent filters in 
different contexts which would be beneficial to developing the model in the future. 
Boyd-Barrett adds that there is a lack of precision in the characterization of some of 
the filters, so that "the model privileges the structural factors that determine 
propagandized news selection, and therefore eschews or marginalizes intentionality" 
(p. 435).  
 In light of this, Boyd-Barrett proposed intentionality as a sixth filter for the 
PM, arguing that Herman and Chomsky seemed to avoid what he called direct 
purchase of media, or "buying out" of individual journalists or their media by the 
intelligence agencies or related authorities. To illustrate his point, Boyd-Barrett 
refers to revelations in the 1970s that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
published hundreds of books in order to undermine both the Soviet Union and 
communism and Boyd-Barrett also refers to the Rolling Stone article by Carl 
Bernstein on October 20, 1977 which disclosed that the CIA worked closely with  
400 journalists from a range of media outlets such as Associated Press, ABC, CBS, 
Hearst Newspapers, NBC, The New York Times, Reuters, United Press International 
and others (p. 436). 
Annabelle Lukin (2012) criticises the absence of a consideration of language 
or discourse in the PM. Although Chomsky is considered "the father of modern 
linguistics" (p. 100), Lukin points out the use of language was essentially ignored by 
the PM. Lukin indicates that while language is indisputably the carrier of the PM, 
Herman and Chomsky's analysis does not recruit a single theoretical method from the 
discipline most directly engaged in understanding and describing the nature of the 
language used in propaganda, and its relationship to notions such as ideology (p. 
100). The use of language in propaganda has an important role in confronting the 
protesters in Bahrain. Since the uprising started in 2011, the opposition and 
protesters have been described in the pro-regime media as traitors, insurrectionists, 
terrorists and killers. For instance, a news article that was published in Al-Watan 
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(2013b) headlined " خونة الوطن يُنسقون لحلقات التآمر الخارجي على البحرين: تجمع الوحدة " which 
translates to "The Unity Gathering: Traitors Coordinating a Conspiracy against 
Bahrain". While Herman and Chomsky ignored the use of language, this example 
evidences how, in Bahrain, the PM fifth filter of ideology is clearly at work as the 
pro-regime media uses extreme language as propaganda and as a weapon to resist 
political reform. This will be analysed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model to "manufacture consent" 
provides a useful theoretical framework to understand how the media in Bahrain 
including sports media has been politicized to serve the dominant interests of the 
elites. The PM points to the use of framing in news agenda. Herman and Chomsky 
discuss how victims of humanitarian catastrophes were "worthy" and sometimes 
"unworthy". Chomsky points to the performance of media outlets as "they determine, 
they select, they shape, they control, they restrict in order to serve the interests of 
dominant, elite groups in the society" (cited in Wintonick and Achbar 1994, p. 55).  
It is believed that the PM has strength to be applied in different ways: 
The model’s general argument, then, is that how victims and 
events are portrayed within mainstream media discourses will 
largely be dependent upon the interests of power within specific 
time/place contexts. This area of focus could also be significantly 
broadened and expanded to include events, issues and other 
groups of actors (beyond victims). (Klaehn 2009, p. 49). 
Eric Herring and Piers Robinson (2003) point out that the Propaganda Model explains 
why framing news reports about US foreign policy is often consistent with the agenda 
of U.S corporate and political elites. Also, Andrew Mullen and Jeffery Klaehn (2010) 
argue that the PM could be bolstered and its analytical capability could be enriched 
by other theories such as framing and agenda-setting (p. 223). The structure of the 
PM can be seen in action in the Bahrain context, where the control and the use of 
media as a political means of propaganda is explicit. It is therefore important to 
closely examine framing and how it operates within media.  
 
3.2 Use of framing in media     
Framing has been applied as a research methodology in a range of disciplines 
(Benford and Snow 2000), including politics and political psychology (Iyengar 1990; 
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Nelson et al. 1997), economic psychology (Gonzalez et al. 2005); communication 
and media studies (Entman 1991; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Cissel 2012), 
sociology (Al-Rawi 2014), and linguistics and discourse analysis (ed. Tennen 1993; 
Hope 2010; Mahfouz 2013).  
The founding of framing theory has been attributed to the sociologist Erving 
Goffman (1974) who pointed out in Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization 
of Experience, that framing is a "schemata of interpretation" used by individuals or 
groups to interpret or understand events (p. 21). Shanto Iyengar's (1990) study of 
poverty as a political issue showed how people's perspective about an issue depended 
on the way the issue was framed by media. Poverty, according to Iyengar, was not 
considered a private problem when it was framed as a social problem. Thus, framing, 
according to Robert M. Entman (1993), presents a way to illustrate the power of a 
communication text (p. 51) and it involves manipulating the text for the benefit of the 
medium or the message sender (p. 52).  
Framing has developed as a particularly useful theory in media over the last 
three decades. While early studies that examined the concept of framing concentrated 
more on the power of a media text and how it was shaped and presented (Iyengar 
1990; Entman1991), scholars in the 2000s have paid more attention to the impact of 
framing on audiences (Brewer et al. 2003; Gonzalez et al. 2005; Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007). Some scholars have argued that framing is a two-sided 
relationship where media outlets frame messages focusing on certain aspects, while 
the audience interpret the message by using their educational and cultural 
background and experiences (Baresch et al. 2011; Van Gorp and Vercruysse 2012). 
It is worth noting that scholars have generally agreed that framing has the power to 
influence an audience's beliefs (Scheufele and Iyengar 2011; Lecheler and Vreese 
2012; Arvizu 2013). However, while they agree that framing affect people's 
perceptions, they differ about the level of effectiveness of framing.  
Scholars and journalists agree that all news stories are framed and it is a 
crucial process for journalists to choose how to frame their stories. For instance, 
Seow Ting Lee and Crispin C. Maslog (2005) explain that news framing is the way 
that a news story is organized "thematically, stylistically, and factually, to convey a 
specific story line" (p. 313). Steve Smith (1997) argues that framing stories could be 
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"the most important" issue in newsrooms. Smith indicates that choosing the story 
frame is "the most powerful" decision that any journalist makes.  
Andrew C. Billings (2004) points out that media has the power to frame a 
story positively or negatively (p. 203). In their article "The Future of Public 
Engagement", Matthew C. Nisbet and Dietram A. Scheufele (2007) argue that 
framing involves shaping an issue as a problem, what or who is responsible for it, 
and what should be done about it. While Baldwin Van Gorp and Tom Vercruysse 
(2012) believe that framing appears to be to some extent manipulative, Margaret 
Cissel (2012) argues that framing is set to meet the goals of the providing source (p. 
67). This argument brings the discussion back to the early study of Entman (1991) 
who showed how media content could be framed and presented to the audience for 
the benefit of the news makers, corporations or dominant powers. Entman compared 
the coverage by the U.S. media of the shoot-down of the Korean Air Lines KAL 
Flight 007 in 1983 by a Soviet fighter plane, and the shoot-down of Iran Air Flight 
655 in 1988  by a U.S. Navy ship.  
Entman's analysis of the framing of these two very similar stories in the 
coverage of the Times, Newsweek, CBS Evening News, The New York Times and the 
Washington Post showed that the KAL incident was portrayed by American media as 
more important than the Iranian Air incident as it occupied more space in the print 
media and was given more time in the CBS evening news show telecast. While his 
analysis relied rather simply on how much material on the event was available and 
how prominently it was displayed, Entman argues that this frame data helps to 
determine the political importance of a news event (p. 10). The coverage of the two 
events also showed different uses of words, images, graphics, naming of victims and 
publication of their pictures. Overall, Entman found that the KAL incident was 
framed by a moral discourse about a deliberate/ premeditated incident, while the Iran 
Air incident was framed by technical discourse as an accident. 
Entman's study shows that the use of news framing aims to focus the 
audience's attention on a particular event by using various methods; for instance, by 
occupying more space in print media or by giving more time to television coverage. 
The way that media outlets edit and place news is determined by the importance 
given to particular news stories by the media outlet. Entman's study of media framing 
is helpful to understand the use of framing during the 2011 uprising in Bahrain. As 
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Entman has indicated, media uses a specific language to describe events for 
particular purposes. Media outlets also focus their coverage on  particular issues and 
overlook others. Entman showed how narrative text can be framed and produced for 
the audience. In his case study of the media coverage of the two airplane accidents, 
Entman modelled how framing news narratives can be identified by studying 
keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols and visual images. Entman illustrated how 
frames "work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so- (sic) and 
other entirely invisible" (p. 7).  
This thesis argues that sports media in Bahrain has used specific key phrases 
to vilify the demonstrations and the protesters on the one hand and to glorify the Al-
Khalifa family and their supporters on the other. It also examines techniques 
including the use of symbols and visual images in the television coverage of the 2011 
uprising in Bahrain to inspect the official propaganda during the uprising.  
 
3.2.1 Framing and social movements  
 The relationship between social movements and news framing has been 
discussed by scholars who examine  how protests, protesters and their demands are 
framed in media coverage. Murray Edelman (1993) discussed the role of framing in 
the social world where dominant elites have the power and the ability to shape public 
perceptions in order to serve their own agenda. Tim Baylor (1996) agrees with 
Edelman as he indicates that social movements being framed by media outlets is a 
"fact beyond dispute" (p. 242) and he believes that some events are deliberately 
selected, covered and timed. Understanding how framing techniques are employed 
by elites to achieve their goals and to influence public opinion is important according 
to Matthew C. Nisbet (2011) because it informs efforts to hold those in power 
accountable.  
 According to Sydney G. Tarrow (2011) in his book Power in Movement: 
Social Movements and Contentious Politics, there are three mechanisms to portray 
social movements: framing, identity construction, and emotional work (pp. 142-143). 
Tarrow argues that framing in a movement's structure of conflict and alliances 
distinguishes between identities and defines 'us' from 'them' in order to determine the 
enemy (p. 31). Tarrow's argument explains why, for example, a group frames itself 
as a "legitimate authority" and its opponents as "outlaws".  
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 There are several techniques employed by media to target protests such as to 
focus on marginal issues or the nuisance made by protests, to emphasise violence, 
require reliance on official sources, and to speak of a lack of patriotism of the 
protesters and a lack of effectiveness of the protests (Ashley and Olson 1998; Brasted 
2006; Boykoff 2006; Jha 2007; Di Cicco 2010; Boyle 2014). Laura Ashley and Beth 
Olson (1998) who examined how the New York Times, Time, and Newsweek framed 
the women's movement between 1966 and 1986, found that the U.S. media tended to 
delegitimize the movement and its objectives. Monica Brasted (2005) agrees with 
Ashley and Olsen as she explains that media outlets focus on marginal issues such as 
the protesters' appearance rather than on their motivation and demands. This 
technique presents protesters to the audience as outsiders. 
 Jules Boykoff's (2006) content analysis of the news coverage of the World 
Trade Organization protests in Seattle in the 1999 and the World Bank/IMF protests 
in Washington, DC in 2000, shows other techniques used by the U.S. media to 
undermine social movements. Beside the use of the violence frame, the disruption 
frame was used to portray the movements as not only disrupting the two meetings, 
but also disrupting the lives of the local people (p. 214). Damon T. Di Cicco's (2010) 
study of the newspapers coverage of protests between 1967 and 2007 supports 
Boykoff's findings as the media coverage of protests framed the movements as an 
"irritation" and a "hindrance" to daily life (p. 137). Di Cicco points to framing 
protests as unpatriotic as another techniques used by media when covers protests (p. 
138). He notes that the authorities' voice in coverage is louder than the protesters' 
voice and sometimes the protesters' voice is neglected.  
 The use of official sources in protest coverage was an issue discussed by 
Sonora Jha (2007) who examined the difference in reliance on official sources for 
coverage of the anti-WTO protests in 1999 and the anti-Vietnam War protests in 
1967. Jha's study shows that journalists who covered the 1999 protests relied more on 
official sources compared with the 1967 protests despite the availability of the 
Internet that grants access to a variety of sources. Donohue et al. (1995) explains that 
during protests, controlled media outlets align themselves with elites and the status 
quo (p. 116). Michael P. Boyle (2014) agrees with Donohue et al. and argues that the 
more protesters threaten the status quo, the more likely they are framed as outsiders in 
order alienate the public from the protesters' demands.  
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 Another important study that discusses the 2011 uprising in Bahrain but that 
disagrees with the literature  presented above suggests that protest coverage relies on 
unofficial sources and neglects pro-regime sources. Brian J. Bowe and Jennifer 
Hoewe's (2011) content analysis of the three large newspapers, the New York Times, 
Los Angeles Times and Washington Post from January 1, 2011 to March 10, 2011, 
found that the U.S. newspapers relied on non-official sources more than on official 
sources to cover the 2011 uprising. Bowe and Hoewe argue that the coverage of the 
U.S media was biased to the protesters. Their study identifies five frames used to 
cover the protests: slightly against the government of Bahrain, strongly against the 
government of Bahrain, strongly in favour of the government of Bahrain, slightly 
against the United States' involvement in Bahrain and slightly in favour of the United 
States' involvement in Bahrain. Bowe and Hoewe suggest that the statistics show that 
the frames that are against the government of Bahrain and in favour of the protest 
appeared more than the frames that are in favour of the Bahraini government and 
shows a "lack of fairness in news coverage of the conflict in Bahrain" (p. 33). 
Counterpoint to Bowe and Hoewe's argument, it has been pointed out that 
media outlets do occasionally criticize those in power in favour of their opponents 
(McLeod and Detenber 1999, p. 5). Moreover, Brasted (2005) raises an interesting 
point that counters Bowe and Hoewe's view by suggesting that balanced reporting 
leads to biased coverage in favour of elites as they are well-known to the public and 
their challengers need more time to explain their views to the public (p. 384). In 
addition, Bowe and Hoewe's study may have overlooked the fact that several foreign 
journalists, including those who had intended to cover sports events that coincided 
with the uprising were prevented from entering Bahrain by the authorities during the 
first months of the 2011 uprising (Associated Press 2012; Reporters Without Borders 
2013). There were 221 cases including 22 media organizations, of people who were 
denied entry to Bahrain in 2011 and 2012 without being given a reason. Journalists 
who worked for the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, CNN and Reuters 
were prevented from covering the uprising or targeted as a result of their journalistic 
activities (Gutman 2011; Human Rights Watch 2011c; Bahrain Watch 2012b; 
Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2012). Not having reporters when and where the 
major events of the 2011 uprising occurred may have resulted in the U.S. newspapers 
relying on non-official or pro-protesters sources.  
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Similarly, Naila Hamdy and Ehab H. Gomaa (2012) studied framing 
techniques used by semi-official and independent Egyptian newspapers and social 
media platforms during the coverage of the 2011 Egyptian uprising in order to 
undermine the protests. Hamdy and Gomaa coded their data into four main framing 
categories: "conflict", "responsibility", "economic consequences", and "human 
interest". They found that the "conflict frame" was used by semi-official newspapers 
to portray the 2011 Egyptian protests as a "harmful catastrophe" that had an 
enormous negative consequence on the economy whereas the independent 
newspapers framed the uprising more squarely through using the four frames 
mentioned above. Hamdy and Gomaa point out that while the independent 
newspapers covered the protests from the beginning, the semi-official newspapers 
hesitated to clearly explain what was happening (pp. 207-208). Their study indicates 
that the Egyptian semi-official media countered the demonstrations by framing it as a 
movement "harmful" to the economy and the country's stability. In a related study, 
Refaat Mahfouz (2013) examines the coverage of the Egyptian police news prior to 
2011 uprising. Mahfouz's study compared how events involving clashes between 
protesters and policemen were portrayed in the state-controlled newspaper Al-
Gomhuria and the independent newspaper Al-Dostour. For instance, an event 
between Egyptian policemen and Bedouins was framed in the pro-regime newspaper 
Al-Gomhuria as "riots", whereas the same event was framed in the pro-opposition 
newspaper Al-Dostour as a "confrontation" (pp. 316-318). 
 
3.2.2 Framing and propaganda 
 There is a strong relationship between news framing and language choices, 
phrases, words and connotations. According to Teenie Matlock (2010), the way the 
message is worded can set up very specific "interpretations" and "inferences". 
George Lakoff agrees in an interview with Bonnie Azab Powell (2003) that language 
and framing are correlative:  
Every word is defined relative to a conceptual 
framework. If you have something like "revolt," that 
implies a population that is being ruled unfairly, or 
assumes it is being ruled unfairly, and that they are 
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throwing off their rulers, which would be considered a 
good thing. That's a frame. (Powell 2003). 
Matlock and Lakoff believe that the role of language in framing news stories is to 
encourage the audience or the public to interpret the message in a certain way. Ray 
Eldon Hiebert (2003) believes audiences do not think about facts as our minds 
"switch to the way those facts are framed" (p. 242) and this shows, according to 
Hiebert, that framing influences our thoughts about an issue. In his discussion of the 
propaganda at the beginning of  the Iraq war, Hiebert links propaganda with framing 
arguing that the U.S. government portrayed the war in Iraq in a way that served its 
goals (p. 244). Hiebert discusses the way that issues, story lines, slogans and phrases 
were framed. For instance, he notes how the U.S. army characterized the Iraqi 
resistance as "Saddam's Fedayeen" before changing "Fedayeen" (that gives a positive 
connotation in Arabic to "paramilitaries") to "terror-like death squads" (p. 245). 
 In addition, Brian Baresch et al. (2011) raise an interesting point about the 
use of the term "The Arab Spring" in Western and Arabic media. They point out that 
the uprisings that swept the Arab World were labelled in a "favourable and 
democratic light" (p. 637). The term is meant to evoke the season of rebirth and the 
Prague Spring of 1968 and reflects a social value of the Western culture which is the 
struggle for self-determination in the face of subjugation: 
That is the sort of thing news frames do: They highlight 
some aspects of the events behind a story and downplay 
others, often with the effect of supporting a certain way 
of looking at the world. This is accomplished by word 
choice (e.g. using language of “awakening” rather than 
“chaos” to describe the Middle East uprisings) and by 
source selection (e.g. quoting more democracy activists 
than state security officers). (Baresch et al. 2011, p. 637). 
According to Joshua Keating (2011), the term "The Arab Spring" was used in 2005 
for the first time when referring to the democracy movements in the Arab World, 
including elections and woman's rights, by the columnist Charles Krauthammer 
(2005). The term then was used by the Professor of Political Science and Director of 
Institute for Middle East Studies Marc Lynch (2011) in an article published in the 
Foreign Policy magazine who called it somewhat dismissively as "Obama's Arab 
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Spring?". Not surprisingly, many Arab politicians and journalists rejected the use of 
"The Arab Spring", some going as far as to call the demonstrations a "bloody and 
sectarian winter" (CNN 2014), "The Alleged Arab Spring" (Mohi Al-Deen 2012), 
"Arab Autumn" (Nafei 2013), and "Bloody Spring" (Al-Qudat 2014).  
 The politicians and journalists who used the negative connotations in the 
examples listed above were all against the demonstrations in the Arab World and 
accused the protests of being planned and led by the U.S. and Israel. The study of 
Susan Dente Ross (2003) is also worth considering in this context. Ross analysed the 
framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in New York Times editorials after 11 
September 2011. In a 30 months period  after the attack, Ross analysed 34 editorials 
that discussed or engaged with Israel, Israel and Palestine, the Saudis or the Arabs. 
She concluded that Palestinians were likely to be famed as "aggressors" rather than 
"victims" and while Arabs and Palestinians were portrayed as "terrorist criminals 
intent on undermining calm" while others such as the former Palestinian president 
Yasser Arafat, Arabs, and the Saudi were "legitimate brokers of peace" (p. 6).   
 Following this argument, it is interesting to compare phrases used by a state-
controlled media outlet and a foreign media outlet to frame an event of the 2011 
Bahrain uprising. For instance, in a news article published on the Bahrain News 
Agency (2011) website on March 16, 2011 about the removal of the protesters' camps 
from the Pearl Roundabout, the protesters were described as "outlaws who terrorize 
the citizens and the residents and harmed the national economy", whereas a France24 
(2011) news article published on the same day more neutrally described the 
participants as "protesters majority Shiite demanding reforms". The removal process 
was portrayed by the Bahrain News Agency as "تطهير" which can be translated as 
"disinfection" while it was portrayed by France24 as "إخالء" which can be translated 
as "evacuation". These two examples show the use of different key phrases to frame 
the same event. While the use of "إخالء" in Arabic or "evacuation" does not have a 
negative meaning, the use of "تطهير" or "disinfection" suggests bacteria or a group of 
intruders and is clearly negative.  
 It is clear that the use of language in framing such as an "illegal movement" to 
indicate to a protest or "unpatriotic citizens" to indicate to protesters is in fact 
propaganda that reflects an ideology. While Noshina Saleem (2007) asserts that 
media frames reflect a specific ideology, George Lakoff (2004) has a clearer grasp for 
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the relationship between framing and propaganda. In the book Don't Think of An 
Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate, Lakoff states: 
Propaganda is another manipulative use of framing. 
Propaganda is an attempt to get the public to adopt a 
frame that is not true and is known not to be true, for the 
purpose of gaining or maintaining political control. 
(Lakoff 2004, p. 100). 
Lakoff believes that propaganda is not a frame; rather it is an endeavour to build a 
perception of an event in the public mind to achieve specific objectives. This 
argument partially corresponds with David Barnhizer's (2013) view that propaganda 
experts frame everything "into thematic propaganda 'missiles' that we launch to 'sell' 
our positions or sabotage those of our opponents" (p. 1). John B. Parrott (2009) 
believes that framing and propaganda seek to "instil a politically relevant disposition 
into an audience" (p. 419). Raluca Cozma (2014) agrees with Barnhizer and Parrott, 
indicating that there are several devices involved in propaganda including "name 
calling" which is the technique of labelling ideas or people, for example, as "fascist", 
"radical", or "terrorist" in order to make the audience rebuff or denounce them 
without examining any evidence (p. 435). Maria Bondes and Sandra Heep (2012) 
argue that framing is used as a foundation of regime legitimacy as "the ruling elites in 
authoritarian regimes propagate official frames in a continuous effort to reproduce the 
belief of the populace in the elites' leadership qualities and their determination to 
serve the common interest" (p. 4).  
 In summary, elites who control media tend to target social movements that 
threaten their interests. There are several strategies that are used by media to 
undermine social movements in the coverage of protests including: portraying 
protests as illegal or illegitimate movements, framing the consequences of a 
movement negatively, portraying the status quo as legitimate while labelling 
protesters as outlaws. While framing protesters as deviant aims to protect the elite and 
to separate protesters from the public, Baresch et al. (2011) believe that media content 
reflects social meanings through the selection of words, news sources and metaphors. 
In light of the relationship between framing and propaganda that has been outlined 
above, this thesis will investigate just how news framing was employed by sports 
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media in Bahrain to serve the regime's propaganda and in order to maintain status 
quo.   
While acknowledging that a range of frames were used by media outlets to 
cover protests, this present thesis focused on three main frames to examine how the 
2011 uprising in Bahrain was covered and the strategies were used during the 
coverage. The three frames are: the characterization frame, the consequences frame, 
and the unpatriotic frame. These frames help answer the thesis' research questions as 
they cover the four major elements of the uprising: the demonstrations, the Al-
Khalifa family, the protesters and the supporters of the ruling family. According to 
Sanda Kaufman et al. 2013, the characterization frame is linked to the identity of the 
rivals and it is used by them, either positively to justify the party/person's actions 
against others, or negatively to undermine the legality of the opponent cast doubt on 
their motive. It is important for a movement to select its own framing before its 
enemies do so. As George Lakoff (2011) suggests that unless a movement frames 
itself "others will frame you -- the media, your enemies, your competitors, your well-
meaning friends". Lakoff believes that framing has major positive or negative 
consequences on a movement as it tells the character of a movement. In light of this, 
this thesis uses the characterization frame to examine the key phrases used to frame 
the 2011 uprising in Bahrain. This frame was also used to investigate how the Al-
Khalifa family was framed by the local sports media.  
This thesis also examines how the consequences of the 2011 uprising were 
framed. Patti M. Valkenburg et al. (1999) point out that media outlets present an 
issue to the audience in terms of the consequences that may occur as a result of the 
issue. They suggest that the consequences frame is used to make an issue relevant to 
the audience (p. 552). In light of this, the present thesis investigates how the 
consequences of the uprising were framed. For instance, did the consequences of the 
uprising 'unite the country or encourage political reforms', or did it 'destabilize the 
security and the national's unity'? 
This thesis also uses the unpatriotic frame to examine how the protesters were 
framed. While Di Cicco (2010) applies the unpatriotic frame to political movements, 
the present thesis applies it to the protesters in Bahrain. Douglas M. McLeod and 
James K. Hertog (1992) stated that "one of the keys to whether a protest group is 
'isolated' or 'accepted' by the larger society is the mass media's treatment of the 
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protesters" (p. 260). Thus, through analysis of the unpatriotic frame, this thesis 
examines whether the protesters were framed as "loyal to their country", or 
"disloyal". This frame was also applied to the Al-Khalifa family supporters to enable 
a comparison with its use when applied to the protesters.  
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Chapter 4: Newspaper data analysis: methods and findings  
 
 This chapter explains the reasons behind the selection of the two newspapers 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad. A content analysis provides quantitative and 
qualitative descriptions of the selected sports news articles of the two newspapers to 
examine how the 2011 uprising in Bahrain was framed by the sports media and to 
assess the strategies used to politicize the sports news.  
 The data collected from Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad covers the period 
from March 2011 to May 2011. Because a literal translation to English of Arabic text 
might lead to some misrepresentation, considerable effort has been made to translate 
the meanings of words, terms and sentences. For instance, the word 'اإلساءة' in the 
sentence 'اإلساءة إلى الرموز الوطنية' can be translated as "insult". In this sentence, the 
term frames the consequences of the protests as an insult to the Bahraini figureheads 
and leadership. This translation keeps the intended meaning of the sentence. More 
examples of translations from Arabic to English used in this thesis can be found in 
Appendix 1.  
 
 4.1 Rationale for selecting Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad 
 There are currently seven daily newspapers in Bahrain with five published in 
Arabic and two in English. They are: Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Gulf Daily News (in 
English), Al-Ayam, Daily Tribune (in English), Al-Wasat, Al-Watan and Al-Bilad. 
Newspapers of Bahrain are privately owned. However, except for Al-Wasat which is 
considered a pro-opposition newspaper, they are directly controlled by the regime 
(Reporters Without Borders 2012a; Freedom House 2013b; Kafai 2014; Front Line 
Defenders 2014). The table presented in Figure 12 provides an overview of the daily 
newspapers including the year they were first published, their publication language, 
distribution, political stance, number of the issue and sports pages. It should be noted 
that the newspaper pages increase or decrease according to occasion (such as public 
holidays) and the numbers stated in the table gives an average number of pages in 
each of the six newspapers.  
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Figure 12: Daily newspapers in Bahrain in order of first publication 
    
  As for  Al-Wasat, a pro-opposition newspaper was excluded from the analysis 
because it was forced to shut down by the regime for one day on April 3, 2011 after its 
editorial board including the editor-in-chief Mansoor Al-Jamri were sacked. Al-Wasat 
was then allowed by the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) to publish again after 
another editor-in-chief was appointed (Al-Ayam 2011). This editor-in-chief was 
considered a pro-regime figure, which raised concerns at that time that Al-Wasat was 
being influenced by the official line as with other pro-regime newspapers. From the pro-
regime Arabic newspapers, Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad were chosen for this thesis 
for several reasons. Akhbar Al-Khaleej is the oldest newspaper in Bahrain and it was 
established in 1976 by Mahmood Al-Mardi. The newspaper claims to circulate a daily 
average of 42,000 copies to reach a readership of 170,000 that makes about 28% of the 
population of Bahrain (Akhbar Al-Khaleej 2014). Also, the newspaper claims to be a 
market leader in print production in the country through Dar Akhbar Al-Khaleej Printing 
& Publishing House (Dar Akhbar Al-Khaleej 2014). Al-Bilad was chosen because it was 
the most recent (in 2008) newspaper to be established. It was started by several 
businessmen including Moanes Al-Mardi son of Mahmood Al-Mardi, the establisher of 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej. Moanes Al-Mardi is also the current editor-in chief of the 
newspaper. The online archive of Al-Bilad for the period of study was available on the 
newspaper's website. Although the Chairman of the Board of the newspaper Abdulnabi 
Al-Shoala is a former Cabinet Minister of State and Minister of Labour and Social 
Affairs (Nabialshoala 2014), the newspaper claims that it is not subject to censorship 
and protects free speech (Al-Bilad 2014). In addition, the regime praises the efforts of 
the newspaper. During an official meeting with the Al-Bilad editor-in-chief, the former 
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President of the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) Sheikh Fawaz bin Mohammed Al-
Khalifa acknowledged the "crucial role played by Al-Bilad in highlighting the 
kingdom's landmark achievement at all gatherings" (Bahrain News Agency 2010). 
While the readership figure of Akhbar Al-Khaleej is known, there is no official figure 
for the Al-Bilad readership. Additionally, the two newspapers are controlled by the 
regime and this present and so they are appropriate for study of the performance of the 
state-controlled sports media.  
  Both Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad have a supplement of sports news with 
8 to 12 pages depending on the scheduled sports activities that day. For instance, when 
Bahrain host an international sports event such as the Bahrain Grand Prix the number of 
pages increased to 20, but they can be also be as few as four pages on public holidays. 
Sports pages are divided into two sections: 'local news' and 'international news'. On 
ordinary days the two sections share equal numbers of pages but when a local event 
occurs such as the King's Cup Football Final, local sports news occupy most of the 
sports section. However, in the days immediately after the 2011 uprising, sports 
activities were suspended and the sports pages in the two newspapers were cut to about 
four pages each. For instance, the Akhbar Al-Khaleej sports section supplement issued 
12 sports pages in the first eight days of March 2011, later dropped to eight sports pages 
in the second week of March, and then dropped again to three pages inside the main 
newspaper issue until the end of May 2011.  
 
4.2 Collecting newspaper data 
  The newspaper data were collected from several sources. Portable Document 
Format (PDF) versions of the hardcopy of Al-Bilad issues cover the period of March 1, 
2011 to May 31, 2011 were downloaded from the newspaper website 
http://www.albiladpress.com. Issues of Al-Bilad of March 11, 16, 17, 18, 21, 24, 26 and 
May 3, 2011 were not uploaded on the newspaper website and were not available in the 
newspaper archives. For Akhbar Al-Khaleej, the PDF version of the hardcopy archive 
was not available online at the newspaper website; therefore the issues were 
downloaded from a temporary website http://influx.bh/resources/jazeeri/ that was 
established by an activist who has been archiving the newspaper issues for her private 
project. It should be noted that http://influx.bh/resources/jazeeri/ is not working 
anymore. Issues of Akhbar Al-Khaleej of March 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 were not 
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available at the website http://influx.bh/resources/jazeeri/. The missing issues were sent 
by a journalist colleague who lives in Bahrain and has access to the newspapers archives 
(Figure 13). To verify the validity of the data, two issues of every week of the 14 weeks 
that cover the period of the study were sent to the colleague to confirm it matched with 
the issues in the newspaper archive. Although the colleague had access to the newspaper 
archives, he had difficulty to sending all issues from March to May 2011 as it could 
have put him in trouble with the newspaper's management.  
 Despite the difficulty accessing the archives and collecting the full issues of 
Al-Bilad, only 3.8% of the data is missing, and according to Yiran Dong and Chao-
Ying Joanne Peng (2013), this percentage is insignificant. The PDF version of the 
hardcopy of the newspaper issues are essential for this project for several reasons. 
Firstly, the PDF version show the size of the news article relative to other articles on 
the same page. Secondly, they show the photograph/s that accompanied the news 
article. Thirdly, they show where on the page the news article was placed (top, 
middle or bottom). Fourthly, they show how the news article was placed that is, 
foregrounded on the first pages above the fold or hidden on the second page and so 
on. In the sports supplements that were examined, articles made up about 97% of the 
material and 3% were opinion columns that did not cover the uprising. It should be 
noted that there were very few opinion columns during the period of the study that 
discussed unrelated issues. 
No. Newspaper Date Note 
1 Akhbar Al-Khaleej 1 March 2011 to 
31 May 2011 
All hard copy issues have been saved in 
PDF files 
2 Al-Bilad 1 March 2011 to 
31 May 2011 
All hard copy issues have been saved in 
PDF files except issues of 11
th
, 16
th
, 17
th
, 
18
th
, 21
st
, 26
th
, March and the 3
rd
 of May 
Figure 13: Newspaper material: Data collection summary  
 
4.3 Sports sections and types of articles  
The total pages in the collected sports section supplements from Akhbar Al-
Khaleej and Al-Bilad was calculated and categorized into either local sports pages or 
international sports pages (the newspapers organises the sports sections). Local 
sports pages covered local sports events and international sports pages covered 
international sports events. However, occasionally both sports sections published 
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local and international news on the same page. For instance, the activities of the 
Bahrain sports teams and figures abroad were categorized as local news. The page 
was considered 'local' when it had more local news than international news and vice 
versa. The first page of the sports section in both sports sections supplements was 
always considered a local page even when it included more international news 
articles. With the exception of special events, the first page is often published local 
news. Although sports pages were numbered by the newspaper, every sports page 
was recounted to confirm the overall numbers of pages in the sports section of the 
two newspaper newspapers. Every published sports article was read. International 
sports articles were excluded from the study whereas local sports articles were 
classified into four main categories: explicitly about the uprising, implicitly about the 
uprising, explicitly about the regime, and unrelated sports news articles that did not 
belong to any of the other three categories.  
 
4.3.1 Explicit coverage of the uprising 
  This category included sports news articles that explicitly covered the 
uprising and its consequences for the local sports events (for instance, articles that 
covered events such as The Athletes' March, other protests or reported on the 
uprising such as sanctions that were applied on the athletes and sports figures). These 
news articles pointed to the uprising by using explicit political terms such as 
"demonstrations", "The Athletes' March", "the unlicensed marches", "the political 
crisis", or "the illegal gatherings". Figure 14 is an example of a sports news article 
that explicitly covered the uprising titled "Commission of Inquiry Decides to 
Suspend 150 Athletes Who Participated in the Abusive Acts to the nation". The news 
article announced the suspension of 150 athletes and sports figures by the 
commission of inquiry for participating in  المسيرات غير المرخصةو" مسيرة الرياضيين غير  
 that can be translated as "The unlicensed marches and the unlicensed "المرخصة
Athletes' March". These protests, according to the news article, offended "The wise 
leadership and the nation". The news article also announced that there would be more 
athletes to be suspended in the following days.   
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Figure 14: Sample of a sports news article that explicitly covers the uprising (Al-Bilad, April 5, 2011)  
 
4.3.2 Implicit coverage of the uprising 
  This category included sports news articles that implicitly covered the 
uprising and its consequences on the local sports activities without using explicit or 
direct political terms such as "demonstrations", "uprising", "protests", "protesting", 
or "The Athletes' March". It included sports news articles that used indirect terms 
such as "the events" to describe the uprising without indicating to the nature of these 
events. For instance, a news article published in Akhbar Al-Khaleej on March 6, 
2011, covered the impact of the suspension of the local football league on the 
athletes' fitness and used the term "emergency circumstances" to describe the 
protests. The nature of these circumstances was not clarified. Most of these articles 
were published before the broadcast of the television sports programme With the 
Event on April 4, 2011. 
 The news article titled " اإلسكافي تعليق المسابقات يفرض نفسه : صعوبة إيجاد حلول ناجعة
 which can be translated as "The Handball Federation Has no Choice "على اتحاد اليد
than Suspending the Competitions" (see Figure 15) is an example of an article that 
implicitly covered the uprising. It discussed the possible return of the handball 
competitions after "الوقفة االضطراراية" which can be translated as the "compulsory 
suspension". The article does not explain why the handball competitions were 
suspended in the first place. Reading this article as a discrete stand-alone piece does 
not explain the political conditions of Bahrain at the time.  
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 Figure 15: Sample of a sports news article that implicitly the uprising (Al-Bilad 5, April 2011)  
 
4.3.3 Explicit coverage of the regime 
  This category included sports news articles that explicitly covered the Al-
Khalifa family members' sports events. It covered sports news articles that were 
accompanied by Al-Khalifa family members' photos or photos with Al-Khalifa 
family members' in the background, or with their names in the headline or the text. It 
should be noted that the news articles that covered the uprising explicitly were 
categorized into "explicitly about the uprising" not "explicitly about the regime" even 
when they were accompanied with an Al-Khalifa family member's name or photo. 
The majority of this category included official news articles that were usually 
unedited news sent by official offices, ministries, or clubs via email or fax to the 
newspapers accompanied by particular photos and their captions. Official sports 
news articles are not limited to an unedited story as they are occasionally written or 
edited by journalists who follow the official line including addressing the Al-Khalifa 
family member "His Highness", presenting Al-Khalifa members' names as they are 
presented in official news and accompanying the news article with official photos 
which are usually sourced from the Bahrain New Agency website or drawn from the 
newspaper archive.  
 Figure 16 shows an example of a news article that covered the king's sons 
Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa and Khalid bin Hamad Al-Khalifa's event in an 
Endurance Riding competition. The news article was accompanied by three photos 
and occupied three-quarters of the page. The headline and the two sub-headlines 
contained 31 words in total " ناصر بن حمد يشيد بجهود رئيس االتحاد الملكي للفروسية واالستعداد  
تلسباق السب " that can be translated as "Nasser bin Hamad Commends the President of 
the Royal Equestrian Federation Efforts in Preparing for the Saturday Race". The by-
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line was "covered by media office of Sheik Nasser bin Hamad" which meant that this 
article was written and sent by Sheikh Nasser's office to be published in the 
newspapers and it usually has priority over other local sports news. This category 
does not refer to the uprising or the political events at the time. This type of article is 
published in the local newspapers on a daily basis and is exploited in favour of the 
regime. However, these articles were not be analysed because they are published in 
the local newspapers on a daily basis and because they avoided covering the uprising 
and the related events, this thesis only examined the regime's propaganda that is 
linked to the 2011 uprising. In addition, while the number of the articles that 
explicitly covered the uprising rose, the number of articles that covered the sports 
activities of the Al-Khalifa family fell during the suspension of the sports activities 
which shows that they were not used to vilify the demonstrations or the protesters.  
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 16: A sample of an official sports news article (Akhbar Al-Khaleej March 1, 2011)   
 
4.3.4 Unrelated news articles 
  This category included news articles of local sports events unrelated to the 
uprising or that do not belong to the other three categories (such as articles that 
covered local football or volleyball news and were not accompanied by any of the 
Al-Khalifa family members' photos or names). This category was excluded from the 
analysis as it is not related to the study. Figure 17 is an example of a news article that 
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covered the 2012 Youth Asian Nations Cup football qualifiers titled " األحمر الشاب في
 which can be translated as "The Young Red in Group "المجموعة الثانية لتصفيات كأس العالم
Two of the Asian Cup Qualifiers". The headline consisted of eight words only and 
the news article was written by an Al-Bilad journalist, Ahmad Jaffar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Sample of a sports news article that covers a local sports event (Al-Bilad March 31, 2011)  
 
4.4 Method of analysing newspaper data 
 The sports pages of the sports sections of the two newspapers were 
categorized as either local sports pages or international sports pages. The news read 
the news articles were then read and classified into the four categories: explicitly 
about the uprising, implicitly about the uprising, explicitly about the regime, and 
unrelated sports news articles. Subsequently, one sports article from every newspaper 
in each day of the period of the study was selected from the category "explicitly 
about the uprising" to answer the research questions: 
 RQ1: How did sports media frame the 2011 uprising? 
 RQ2: What strategies were used to politicize pro-regime sports media during 
the uprising?  
In total, 46 sports news articles (19 from Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 27 from Al-Bilad) 
were selected. An article from each day of the period of the study and from each 
newspaper was selected. When there was no article that explicitly covered the 
uprising in an issue, an article was selected from the next day's issue. The articles 
that covered the period from March 1 to May 31, 2011 were selected from the upper 
right side of the first sports page as Arabic is written and read from right to left. 
When there was no article in the upper right side of the page, the priority was to the 
article that occupied more space in the first page. When there was no explicit article 
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about the uprising on the first page, this method of selection was applied to the 
second page and so on. The 46 selected articles accounted for 58.9% of the total 
published articles that explicitly covered the uprising.  
 A quantitative and qualitative content analysis was used to analyse the data 
(Macnamara 2005; Bhattacherjee 2012). The analysis identified the use of the three 
frames: the first was the characterization frame (Lakoff 2011; Kaufman et al. 2013) 
that examined how the uprising and the Al-Khalifa family were framed by the sports 
coverage. The second frame was the consequences frame (Valkenburg et al. 1999) 
that identified how the consequences of the uprising were framed. The third frame 
was the unpatriotic frame (Di Cicco 2010) that identified how the protesters and the 
pro-regime supporters were framed. Analysis of these three frames helps in an 
understanding of the propaganda of the Bahraini regime. The analysis also 
investigated the use of official, pro-regime, and pro-protesters sources to cover the 
uprising and the use of the protesters' photographs.  
 The reliability of coding was tested with the Ole Holsti (1969) intracoder 
reliability formula. To ensure that the process was not subject to bias and to ensure 
objectivity of the results, all of  the total of 46 articles (100% of the selected 
newspaper data) were coded and analysed twice on separate occasions. The 
intracoder reliability agreement was 0.93 (where 1.0 shows a total agreement in the 
coding on different occasions). 
 
4.4.1 Newspaper coverage: Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad 
 Each page of each sports section was counted and categorized and then each 
article of the local news pages was counted and categorized. The next section shows 
the number and the type of the two newspapers pages and articles published in 
March, April, and May 2011.  
 
4.4.2 Akhabr Al-Khaleej sports section: March 2011 
Statistics presented in Figure 18 show the number and the types of the Akhbar 
Al-Khaleej pages in March 2011. In March, Akhbar Al-Khaleej published 936 pages 
of which 199 (21.2%) were sports pages. The pages split into 108 local sports pages 
(11.5%) and 91 international sports pages (9.7%). While the beginning of March 
witnessed publication of an average of 40 pages per newspaper issue, the average 
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dropped in the second half of March to 24 pages per issue after the suspension of the 
local sports events which had an impact on the sports section of the newspaper that 
decreased from 12 pages to 3 pages. 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (March 2011) 
Number of pages 
including sports pages 
Sports section 
pages 
Local sports 
pages 
International 
sports pages 
936 199 (21.2%) 108 (11.5%) 91 (9.7%) 
   Figure 18: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: March 2011: Number of pages and types of sports news coverage   
 
4.4.3 Akhbar Al-Khaleej sports section: April 2011 
Statistics presented in Figure 19 show the number and the types of the Akhbar 
Al-Khaleej pages in April 2011. During this month, Akhbar Al-Khaleej published 812 
pages which included 116 (14.2%). The sports section split into 60 local sports pages 
(7.3%) and 56 international sports pages (6.8%). The total number of pages of 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej published dropped from 936 pages in March to 812 pages in 
April.  
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (April 2011) 
Number of pages 
including sports pages 
Sports section 
pages  
Local sports 
pages 
International 
sports pages 
812 116 (14.2%) 60 (7.3%) 56 (6.8%) 
    Figure 19: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: April 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage  
 
4.4.4 Akhbar Al-Khaleej sports section: May 2011 
Statistics presented in Figure 20 show the number and the types of Akhbar Al-
Khaleej pages published in May 2011. In May, the newspaper published 972 pages 
of which 124 pages (12.7%) were for the sports section. The content of the sports 
pages split into 91 (9.3%) local sports pages and 33 (3.3%) international sports 
pages. The number of Akhbar Al-Khaleej pages increased by 160 pages in May. In 
addition, there was an increase in the number of the sports section pages from 116 
pages in April to 124 pages in May. While international sports decreased from 56 
pages in April to 33 pages in May, local sports increased from 60 pages to 90 pages 
after the resumption of the local sports activities.  
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Akhbar Al-Khaleej (May 2011) 
Number of pages 
including sports pages 
Sports section 
pages 
Local sports 
pages 
International 
sports pages 
972 124 (12.7%) 91 (9.3%) 33 (3.3%) 
Figure 20: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: May 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage  
 
4.4.5 Akhbar Al-Khaleej sports section: March to May 2011  
 Statistics presented in Figure 21 show the total amount and the type of sports 
coverage of Akhbar Al-Khaleej during March, April and May 2011. Considering the 
suspension of the local sports events for several weeks, Akhbar Al-Khaleej published 
439 sports pages (16.1%) with 259 pages (9.5%) for local sports activities and 180 
pages (6.6%) of international sports activities. The remaining percentage of the 
newspaper content (83.9%) was shared by daily pages and sections including the first 
and the last pages, the local news section, the investigation section, the financial 
section, the opinions section, the international politics news section, the drama 
section and the readers' page.  
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (March to May 2011) 
Number of pages 
including sports section 
Sports section 
pages 
Local sports 
pages 
International 
sports pages 
2720 439 (16.1%) 259 (9.5%) 180 (6.6%) 
Figure 21: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: March to May 2011: Total number of pages and type of sports news coverage  
 
4.4.6 Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Types of sports news articles: March 2011 
Statistics presented in Figure 22 show the types and the total number of 
published sports news articles in Akhbar Al-Khaleej in March 2011. The newspaper 
published 397 sports news articles including 46 (11.5%) news articles that implicitly 
covered the uprising, 105 (26.4%) news articles that covered the sports activities of 
the Al-Khalifa family members and 246 (61.9%) news articles that were not related 
to any of the other three categories. There were no articles that covered the uprising 
explicitly published during this month. 
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Akhbar Al-Khaleej (March 2011) 
Explicitly about the 
uprising 
Implicitly about the 
uprising 
Explicitly about the 
regime 
Unrelated 
0 articles (0%) 46 articles (11.5%) 105 articles (26.4%) 246 articles (61.9%) 
Total: 397 sports news articles in March 2011 
  Figure 22: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: March 2011: Types of sports news articles  
 
4.4.7 Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Types of sports news articles: April 2011 
Statistics presented in Figure 23 show the types and the total number of the 
published sports news articles in Akhbar Al-Khaleej in April 2011. The newspaper 
published 392 sports news articles. The explicit coverage of the uprising began on 
April 6, 2011. Akhbar Al-Khaleej published 43 (10.9%) that explicitly covered the 
uprising, 46 articles (11.7%) that implicitly covered the uprising. This month 
witnessed a slight decrease in the articles that covered the Al-Khalifa family 
members' sports activities with 95 articles (24.2%) compared with 105 articles 
(26.4%) in March. Additionally, there was a slight drop in the unrelated sports news 
articles from 246 articles (61.9%) to 208 articles (53%) following the drop in the 
total number of published pages.  
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (April 2011) 
Explicitly about 
the uprising 
Implicitly about the 
uprising 
Explicitly about the 
regime 
Unrelated 
43 articles (10.9%) 46 articles (11.7%) 95 articles (24.2%) 208 articles (53%) 
Total: 392 sports news articles in April 2011 
Figure 23: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: April 2011: Types of sports news articles  
 
4.4.8 Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Types of sports news articles: May 2011 
 Statistics presented in Figure 24 show the types and the total number of the 
published sports news articles in Akhbar Al-Khaleej in May 2011. The newspaper 
published 477 sports news articles during this month with no articles (0%) that 
covered the uprising explicitly (compared with 43 articles (10.9%) that covered the 
uprising explicitly in April). Also, the sports news articles that implicitly covered the 
uprising dropped from 46 articles to 4 articles (0.8%) in this month. The number of 
articles that covered the Al-Khalifa's sports activities fell from 95 in April to 85 
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sports articles (17.8%) in May. In contrast, the unrelated news articles increased from 
208 articles (53%) in March to 388 articles (81.3%) in April.   
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (May 2011) 
Explicitly about 
the uprising 
Implicitly about 
the uprising 
Explicitly about the 
regime 
Unrelated 
0 articles (0%) 4 articles (0.8%) 85 articles (17.8%) 388 articles (81.3%) 
Total: 477 sports news articles in May 2011 
 Figure 24: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: May 2011: Types of sports news articles  
 
4.4.9 Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Types of sports news articles: March to May 2011 
Statistics presented in Figure 25 show the types and the number of the 
published sports news articles published in Akhbar Al-Khaleej from March to May 
2011. The newspaper published 1262 news articles including 43 sports news articles 
(3.3%) that explicitly covered the uprising, 94 news articles (8.3%) that implicitly 
covered the uprising, 285 sports news articles (21.3%) that covered the Al-Khalifa 
family members' sports events, and 842 unrelated sports news articles (65.9%). 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (March to May 2011) 
Explicitly about 
the uprising 
Implicitly about the 
uprising 
Explicitly about the 
regime 
Unrelated 
43 articles (3.3%) 106 articles (8.3%) 285 articles (22.3%) 842 (65.9%) 
Total: 1276 sports news articles in May 2011 
    Figure 25: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: March to May 2011: Total types of sports news articles  
 
4.4.10 Al-Bilad sports section: March 2011  
 Statistics presented in Figure 26 show number and the types of Al-Bilad 
pages in March 2011. Al-Bilad published 712 pages including 148 pages (20.7%) for 
the sports section split into 70 local sports pages (9.8%) and 78 international sports 
pages (10.9%). The newspaper pages of Al-Bilad dropped from 32 pages for an issue 
in the beginning of March to 24 pages for an issue by the end of the month. As a 
result, the sports section decreased from 8 pages to 4 pages and then to as little as 
two pages for several days. It should be noticed that there were seven issues (11, 16, 
17, 18, 21, 24 and 26) missing from this month that were not included in the 
statistics. 
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Al-Bilad (March 2011) 
Number of pages 
including sports section 
Sports section 
pages 
Local sports 
pages 
International 
sports pages 
712  148 (20.7%) 70 (9.8%) 78 (10.9%) 
    Figure 26: Al-Bilad: March 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage  
 
4.4.11 Al-Bilad sports section: April 2011 
 Statistics presented in Figure 27 show the number and the types of Al-Bilad 
pages in April 2011. Al-Bilad published 796 pages including 120 pages (15%) for the 
sports section which was split equally into 60 local sports pages (7.5%) and 60 
international sports pages (7.5%). Number of pages published increased from 712 
pages in March to 796 pages in April. This was due to the seven missing issues in the 
previous. On the other hand, the sports section decreased from 148 pages in March to 
120 pages in April due to the suspension of the local sports activities.  
  Figure 27: Al-Bilad: April 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage  
 
4.4.12 Al-Bilad sports section: May 2011 
 Statistics presented in Figure 28 show the number and the types of the Al-
Bilad pages in May 2011. The newspaper published 960 pages including 172 sports 
pages (17.9%) split into 89 local sports pages (9.2%) and 83 international sports 
pages (8.6%). The sports section of Al-Bilad increased from 120 pages in April to 
172 pages in May after resumption of the local sports activities. The issue of May 3, 
2011 was missing and it was not included in the statistics. 
Al-Bilad (May 2011) 
Number of pages including 
sports section 
Sports section 
pages  
Local sports 
pages 
International 
sports pages 
960  172 (17.9%) 89 (9.2%) 83 (8.6%) 
  Figure 28: Al-Bilad: May 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage 
 
Al-Bilad (April 2011) 
Number of pages including 
sports section 
Sports section 
pages 
Local sports 
pages 
International 
sports pages 
796 120 (15%) 60 (7.5%) 60 (7.5%) 
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4.4.13 Al-Bilad sports section: March to May 2011 
 Statistics presented in Figure 29 show the amount and the types of sports 
coverage of Al-Bilad during March, April and May 2011. In this period, Al-Bilad 
published 2468 pages excluding the missing issues. The sports coverage of Al-Bilad 
included 440 pages (17.8%) spilt into 220 local sports pages (8.9%) and 220 
international sports pages or (8.9%) of the newspaper content.  
Al-Bilad (March to May 2011) 
Number of pages 
including sports section 
Sports section 
pages 
Local sports 
pages 
International 
sports pages 
2468  440 (17.8%) 220 (8.9%) 220 (8.9%) 
    Figure 29: Al-Bilad: March to May 2011: Total number of pages and types of sports news coverage  
 
4.4.14 Al-Bilad: Types of sports news articles: March 2011 
 Statistics presented in Figure 30 show the types and the total number of 
published sports news articles in Al-Bilad in March 2011. Al-Bilad published 237 
sports news articles during March including 10 sports news articles (4.2%) that 
explicitly covered the uprising, 25 sports news articles (10.5%) that implicitly 
covered the uprising, 77 sports news articles (32.4%) that covered the Al-Khalifa 
family members' sports activities and 125 unrelated sports articles (52.7%).  
Al-Bilad (March 2011) 
Explicitly about 
the uprising 
Implicitly about 
the uprising 
Explicitly about 
the regime 
Unrelated 
10 articles (4.2%) 25 articles 
(10.5%) 
77 articles 
(32.4%) 
125 articles 
(52.7%) 
Total: 237 sports news articles in March 2011 
    Figure 30: Al-Bilad: March 2011: Types of sports news articles  
 
4.4.15 Al-Bilad: Types of sports news articles: April 2011 
Statistics presented in Figure 31 show the types and the total number of 
published sports news articles in Al-Bilad in April 2011. The newspaper published 
259 sports news articles including 24 articles (9.2%) that explicitly covered the 
uprising, 30 articles (11.5%) that implicitly covered the uprising, 68 articles (26.2%) 
that covered the Al-Khalifa family members' sports activities, and 137 unrelated 
articles (52.8%).  
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Al-Bilad (April 2011) 
Explicitly about 
the uprising 
Implicitly about 
the uprising 
Explicitly about 
the regime 
Unrelated 
24 articles (9.2%) 30 articles 
(11.5%) 
68 articles (26.2%) 137 articles (52.8%) 
Total: 259 sports news articles in April 2011 
      Figure 31: Al-Bilad: April 2011: Types of sports news articles  
 
4.4.16 Al-Bilad: Types of sports news articles: May 2011  
Statistics presented in Figure 32 show the types and the total number of 
published sports news articles in Al-Bilad in May 2011. The newspaper published 
343 articles during this month including one article (0.2%) that explicitly covered the 
uprising, five articles (1.4%) that implicitly covered the uprising, 96 articles (27.9%) 
that covered the Al-Khalifa family members' sports activities, and 241 unrelated 
articles (70.2%). The articles that covered the Al-Khalifa family members' sports 
activities increased from 68 news articles (26.2%) in April to 96 news articles 
(27.9%) in May. The unrelated news articles jumped from 137 articles (52.8%) in 
April to 241 articles (70.2%) in May after the resumption of the local sports 
activities.  
Al-Bilad (May 2011) 
Explicitly about the 
uprising 
Implicitly about 
the uprising 
Explicitly about the 
regime 
Unrelated 
1 article (0.2%) 5 articles (1.4%)  96 articles (27.9%) 241 articles (70.2%) 
Total: 343 sports news articles in May 2011 
  Figure 32: Al-Bilad: May 2011: Types of sports news articles  
 
4.4.17 Al-Bilad: Types of sports news articles: March to May 2011  
Statistics presented in Figure 33 show the types and the total number of 
published sports news articles in Al-Bilad in March, April and May 2011. The 
newspaper published 878 articles including 35 articles (3.9%) that covered the 
uprising explicitly, 56 articles (6.8%) that covered the uprising implicitly, 241 
articles (27.4%) that covered the Al-Khalifa family members' sports activities and 
542 unrelated news articles (61.7%).  
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Al-Bilad (March to May 2011) 
Explicitly about the 
uprising 
Implicitly about 
the uprising 
Explicitly about the 
regime 
Unrelated 
35 article (3.9%) 60 articles (6.8%)  241 articles (27.4%) 542 articles (61.7%) 
Total: 878 sports news articles in May 2011 
Figure 33: Al-Bilad: March to May 2011: Total types of sports news articles  
 
4.4.18 Total sports coverage of the two selected newspapers 
 Statistics presented in Figure 34 show the number and type of Akhbar Al-
Khaleej and Al-Bilad pages in March, April and May 2011. Together, the two 
newspapers published 5188 pages including 879 sports pages (16.9%) split into 479 
local sports pages (9.2%) and 400 international sports pages or (7.7%) of newspaper 
content. 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej  and Al-Bilad (March to May 2011) 
Number of pages 
including sports pages 
Sports section pages Local sports 
pages 
Unrelated 
5188  879 (16.9%) 479 (9.2%) 400 (7.7%) 
Figure 34: Newspaper coverage: March to May 2011: Total number of pages and types of sports news 
coverage  
 
4.4.19 Total types of sports news articles in the two selected newspapers 
 Statistics presented in Figure 35 show the types and the total number of 
published sports news articles in Akbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad in March, April and 
May 2011. The two newspapers published 2155 local sports news articles including 
79 articles (3.6%) that explicitly covered the uprising, 166 articles (7.7%) that 
implicitly covered the uprising, 526 articles (24.4%) that covered the Al-Khalifa 
members' sports activities and 1384 unrelated articles (64.2%).   
Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad (March to May 2011) 
Explicitly about 
the uprising 
Implicitly about 
the uprising 
Explicitly about the 
regime 
Unrelated 
78 articles (3.6%) 166 articles (7.7%) 526 articles (24.4%) 1384 articles (64.2%) 
Total: 2155 sports news articles in May 2011 
 Figure 35: Newspaper coverage: March to May 2011: Total number and of sports news articles   
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4.5 Data analysis and findings 
 After classifying the newspaper data, 19 articles of Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 27 
articles from Al-Bilad were selected from the category "explicitly about the 
uprising". In the selected 19 articles of Akhbar Al-Khaleej, each frame was used at 
least eight times (Figure 36). The characterization frame was used 19 times (100%) 
in the 19 articles of Akhbar Al-Khaleej. The second most used frame was the 
unpatriotic frame that was used in 13 articles (68.4%) and the consequences frame 
was used in eight articles (42.1%).  
 
Frame Articles Percentage of total articles 
Characterization frame 19 100% 
Consequences frame 8 42.1% 
Unpatriotic frame 13 68.4% 
                     Figure 36: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Number and percentage of the use of the three frames  
 
 In the selected 27 articles of Al-Bilad, each individual frame was used at least 
in 10 articles (Figure 37). The characterization frame appeared in 26 articles (96.2%). 
The consequences frame was the second most used frame in the coverage as it 
appeared in 11 articles (44.7%), and then the unpatriotic frame that was used in 10 
articles or (37%). Unlike Akhbar Al-Khaleej, the coverage of Al-Bilad began on 
March 4, 2011 as several articles referred to "political events", "political 
circumstances", "political activities" and occasionally "political crisis" in the sports 
news coverage that discussed the suspension of the local sports activities. It is noted 
that key phrases such as "protests", "marches", "demonstrations", and The Athletes' 
March" were not used by Al-Bilad until the broadcast of the With the Event television 
programme on April 4, 2011 when explicit key phrases that referred to the uprising 
were used by the newspapers.   
 
Frame Article Percentage to total articles 
Characterization frame 26 96.2% 
Consequences frame 11 40.7% 
Unpatriotic frame 10 37% 
                      Figure 37: Al-Bilad: Number and percentage of the use of the three frames  
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 In the total of 46 articles (19 articles for Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 27 articles for 
Al-Bilad), the characterization frame was used in 45 articles that made up 97.8% of 
the total, the unpatriotic frame was used in 23 articles (50%), and the consequences 
frame was used in 19 articles (41.0%) (Figure 38). The coverage delegitimized the 
uprising by framing it as "illegal marches", "unlicensed gatherings", or "the 
unlicensed Athletes' March". Articles that used neutral key phrases to portray the 
protests were mostly published by Al-Bilad in March 2011 when the protests were 
portrayed as "political events" or "political circumstances". The consequences frame 
was used in eight articles (42%) of the Akhbar Al-Khaleej coverage and 11 articles 
(40.7%) of the Al-Bilad coverage (a total of 19 times (41.3%) of the coverage of the 
two newspapers). In addition, the unpatriotic frame frequented 13 articles (68.4%) of 
the Akhbar Al-Khaleej coverage compared to 10 articles that made up (37%) of the 
Al-Bilad coverage. A total of 23 articles (50%) in the two newspapers used the 
unpatriotic frame. The protesters were framed as unpatriotic citizens who offended 
the nation and the wise leadership as the political movement aimed to harm the 
country and divide the society.  
   
 Akhbar Al-Khaleej Al-Bilad Total 
Frame Articles % Articles % Articles % 
Characterization 19 100% 26 96.2% 45 97% 
Consequences  8 42.1% 11 40.7% 19 41.3% 
Unpatriotic  13 68.4% 10 37% 23 50% 
                    Figure 38: Newspaper coverage: Frequency of the three frames by number and percentage  
 
4.5.1 Use of the characterization frame for the protests  
 The coverage of the uprising by Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad portrayed 
the protests negatively by focusing on the legal framework of the movement (Figure 
39). The three key phrases of the characterization frame of the uprising "unlicensed 
gatherings" or "illegal gatherings" or "illegal marches" were used  25 times (33.3%) 
while the phrases "unfortunate events" or "security events" were used 11 times 
(14.6%). Additionally, the phrase "crisis" was used  9 times (12%) and 
"disturbances" was used 8 times (10.6%). The coverage targeted The Athletes' March 
by using key phrases such as "the wretched Athletes' March" or "what is called The 
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Athletes' March" 5 times (6.6%). In contrast, neutral key phrases such as "political 
event", "political activities", "political circumstances", and "political march" were 
used 11 times (14.6%). However, these neutral key phrases were often preceded or 
followed by a negative term each time. For example, while "the recent events" is 
considered a neutral key phrase, it was preceded once by "the abuses" to become "the 
abuses in the recent events" which showed that the recent events were harmful to the 
people and the country. Overall, the demonstrations were framed as "distressful acts" 
that breached the security of the country.    
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Key phrase of framing the uprising Akhbar Al-Khaleej Al-Bilad Coverage % 
The unlicensed marches 
"The unlicensed Athletes' March" 
"The unlicensed protests" 
"Illegal marches" 
"Illegal gatherings" 
 
14   11   25   33.3% 
The unfortunate events 
"The recent security events" 
 
4   7   11   14.6% 
The political events 
"The recent events" 
"The political activities" 
"The political circumstances" 
"The political march" 
 
4   7   11   14.6% 
The sit-in 
"Disgraceful acts" 
"Security disturbances" 
"Marches that breached security"   
"Marches demand regime overthrow" 
 
3   5   8   10.6% 
The political crisis 
"The political unrest" 
"The crisis" 
"The security crisis" 
"The recent crisis"   
 
3   6   9   12% 
The Athletes' March 
"The wretched Athlete's March"  
 "What is called The Athletes' March" 
 
3   4   7   9.3% 
Irregularities and abuses  
"The sports abuses" 
"Sports irregularities" 
 
3    1   4   
 
5.3% 
 
Total 34   41   75   99.7% 
Figure 39: Newspaper coverage: Key phrases and frequency of the characterization frame of the uprising   
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4.5.2 Use of the characterization frame for the Al-Khalifa family 
 Key phrases to frame Al-Khalifa as a family or individuals were used 82 
times (pointing to the Al-Khalifa family members within the selected articles with 
their real names or positions such as: the King, Prime Minister, or Crown Prince 
excluded from the analysis). There was a concentration on the sagacity and the 
nobility of the Al-Khalifa family (Figure 40). The key phrases of this frame included 
"the wise leadership", "the wise government", "the noble leadership", and "the noble 
Al-Khalifa" which were used 43 times (53%). The phrase "the leadership" was used 
16 times (19.7%), "the regime" was used 12 times (14.8%) and "the nation's 
figureheads", and "the national figureheads" were used 10 times (14.8%). The 
newspaper coverage endeavoured to present the Al-Khalifa family as the sacred 
figureheads and the legitimate authorities that should not be challenged; targeting the 
family is targeting the legitimacy and civil peace. The frame, overall, was employed 
to protect the royal family and its members. It is noticed that the frame did not just 
focus on the strong figures of the royal family, but also the royal family as a whole. 
The protests criticized policies of the royal family, which justified the domination of 
the key phrase "the wise leadership or government".   
 
Kay Phrase of Framing Al-Khalifa Akhbar Al-Khaleej Al-Bilad Coverage  % 
The wise leadership or government/ The 
noble Al-Khalifa or leadership 
20 23 43 53% 
The leadership 2 14 16 19.7% 
The nation's figureheads / The national's 
figureheads 
2 8 10 12.3% 
The regime 4 8 12 14.8% 
Total 28 53 81 99.8% 
Figure 40: Newspaper coverage: Kay phrases and frequency of the use of the characterization frame for the Al-Khalifa 
family  
 
4.5.3 Use of the consequences frame for the protests 
 The consequences of the uprising were labelled negatively 19 times (100%). 
The coverage ignored the protesters' demands and framed the consequences of the 
uprising as "sabotage" and "inciting sectarian strife" (Figure 41). The two key 
phrases "destabilization of the security and the stability" and "breaching the 
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national's unity" were used 13 times (68.4%). The uprising was accused of causing 
the suspension of sports activities three times (15.7%), influencing the local economy 
negatively two times (10.5%), and infringement the national's sovereignty once 
(5.2%). Overall, the uprising was framed as a movement that targeted civil peace. 
Overall, the frame aimed to stir people's fear of the immediate consequences of the 
uprising that "destabilized" the stability of the country and the society. This frame 
overlooked the consequences of actions taken by the regime to confront the protests. 
The message that purported to be sent was that the uprising targeted the social and 
economic interests of the people of Bahrain and that the uprising would negatively 
affect the daily life of Bahrainis.  
.  
Kay Phrase of the consequences 
frame 
Akhbar Al-khaleej Al-Bilad Coverage % 
Destabilize the security and stability  
"Destabilizing the nation's unity" 
"Clashes between people" 
"Acts of sabotage"  
"Breach the nation's security" 
"Threat to the nation's security" 
"Targeting civil peace" 
"Inciting sectarian strife" 
6 7 13 68.4% 
Economic losses 
"Financial losses" 
"Wages of referees not being paid" 
0 2 2 10.5% 
Suspension of the sports activities  
"Players not attending trainings"  
0 3 3 15.7% 
Infringement the national sovereignty  0 1 1 5.2% 
 
Total frequency of the key phrases  6 13 19 99.8% 
  Figure 41: Newspaper coverage: Key phrases and frequency of the use of the consequences frame  
 
4.5.4 Use of the unpatriotic frame for the protesters and the supporters   
 The protesters were framed as unpatriotic citizens who insulted the nation and 
the leadership. The unpatriotic frame was used in 23 articles (50%) of the newspaper 
coverage; 13 articles (56.5%) published in Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 10 articles 
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(43.4%) published in Al-Bilad. The demonstrations, including The Athletes' March, 
were framed as protests that offended the nation and the "wise leadership". "Al-
Khalifa and the nation", "Al-Khalifa and Bahrain", "Al-Khalifa and the kingdom", or 
Al-Khalifa and the dear land" were used in 43.4% of the newspaper coverage. Each 
time, the protesters were framed as unpatriotic citizens not only for "offending" the 
nation only, but also for "offending" the wise leadership or "the figureheads of the 
nation". It should be noted that while a key phrase such as "offending the figureheads 
of the nation" can be considered a consequence of the uprising, this key phrase, for 
example, was actually used in Arabic in what is considered as a noun to become 
"those who offended the nation" or "those who are disloyal to the nation and the 
leadership". On the other hand, the newspaper coverage did not focus on the 
supporters of the Al-Khalifa family or their roles during the uprising except for two 
articles where they were praised for attending training sessions during the general 
strike.    
  
Key phrase of the unpatriotic frame Akhbar Al-
Khaleej 
Al-Bilad Coverage % 
Offending the figureheads of the nation  1   2   3   13% 
Offending the nation/ the wise leadership      5   4   9   39.1% 
Offending our figureheads/ the wise leadership   1   1   2   8.6% 
Overthrowing the regime     1   0   1   4.3% 
Offending the figureheads/ the political leadership 3   0   3   13% 
Offending the wise leadership/ the dear nation   1   2   3   13% 
Offending the regime 1   0   1   4.3% 
Disloyal to the nation and its wise leadership 0   1   1   4.3% 
Total 13   10   23   99.6% 
Figure 42: Newspaper coverage: Key phrases and frequency of the use of the unpatriotic frame   
 
4.5.5 Use of sources  
 The 46 sports news articles (100%) relied on official and pro-regime sources 
including Al-Khalifa family members, local clubs, sports federations, and 
commission of inquiry (Figure 43). Neither newspaper interviewed any of the 
protesters or the athletes involved in the demonstrations, even those who were 
accused of offending the nation and the leadership. The coverage of the protests 
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adopted the point of view of the regime. The findings show that only 4 articles (21%) 
from Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 13 articles (50%) from Al-Bilad were accompanied by 
by-line. It should be noticed that 8 of 13 articles that were accompanied by by-line 
were published in Al-Bilad before April 6, 2011. After this date, Al-Bilad changed 
the tone of the coverage from using key phrase such as "political circumstances" or 
"emergency circumstance" to using key phrases such as "illegal gatherings/marches". 
 
 Articles Articles with 
by-line 
% Official and pro-
regime sources 
% 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej 19 4 21% 19 100 
Al-Bilad 27 13 48.1% 27 100 
Total 46 17 36.9% 46 100 
Figure 43: Newspaper coverage: The use of official and pro-regime sources  
 
 
4.5.6 Use of images of the protesters     
 The Al-Bilad newspaper coverage included five photos that accompanied 
several articles whereas Akhbar Al-Khaleej did not publish any of the protesters 
photos. One photo among the five was published three times. As shown in Figure 44, 
angry sports figures appeared holding a banner that states "  تضامناً  مسيرة جميع الرياضيين
 ."which is translated as "All Athletes March In Solidarity with the People "مع الشعب
The other small banner states "لن نرحل حتى تتحقق مطالبنا" which can be translated as 
"We Will not Leave Until our Demands Are Met". Another of the five published 
photos was not from anti-regime protests. The photo was taken before one of the 
local football league games and after the resumption of the local activities for players 
holding a banner. They vowed to be "loyal soldiers" to the leadership and to stick to 
them in thick and thin. The players framed themselves as "soldiers" who are "loyal" 
to the leadership and in response to the uprising that was framed as a movement that 
targeted the Al-Khalifa family.       
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         Figure 44: One of The Athletes' March photos published in Al-Bilad on April 12, 2011 
  
 The findings presented in this chapter show that the characterization frame 
was used to undermine the protests by portraying the movement as "disgraceful 
acts", "security disturbances" and "unlicensed marches". Overall, more key phrases 
were used to portray the protests as having negative consequences. Furthermore, the 
characterization frame was used positively to frame the Al-Khalifa family as the 
representative of the legitimate authority and the figureheads for the nation so that 
the newspaper coverage associated the security and the stability of the country with 
the Al-Khalifa family. The unpatriotic frame was used to disparage the protesters 
who were framed as unpatriotic citizens. On the other hand, the Al-Khalifa family 
supporters were praised for their political stance and for standing against the protests. 
The newspaper coverage relied heavily on official and pro-regime sources and 
ignored the pro-opposition's view of the events. Given that the two newspapers are 
directed by the regime, it is not surprising then that the sports coverage of the 
uprising adopted the official line.  
 Overall, the newspaper coverage endeavoured to create a national identity 
that encouraged the people to stand up by the regime and to repudiate any attempt by 
the protesters to change status quo. The protesters were accused of harming Bahraini 
society, threatening national security and inciting sectarian strife. In directing the 
people toward its agenda, the Al-Khalifa regime offered the people two choices: 
stability or chaos. Supporting the royal family meant supporting a prosperous future 
where is no fear or suffering, while supporting the protesters meant slipping into 
national chaos.   
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Chapter 5: Television data analysis: Methods and findings 
 
 This chapter explains how the television data was collected and the methods 
that were used to analyse this data in order to investigate how the sports media 
framed the 2011 uprising in Bahrain and to investigate the strategies used to 
politicize sports media. The chapter starts with a description of the television data 
and the rationale for the selection of the data of two sports programmes With the 
Event and Special Event that were broadcast on Bahrain Sports Channel on April 4 
and April 11, 2011.  
 Careful attention was paid to select the right words and terms that is as close 
as possible to the English language. For example, a strong Bedouin expression was 
used during the two programmes by Al-Khalifa family supporters " يا بوسلمان  ابشر بعزك
ما تعصاك الليحنا عيالك وعصاك  " which are here translated as "At Your Own Sweet Will". 
This expression signifies that we are your men who strike your enemy and we will go 
with you to the end. More examples of television data translation from Arabic to 
English can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
5.1 Description of television data 
There is only one sports channel in Bahrain and it is controlled and directed 
by the regime. Bahrain Sports Channel, however, has an alternative channel that airs 
only when two events coincide. For example, when two important football matches 
are played at the same time, the main channel and the alternative channel air the two 
matches. The main focus of the channel is broadcasting sports events, mostly local 
matches, and covering pre and post-match, results and analyses. During the period of 
the study, Bahrain Sports Channel continued screening old archived programmes as 
the local sports activities were suspended due to the uprising. Besides the old 
programmes, two programmes that explicitly covered the uprising and mainly The 
Athletes' March were aired to discuss the involvement of athletes and sports figures 
in the demonstrations. The two programmes displayed images and personal 
information of individuals who participated in The Athletes' March with the 
panellists calling their clubs and the regime to take action against them.     
With the Event programme was aired on April 4, 2011 about 21:00 and 
finished after 00:00 the next day. The length of the programme was two hours, 59 
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minutes and 30 seconds. The picture and the sound were clear except for a short cut 
in the picture for a few seconds in minute 1:45:10 and another a cut in the first few 
seconds of the show. In addition, there was a jam in the picture for 14 seconds in 
minute 02:53:30 before it resumed where it started. Additionally, the sound did not 
match the picture for the first six minutes (Figure 45). The programme was aired in 
Bahrain Sports Channel and Bahrain Channel (the main channel) at the same time 
except for the last 6 minutes when Bahrain Channel cut the transmission to broadcast 
the midnight news bulletin while Bahrain Sports channel continued airing the 
programme live. With the Event was aired about 45 days after The Athletes' March 
was organized on February 21, 2011.  
The second programme Special Event was aired on April 11, 2011. It 
commenced about 22:00 and finished about 01:00 the next day. The length of the 
programme was two hours, 55 minutes and 27 seconds. The picture was clear, 
however, there was a cut for about 3 seconds at the beginning of the programme. As 
well, the sound does not match the picture until minute 00:06:25 of the programme 
as the sound was late for a few seconds.  
Bahrain Sports Channel: Television data 
Data and source The programme  Notes 
 
Aired on April 4, 2011 and uploaded 
to YouTube in April 4, 2011 
 
 
 
With the Event 
- Duration: 2:59:30 
- Picture and sound: clear 
- A short cut in the first few seconds 
- A short cut in 01:45:10 for 3 seconds 
- A short cut in 02:53:30 for 14 seconds 
- The sound does not match the picture from  
minute 00:00:00 to minute 00:06:20 
 
 
Aired in April 11, 2011 and uploaded 
to YouTube in April 14, 2011 
 
 
 
Special Event 
- Duration: 02:55:26 
- Picture and sound: clear 
- A short for 3 seconds during the first minute of 
the programme 
- The sound does not match the picture from 
minute 00:01:00 to minute 00:06:25 
Figure 45: Television material: Data collection summary  
 
 Both programmes were aired live on Bahrain Sports Channel. The two 
programmes started with a wide-shot of the studio. The host was facing the guests 
who were seated in armchairs and separated by a small brown coffee table. Pro-
regime sports figures guests were in the studio while others were interviewed on the 
phone. Three guests were in the studio of With the Event and four gests were in the 
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studio of Special Event; two in the first part and two in the second part of the 
programme. Between the programme breaks Special Event displayed a black 
background with yellow rings and Arabic writing carrying the programme title. The 
two programmes displayed "news ticker" and "crawler" bars on the screen. The news 
ticker announced news tips while the crawler showed messages sent by pro-regime 
supporters. While the panelists were addressing the audience, both bars were sending 
different types of messages dispraising the uprising and anti-regime protesters. The 
panelists and the two bars were meant to encourage the pro-regime audience to adopt 
the messages sent by the two programmes.  
5.2 Collecting television data 
 Bahrain Sports Channel has an archive of television programs but as a 
research student in exile, I have no access to With the Event and Special Event. Thus, 
the two programmes were downloaded from a YouTube user called "B4HRAIN". 
The user joined YouTube on October 27, 2008 and their last video was uploaded on 
April 10, 2012. B4HRAIN has 215 videos, 986 subscribers and their videos recorded 
1,094, 422 views. B4HRAIN has picked a profile picture of the King and the Crown 
Prince praying. It is notable that the user's videos included: speeches and interviews 
of the regime's figures including the King of Bahrain Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, 
military orders of the Bahraini Defence Force during the period of martial law, 
"patriotic songs" about Bahrain and the Al-Khalifa family, and news bulletins from 
Bahrain Channel and other pro-regime channels. With the Event was uploaded on 
April 4, 2011 and titled on YouTube "BTV Show on Sports Violations  برنامج مع الحدث
 The Arabic text is translated as "With the Event Show: Athletes ."تجاوزات الرياضيين
Violation" and the programme can be found on: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXd6UQ5MAds. Special Event was uploaded on 
April 14, 2011 titled "برنامج حدث خاص عن تجاوزات الرياضيين" which is translated to 
"Special Event programme about Athletes' Irregularities" and it can be found on: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-SH9oqgl84. Both YouTube clips were last 
accessed online on November 15, 2015.  
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5.3 Rationale for selection of the two programmes   
 The two programmes were significant as newspapers did not report on the 
uprising overtly until April 6, 2011 and after the King's son who was also the 
President of the Bahrain Olympic Committee Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad was 
interviewed in With the Event. Nasser bin Hamad threatened those who were 
involved in the uprising would be punished. The establishment of commission of 
inquiry was announced during With the Event and those whose images appeared in 
the programme were suspended or arrested. In addition, several of sports news 
articles that covered the uprising pointed to the two programmes. For example, a 
news article published in Akhbar Al-Khaleej on April 7, 2011, stated that Al-Hala 
Sports Club Board of Directors had an immediate meeting to discuss what was 
displayed in With the Event including photos of the participants of "The paltry 
Athletes' March".  
 
5.4 With the Event television Sports programme 
 The opening sequence of With the Event started with a report about the king 
who confronted the protesters and saved Bahrain. The audience saw at the first 
glance of the programme a wide-shot showing the panellists while pictures of the 
King (right) and the Prime Ministers (left) displayed on a digital screen at the back of 
the studio behind the seated panellists (referred to here as the background set for the 
studio) beside another picture that had an unclear meaning of a person who came out 
of the dark and went back again (Figure 46). The programme hosted three guests. 
From left to right were Faiz Al-Sada (the host) who usually hosts social and sports 
programmes, Majid Sultan (a sports journalist), Abdullah Bo Nofil (a sports 
journalist) and Faisal Al-Sheikh (a sports journalist). The three guests wore Thawb 
and only Faisal Al-Sheikh wore a business suit. The guests were familiar to the 
audience and appear in different sports programmes. Faisal Al-Sheikh writes political 
columns in local and regional newspapers and he also appeared in political 
programmes in Bahrain Channel during the uprising. The Thawb and business suit 
are formal dress that people in Bahrain wear at weddings, funerals, television 
programmes, or formal parties. Many Bahraini wear Thawb or business suit 
whenever it is more comfortable as it is a personal decision that does not signify the 
person's academic or social background. In this context, the Thawb and business suit 
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do not symbolize or indicate any point linked with the study. The blue bar in the 
bottom of the screen stated in Arabic "  للمشاركة في برنامج حدث خاص أرسل رسالة نصية على
 ,which can be translated as "To participate in the With the Event programme "األر
send an SMS on the numbers". The news ticker in red stated " تم التمديد ليومين وذلك رغبة
 which can be translated as "(out of frame) Has Been Extended at the "من الرياضيين
Request of the Athletes". As for the two programmes, in the top right corner of the 
monitor the word "مباشر" or "Live" as the programme was broadcasted live and in the 
top left corner of the monitor appeared the channel logo. "Zain" that appeared in the 
bottom left corner is a telecommunication company that operates in Bahrain and 
"94194" was the number that the messages should be sent to by Zain users. There 
were two more numbers of "VIVA 88082" and "Batelco 92345", but they do not 
appear in Figure 46. "VIVA" and "Batelco" are other telecommunication companies 
that also operate in Bahrain. In minute 00:04:10 of With the Event a red bar was 
displayed showing a phone line number with the international code for Bahrain 
calling on the audience to participate in the programme ("To participate: 
0097317681058"). However, the phone line was limited in With the Event to sports 
figures and Al-Khalifa family members.  
  The host of With the Event interviewed three sports figures who participated 
in the Athletes' March over the phone: the National Football Team player Mohamed 
Sayed Adnan, the National Football Team Player A'ala Hubail, and Al-Ahli Club 
Manager Faisal Alali. The host of the programme also interviewed pro-regime sports 
figures, including Secretary-General of the Football Federation of Bahrain 
Abdulrahman Sayar, the National Handball Team player Saeed Joher and the 
National Handball Player Ahmed Abdulnabi over the phone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: With the Event: Screenshot of the panel of the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 
4, 2011) 
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 During With the Event, edited digital images of The Athletes' March were 
displayed. The faces of the participants were circled and their names and/or sport 
were identified. Figure 47 shows an edited digital image of The Athlete's March from 
minute 01:36:38 of With the Event. Four sports figures' faces were circled and 
identified as from left to right Mubark Al-Haiki (a volleyball player), Hussain Al-
Haiki (a volleyball player), Nader Abduljalil (a Manger in Al-Ahli Club) and Mirza 
Abdullah (a volleyball player).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 01:36:38 identifying sports 
figures in The Athletes' March (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
 
5.5 Special Event television sports programme  
 Special Event started with a report about the feedback following With the 
Event that was aired a week earlier. Special Event was divided into two parts. The 
first part was about the legal aspect of the participation of the sports figures in the 
uprising and the legitimacy of the sanctions that would be applied to them. This part 
involved the host Faiz Al-Sada and two guests in the studio (Sheikh Rashed bin 
Abdulrahman (the Vice President of Al-Muharraq Club) and Mohammed Al-Mogbil 
(a counsellor)). The second part of the programme that started from minute 00:52:53 
discussed the role of sport and sports media in the uprising and hosted Fouad Fahd (a 
sports critic) and Abdullah Ashour (a sports journalist). The guests often appeared in 
Bahrain Sports Channel prior the uprising. The programme also interviewed the pro-
regime figures and the Al-Khalifa family members Mubarak Al-Sulaiti (FIFA 
Members), Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa (an Honorary Member of Al-Riffa 
Club), Majid Sultan (a sports journalist) and Sheikh Abdulla bin Khalid (the Al-Riffa 
Club President) over the phone. The phone line to the programme was available for 
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the audience in the second part of the programme. This was unlike With the Event in 
which the phone line was limited to sports figures and Al-Khalifa family members.   
 A wide-shot of the programme studio in Figure 48 shows from left to right 
Faiz Al-Sada (the host), Sheikh Rashed bin Abdulrahman (Vice President of Al-
Muharraq Club) and Mohammed Al-Mogbil (a counsellor). A three dimensional 
digital waving flag of Bahrain was displayed in the background. The message in the 
crawler (top) stated in Arabic " ويحفظ شعبهااللهم احفظ البحرين وآل خليفة من صغيرهم إلى كبيرهم  " 
which can be translated as "May God protects Bahrain and the Al-Khalifa Family 
young and old and protect the Bahraini people". The news ticker (bottom) stated 
" سمو الشيخ ناصر بن حمد آل خليفة تم تمديد برنامج بتوجيهات من " which can be translated as 
"Under the guidance of His Highness Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad, the event Has Been 
extended (cut in the sentence)".  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:23:00 shows the 
panel of the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)  
 
 Edited digital images of The Athletes' March were displayed during the 
Special Event. A film clip of a "patriotic song" was also played as the song praised 
the Crown Prince and his personal qualities from minute 00:47:50 to minute 
00:52:45. The song was performed during a festival of Independence Day that was 
held in Bahrain Stadium months before the programme was broadcast. Figure 49 
shows an Iraqi artist called Majid Al-Muhandis wearing a black suit standing beside 
dancers wearing traditional clothes with open red waistcoats while they were 
performing a traditional dance. According to the authorities, songs and poetry that 
praise the Al-Khalifa family are considered "patriotic" and they are played in public 
spaces. For instance, during Independence Day, songs about the King and the Al-
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Khalifa family are played on national television and broadest in schools, universities, 
and shopping malls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:49:39 of the song 
played in the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011) 
 
 
 The festival was under the patronage of the Crown Prince. He appeared in 
Figure 50 wearing Thawb and holding Misbaha (prayer beads). He was smiling while 
listening to the song that sang in colloquial Arabic " ،حيا من جانا يا حيا نور الحفل بحضوره
من كبر حبه انرسمه بعين كل بحريني صورة.. مرحبا مليون وأكثر باللي نتغنى بحبه، ذا ولي العهد ساكن قلبنا 
 which can be translated as: "Oh Welcome Who honoured Us, the Party "واحنا في قلبه 
Brightens by His Presence, Who Is Beloved and His Image Is Drawn in Every 
Bahraini's Eye, Oh a Million Welcome to Who We Are Warbling Love For, He Is 
the Crown Prince Who Lives in Our Hearts and We Live in His Heart".  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:49:39 of the song 
played in the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)  
 
 Additionally, scenes of a visit of the Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman to 
the Salmaniya Medical Complex were showed during the programme (Figure 51). 
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During a phone call made by the host, the sports journalist Majid Sultan was asked to 
comment on scenes from minute 01:37:27 to minute 01:38:36 of the Prime Minister 
shaking hands with the hospital officials while some of them kissed his hand. Sultan 
said that "This is very beautiful to see and not just the Prime Minister's hand deserves 
to be kissed. Khalifa bin Salman was reborn in this crisis. These are the men of 
Bahrain. Khalifa bin Salamn fears no one but the Lord of the worlds". Majid Sultan, 
also, called for the protesters to be punished saying that "We are not one people 
anymore". 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 01:37:28 of a scene of the Prime 
Minister that was displayed in the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)  
 
5.6 Method of analysing television data 
 The unit of analysis for the television data was a period of five minutes for 
every half an hour of each programme. To ensure that the data was not subjected to 
any selection bias, the selection covered the elements of the two programmes 
including the opening and the closing sequences, the panel discussion, the crawler, 
the news ticker, the background, the use of The Athletes' March edited images, the 
use of music, the phone interviews of the pro-regime sports figures and the 
participants in The Athletes March sports and phone calls from the audience. In total,  
35 minutes of With the Event and 35 minutes of Special Event  including the first and 
the last five minutes were analysed. This approach to selection and reduction of 
television data for analysis purposes was adapted from Jewitt (2012, pp. 18-19) and 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10). It should be noted that The Athletes' March 
edited images were displayed in Special Event during the opening sequence and none 
of the images of the march were displayed during the other selected minutes of the 
programme. Additionally, the last five minutes of With the Event were dedicated to 
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the phone call of Sheikh Nasser and a song about the king and was analysed as an 
individual closing sequence. This is unlike the last five minutes of Special Event that 
was dedicated to the panellists and was analysed within the stated elements.  
 Quantitative and qualitative content analyses were used to analyse the data 
(Macnamara 2005; Bhattacherjee 2012). The television data was analysed in light of 
three frames. The characterization frame (Lakoff 2011; Kaufman et al. 2013) was 
used to examine how the uprising and the Al-Khalifa family were framed. The 
consequences frame was not used explicitly during the two programmes and thus it 
was not included in the analysis as an individual frame. However, this does not 
downplay the importance of this frame as the two programmes were broadcast in 
response to the uprising in order to vilify the demonstrations and its consequences. 
The use of the unpatriotic frame (Di Cicco 2010) was used to identify how the 
protesters and the pro-regime supporters were framed. Additionally, the use of the 
crawlers and news ticker during the broadcast of the two programmes was examined. 
Local and international news headlines that were not related to the uprising were 
excluded and only those related to the uprising were analysed. For the crawler, the 
message sender's name or nickname was removed (although not all messages were 
accompanied with a name). The visual elements that distinguish television from 
other mediums (Kepplinger 1989, pp. 179-180), such as the use of the images of the 
Al-Khalifa family and The Athletes' March, the use of the background set, and the 
use of music during a key period of the two programmes, were also examined.   
 The reliability of my coding was tested with the Ole Holsti (1969) intracoder 
reliability formula and considerable effort went into ensuring that the coding and the 
analysis process were not subject to bias. The selected television data that totalled 70 
minutes of the two programmes. The selected minutes of the television data was 
coded and analysed on two separate occasions. The intracoder reliability between the 
two occasions was 0.94 (where 1.0 shows a total agreement in the coding). 
 
5.7 Findings: With the Event: Use of the characterization frame for the protests   
 The analysis examined the use of the characterization frame by the panellists, 
the sports figures, and the report of the opening sequences during the selected time of 
Special Event (35 minutes). Key phrases of the characterization frame were used 17 
times including 16 times (94.1%) negatively and 1 time (5.8%) neutrally. During the 
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programme several key phrases of the characterization frame including "an act of 
treachery", "malice", "greed" and "betrayed and perfidy" were used to portray the 
uprising. The uprising was also framed as a "fright", "sadness", "chaos", "a tense 
atmosphere" and "tough days". The key phrase "The Athletes' March" was used only 
one time during the selected time (Figure 52).  
 Minute 00:00:00 to minute 00:05:00 
00:00:24 The security events 
00:00:29 The treachery 
00:00:44 Clouds of fear 
00:00:51 Malice and greed 
00:01:22 Treachery and thanklessness 
00:01:25 Sadness 
00:01:47 The big challenge  
00:02:31 Betrayed and perfidy 
00:04:57 The crisis  
 Minute 00:30:00 to minute 00:35:00 
00:30:27 Chaos 
00:31:57 Harsh lesson  
Minute 01:00:00 to minute 01:05:00 
01:03:57 The crisis  
 Minute 01:30:00 to minute 01:35:00 
01:31:06 The Athletes' March 
 Minute 02:00:00 to minute 02:05:00 
02:03:01 The security circumstances  
02:03:26 The crisis  
Minute 02:30:00 to minute 02:35:00 
02:33:34 Sadness and tense atmosphere 
Minute 02:54:29 to minute 02:59:29 
02:57:17 Tough days 
Total 
No. and percentage of frequency  17 times: (16 times negative:  94.1%), (1 
time neutral 5.8%) 
     Figure 52: With the Event: Key phrases of the characterization frame of the uprising  
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5.7.1 With the Event: Use of the characterization frame for the Al-Khalifa family  
 Key phrases of the characterization frame of the Al-Khalifa family were used 
36 times by the panellists, the sports figures during the phone interviews, the opening 
and the closing sequences reports (calling the family members by their real names or 
positions were excluded). The king was framed individually 23 times (63.8%), while 
the Al-Khalifa family including the king was framed 13 times (36.1%). The king was 
frame individually 22 times (95.6%) in the first five minutes when a film clip about 
him was played in the opening sequence. The king was praised for his personal 
qualities such as his "kindness", "gorgeousness", "compassion" and his "big heart" 
(Figure 53). 
Minute 00:00:00 to minute 00:05:00 
00:00:42 The wise leadership 
00:01:40 The most honest man (the king) 
00:01:47 The great Bo Salman (the king's agnomen)  
00:02:52 The king who has the best personal qualities 
00:02:55 Kind 
00:02:57 Gorgeous 
00:02:58 Eminent 
00:02:59 Sweetheart 
00:03:00 Compassionate 
00:03:01 Hamad who has a big heart (4 times)  
00:03:07 The king who has the best personal qualities 
00:03:10 Kind 
00:03:12 Gorgeous 
00:03:13 Eminent 
00:03:14 Sweetheart 
00:03:15 Compassionate 
00:03:16 Hamad who has a big heart (4 times) 
Minute 00:30:00 to minute 00:35:00 
00:32:02 Our leadership 
00:34:02 The regime 
 Minute 01:00:00 to minute 01:05:00 
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01:00:06 The regime 
01:00:26 Our Sheikhs  
01:02:13 The regime 
01:03:16 The compassionate father (the king) 
01:03:43 The figureheads   
01:04:19 The nation's leadership 
Minute 01:30:00 to minute 01:35:00 
01:30:16 The royal family 
01:33:15 The nation's figureheads   
01:33:18 The royal family 
Minute 02:00:00 to minute 02:05:00 
/ / 
Minute 02:30:00 to minute 02:35:00 
02:31:14 The leadership of Bahrain 
02:32:50 The regime 
Minute 02:54:29 to minute 02:59:29 
02:54:58 The regime 
02:56:31 A man son of a man 
02:56:50 O long life 
02:58:00 The regime 
02:58:05 The regime that has manner and ethics  
Total 
No. of and percentage of 
frequency  
36 times: The king (23 times 63.8%); the Al-Khalifa 
family including the king (13 times 36.1%) 
Figure 53: With the Event: Key phrases of the characterization frame of the Al-Khalifa family. (/)= no 
key phrase of frame was used.  
 
5.7.2 With the Event: Use of the unpatriotic frame for the protesters and the 
supporters   
 During With the Event, the host, the guests and pro-regime figures, and the 
opening and the closing sequences used the key phrases of the unpatriotic frame 39 
times. Pro-regime supporters framed themselves as "us" or good citizens and they 
framed their opponents as "them" or the outsiders. "Us" recurred 17 times, whereas 
"them" recurred 22 times (Figure 54). While key phrases of the frame of the pro-
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regime supporter were "white", "loyal", "faithful", "honourable soldiers", or 
"patriotic", the protesters were portrayed as "spiteful and ungrateful people", 
"hypocrites", "against the regime", or "unpatriotic people".  
00:00:00 to 00:05:00 
                    The Al-Khalifa family's supporters  The protesters  
00:01:51 The king's honourable soldiers   / 
00:02:15 Bahrain's lovers / 
00:02:25 / Spiteful people 
            00:30:00 to 00:35:00 
00:31:48 Patriotic people / 
00:32:04 / Hypocrites 
00:33:06 With us Against us 
00:33:51 / Hypocrites 
00:34:01 With the regime Against the regime 
00:34:06 / Hypocrites  
         01:00:00 to 01:05:00             
01:02:00 / Ungrateful people 
01:02:09 White  Black 
01:02:25 / Unpatriotic people  
01:03:51 People with patriotic attitudes / 
01:04:16 Patriotic people  / 
01:04:32 Honest men and loyal to Bahrain / 
01:04:45 Sports role models  / 
01:04:45 Youth's role models/loyal and faithful  / 
        01:30:00 to 01:35:00   
/ / / 
        02:00:00 to 02:05:00 
/ / / 
        02:30:00 to 02:35:00 
02:31:13 Loyal to Bahrain and its leadership   / 
       02:54:29 to 02:59:29 
02:55:00 Well done/loyal/love Bahrain, its May a wall fall on him 
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leadership and people 
02:55:15 / They lost love of their fans 
02:55:19 / They lost their way 
02:55:29 / They will be held accountable  
02:55:36 / They will be held accountable 
02:55:57 / They will be held accountable 
02:56:03 / They will be held accountable 
02:56:11 / They will be held accountable 
02:56:14 They will be awarded / 
02:56:22 With us Against us 
02:56:41 / Offended Bahrain 
02:56:48 Thanks you/well done / 
02:57:23 Honourable people who love this 
country 
/ 
02:57:27 / Traitors/do not wish good to 
Bahrain  
02:58:17 / They will be held accountable 
02:58:24 / They will fallout 
Total 
No. and percentage 
of frequency 
17 times (100% Positive) 22 times (100% Negative) 
Figure 54: With the Event: Key phrases of the unpatriotic frame. (/)= no key phrase of frame was used.   
 
5.7.3 With the Event: The opening sequence report   
 With the Event started by presenting the guests and then a report of 3 minutes 
and 35 seconds that was titled "Bahrain is Healing". The king and the royal family 
members' scenes occupied 2 minutes and 11 seconds whereas scenes of a fountain, 
happy people, children playing in a shopping mall, helicopter views of the capital 
Manama, and another view of one of the king's palaces occupied 1 minute and 24 
seconds. The report also showed scenes of the king performing a traditional Bedouin 
dance called Ardha, or of him surrounded by school students, people acclaiming the 
king while following his parade, and a scene of the king reading a book in his private 
office. Moreover, the report presented the king as an athlete as he welcomed the 
National Football Team players at his palace. The report framed the king as a potent, 
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prudent, and loveable gentleman on one hand and a courageous military commander 
on the other (Figure 55).  
Time The king's scenes during the opening sequence report  Duration 
00:00:35 to 00:00:41 / 6 seconds 
00:00:41 to 00:00:44 The king wearing a military dress while the Prime Minister 
wearing Thawb 
3 seconds 
00:00:45- 00:01:29 / 44 seconds 
00:01:30- 00:01:35 The king and some of Al-Khalifa members dancing Ardha  5 seconds 
00:01:36- 00:01:38 / 2 seconds 
00:01:39- 00:02:20 The king in a car waving to people; the king riding a horse 
with companions; the king wearing Thawb and walking 
while carrying sword; the king looking from the car sunroof 
and waving to people; the King kissing a child; the king 
shaking hands and kissing school girls; the King walking 
beside the Prime Minister and the guards following them; 
the king in a meeting with royal family members 
41 seconds 
00:02:21- 00:02:24 / 3 seconds 
00:02:25- 00:02:29 The king in his private office reading a book 4 seconds 
00:02:30- 00:02:32 / 2 seconds 
00:02:33- 00:02:51 The voiceover stops: A big smile on the king's face while 
listening to a school girl praise him and his political project 
18 seconds 
00:02:52- 00:03:33 A song about the king with no voiceover: the king welcoming 
the national football team in his palace; the king standing on a 
boat and waving to people; the king looking from the car 
sunroof and waving to people; people raising the king's photo 
while following his parade; the king looking from the car 
sunroof and waving to people. The end of the report  
41 seconds 
Total scenes duration of the king and the royal family members: 2 minutes 11 seconds 
Total scenes duration without the king and the royal family members: 1 minute 24 seconds 
Figure 55: With the Event: the king's scenes in the opening sequence report  
 
 A scene of the king walking alongside the Prime Minster while the Crown 
Prince appears in the background was displayed during the report (Figure 56). The 
king wears a military dress is followed by guards. The Prime Minister and the Crown 
Prince were wearing Thawb. The voiceover commented: "Supported by will of the 
people and the sagacity of the leadership, our motherland is healing from the wounds 
of betrayal". The location where the scene was filmed is not clear.  
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Figure 56: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:00:42 shows the king (left) 
walking alongside with the Prime Minister (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
In another sequence, the king was shown dancing the Ardha with his family 
members (Figure 57). The Ardha is a traditional Bedouin dance. The king appears 
wearing Thawb and carrying a sword alongside one of his sons. Another man 
appears behind the king holding a giant flag of Bahrain while several of Al-Khalifa 
family members perform the dance. The location where the scene was filmed is not 
clear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57: With the event: Screenshot from minute 00:01:35 shows the king dancing 
Ardha with his family members (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
In another sequence, the king was shown wearing a military dress while riding a 
horse alongside two unknown guards who are carrying swords (Figure 58). The red 
dress and the saddle of the king's horses represent the colour of the flag of Bahrain. 
The scene signifies the strength and leadership qualities of the king. The location 
where the scene was filmed is not clear.  
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Figure 58: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:01:49 shows the king (middle) riding a 
horse while wearing a military dress (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011) 
 
In another scene, the king appeared as walking while wearing traditional clothes with 
a dagger (or Janbiya) and holding a sword (Figure 59). The Crown Prince appears in 
the background followed by guards. The voiceover on Figure 58 and 59 commented 
"Sir how great you were when confronting the big challenge, riding your purebred 
horse and leading your honourable soldiers. You swore you will not soften". The 
location where the scenes were filmed is not clear.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:01:53 shows the king 
carrying a sword (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
In another sequence, the king appeared in the With the Event opening sequence 
report receiving the national football team (Figure 60). The king wore a red sports 
jacket while some players and the team's coach appear in the background. This scene 
showed the sports qualities of the king who takes care of athletes and appreciates 
their sporting achievements.    
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Figure 60: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:03:00 shows the king with 
the national football team of Bahrain (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
 Overall, the voiceover of the With the Event opening sequence report praised 
the noble and the brave leader who conquered the "traitors" and saved the country 
supported by his "honourable soldiers". Showing scenes of the king dancing the 
Ardha symbolizes war as this Bedouin dance that originates from the Arabian 
Peninsula, takes place when a tribe is heading to war or after defeating the enemy. 
The dance is performed by the tribe's members to get them ready to face the enemy 
or to celebrate the victory over those who challenged the will the tribe. The weapons 
carried by the tribe's members are mainly swords. The members sing and praise the 
tribe, its heroes and current leaders (Asharq Al-Awsat 2008; Janin and Besheer 2003, 
p. 14). Usually, the performers of the dance that takes place in an open area dance 
with pride and vigour.  
 
5.7.4 With the Event: Use of the background  
 The background during With the Event showed images of the king, the Prime 
Minister, the Crown Prince, and other Al-Khalifa family members. The event where 
the images were taken is not clear. As shown in Figure 61, the panellists appeared 
while an image of the Crown Prince smiling is displayed in the background. It seems 
from the black and white colours that the image of the Crown Prince was taken at a 
Bahrain Grand Prix event. This background often appeared during the discussion. 
Other images in the background beside the Crown Prince cannot be clearly seen.    
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Figure 61: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:34:52 shows an image of the 
Crown Prince smiling in the background (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
 
 The three dimensional digital waving flag of Bahrain was also displayed 
several times in the background of the studio set including during the phone call with 
Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, pro-regime athletes, and athletes who 
participated in The Athletes' March. As shown in Figure 62, the digital flag of 
Bahrain is waving in a semi-clear sky behind the panellists which reinforces the 
'patriotic' message and credentials of panellists and the programme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 62: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 01:00:53 shows the waving 
flag of Bahrain in the background (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
5.7.5 With the Event: Use of the crawler   
 The crawler placed at the bottom of the screen that showed messages sent by 
the audience was not displayed in the first five minutes of With the Event There were 
113 messages that were placed 164 times. Most messages were placed only once in 
the crawler but other messages appeared several times (Figure 63). On average each 
message contained ten words. Framing the Al-Khalifa family members and their 
supporters was 100% positive, whereas framing the protesters and protests was 100% 
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negative. The majority of the messages prayed to God to prolong the lives of the 
King, the Prime Minister, the Crown Prince and Al-Khalifa family members. The Al-
Khalifa family was framed as "crown of the head" and the king as "the wise father" 
whereas the supporters of the family framed themselves as "loyal" and "patriotic 
people". They also prayed to God to protect the Al-Khalifa family and the country 
from all evil. The pro-regime supporters vowed to sacrifice themselves for the sake 
of the Al-Khalifa family and the country. It was noticed that message 6 "May God 
Protects Bahrain and Keep it Khalifya Forever" was placed 11 times more than any 
other message (02:00:00 to 02:05:00). This message signifies that Bahrain must be 
ruled by the Al-Khalifa family forever. On the other hand, the Al-Khalifa family's 
supporters were aggressive toward the protesters and the athletes involved in the 
uprising as they were framed as "evil and enemies" who have a "lack of awareness" 
and who "must be persecuted and punished" as they harmed Bahrain and its people. 
 Some messages were accompanied by an author's name but there is no way of 
knowing if these names were authentic or pseudonyms, or if they were by real 
audience members or pro-regime staff of the broadcaster. As well, there were 22 
messages without an accompanying name and it became evident that most of these 
messages were the ones that called out the protestors and demanded punishment. 
These messages were placed several times but not as many times as message 6 
referred to above.  
- Message 6: All those players who were involved in the events must be prosecuted 
(01:00:00 to 01:05:00). 
- Message 12: Every player involved in the events must be prosecuted (02:00:00 to 
02:05:00). 
- Message 1: We demand a punishment for all ungrateful athletes starting from 
Hubail and Sayed Adnan (02:30:00 to 02:30:35). 
- Message 2: The people demand punishment of the players, the people demand 
punishment of the players, they do not deserve clemency (02:30:00 to 02:30:35). 
Message 1 and 2 (02:30:00 to 02:30:35) were screened in the crawler after the phone 
interviews with the two football players Sayed Mohamed Adnan and A'ala Hubail. 
The sanctions applied to some athletes were announced by the clubs during the 
programme. Message 4 in the closing sequence of With the Event encouraged this 
step and stated: "We thank the Al-Riffa and Al-Muharraq managements for the quick 
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response to take procedures against the violators". Overall, the crawler suggested that 
the uprising was an unpatriotic movement and that the people of Bahrain were 
demanding to punishment for the athletes involved in the demonstrations. 
The protesters The Al-Khalifa family and their supporters 
100% negative 100% positive 
Evil, enemies, must be persecuted, must 
be punished, lack of awareness, 
punishment, they do not deserve 
clemency, violator athletes    
The wise leadership, your soldiers, long life, blessing, at 
your own sweet will, sacrifice ourselves for you, Crown 
of the head, blooming, champion, greetings, The wise 
father, the noble Prime Minister, Bahrain is Khalifya, 
Bahrain will remain Khalifya, patriotic, longevity, loyal 
people 
Total no. and frequency of messages 113 messages; 164 times 
 Figure 63: With the Event: The use of the crawler  
 
 
5.7.6 With the Event: Use of the news ticker   
 The news ticker at the bottom of the screen showed news headlines. During 
With the Event there was only one news headline that was related to the uprising and 
it was placed six times. The news headline was about an event that was organized in 
Bahrain Stadium to sign a huge kit of the national football team as a symbolic gift 
that would be presented to the king (Figure 64). The event was called "ما لها إال حمدها" 
which can be translated as "Only for Hamad" and it meant that the king is the only 
legitimate ruler who should lead the nation. Praising and showing their obedience to 
the king and the royal family was considered a 'patriotic' act. Using a sports facility, 
Bahrain Stadium, the biggest stadium in the country, is allowed as long as it is used 
to host "patriotic events". The panellists did not discuss the event and also did not 
point to it during the programme. 
No. Time News Frequency 
1 Minute 00:30:00 to minute 00:35:00 Due to a large turnout from the 
Bahraini athletes to sign a huge 
kit to support his highness the 
king under the title "Only for 
Hamad", the event will be 
extended to another two days 
at the request of the athletes. 
1 
2 Minute 01:00:00 to minute 01:05:00 2 
3 Minute 01:30:00 to minute 01:35:00 1 
4 Minute 02:00:00 to minute 02:05:00 1 
5 Minute 02:30:00 to minute 02:35:00 1 
Total frequency: 6 times 
         Figure 64: With the Event: The use of the news ticker  
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5.7.7 With the Event: Use of images of the Athletes' March 
 With the Event displayed 22 edited digital images of The Athletes' March and 
several of them were displayed more than once during the selected minutes. The 
programme displayed ten edited digital images from minute 01:33:44 to minute 
01:35:00, and 11 edited digital images were displayed during the phone call 
interview with the football player A'ala Hubail from minute 02:00:00 to minute 
02:00:26 and from minute 02:01:14 to minute 02:01:52. Another digital edited image 
was displayed from minute 02:30:00 to minute 02:30:10. Figure 65 is a screenshot 
that shows an edited digital image of The Athletes' March that was displayed in 
minute 01:34:03. The image identifies four players and their sports club; from left to 
right Hasan Abdulnabi (a basketball player), Ahmad Hassan Al-Durazi (a basketball 
player), Sayed Hashim (Al-Ahli Club), and another whose first name was covered by 
the word "Live" at the top right while the second name was Ghoulom (basketball 
player). As the third identified person from the left appeared in the background, a 
black arrow was used to point to him. There was a fifth identified person on the right, 
but his face does not appear in this screenshot taken from the television programme.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 65: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 01:34:03 shows an image of The Athletes' 
March that was displayed during the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
 
 Figure 66 shows another example of The Athletes' March edited digital 
images that was displayed in With the Event. Four athletes were identified and their 
faces were circled. Appearing from left to right are Ali Hassan (volleyball player), 
Shaker Salman (football player), Ahmed Hassan Al-Durazi (basketball player) and 
Mohammed Hassan (basketball player). The first player on the left Ali Hassan did 
not face the camera as he was walking in the background and thus a blue circle and 
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an arrow were used to draw the audience's attention to the target so he can be clearly 
identified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 66: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 01:34:20 shows an 
image of The Athletes' March (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
 During the display of The Athletes' March edited digital images in With the 
Event and in Special Event, a soundtrack from the 2004 blockbuster American movie 
National Treasure starring Nicolas Cage (Turteltaub 2004) was played. This 
soundtrack was played several times in the movie particularly during the most 
exciting scenes of the adventurous movie. This soundtrack was used during the two 
programmes to create an atmosphere of excitement and to engage the audience with 
the messages being sent.  
 
5.7.8 With the Event: The closing sequence  
 In the last five minutes of With the Event, Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-
Khalifa, the King's son and the President of the Bahraini Olympic Committee and the 
Commander of Bahrain's Royal Guard was interviewed over the phone. The phone 
call lasted for 2 minutes and 13 seconds from minutes 02:54:38 to 02:56:5. Before 
the programme ended, the producers played a film clip of a Bedouin song. 
Transcribed below is a translation of the phone call:  
The host: Allow us to receive the president of the Bahrain Olympic 
Committee, his highness Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa may 
God protects him. Good evening Sheikh 
Sheikh Nasser: Hello. Good evening. 
The panellists: Welcome Bo Hamad (Sheikh Nasser's nickname). 
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Sheikh Nasser: Greetings. Thank you. I don't want to take up too 
much of your time. Well done guys. Good efforts all of you and all 
the supporters who declared their loyalty and love to the Kingdom 
of Bahrain, its leadership and its people. Everyone who called for a 
toppling of the regime; may a wall collapse on his head. 
The panellists: Well-said. Amen. 
Sheikh Nasser: We are the youth and sport has no relationship with 
politics and our approach is athletic, ethical and brotherly. People 
(athletes) have involved themselves in matters (the uprising), people 
lost the love of the fans, and other implicated themselves in 
troubles. I don't want to take up too much of your time. Excuse me, 
but anyone who has implicated himself in these matters and 
implicated himself in this net, shall be held accountable. Whether 
he was an athlete, socialite, politician, whatever he was, he will be 
held accountable at this time. Today is the judgment day, and may 
God grants patience and strength to all. May God keeps our Hamad, 
Khalifa bin Salman and Salman bin Hamad. 
The host: Amen. 
Sheikh Nasser: Thank you. 
The host: Your Highness Sheikh Nasser, May God protects you. 
May be this is what people of Bahrain were waiting to hear that 
everyone who spoke about toppling the regime will be held 
accountable. This is what we thank you for. This reassured us and 
soothed our hearts.  
Sheikh Nasser: Indeed, they will be held accountable. Bahrain is 
an island and there is nowhere to escape. Everyone involved in 
these matters will be held accountable and everyone who supported 
(the regime) will be rewarded. God willing, those who have been 
patient and stood up with my master His Majesty the King Hamad 
are known. As we knew who stood up against us, we know who 
stood up with us, and days will judge. 
Faisal Alsheikh (a studio guest): Sheik I have one word to say if 
you allow me. 
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Sheikh Nasser: Please. 
Faisal Alsheikh: You are a man son of a man. Your words are a 
crown for our heads. Today the speech of my master His Majesty 
the King who said that we would not forgive those who offended 
Bahrain. May God protects you and keep Al-Khalifa for us always. 
Sheikh Nasser: Thank you and well done all.  
Faisal AlSheikh: May God protects you. 
The host: Thank you and may God prolongs your life. His 
Highness Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, the President of the 
Bahrain Olympic Committee. Thank you Sheikh.   
 
 Sheikh Nasser vowed that those who participated in the uprising would be 
held accountable. He repeated "will be held accountable" four times and threatened 
the protesters by saying that "Bahrain is an island and there is nowhere to escape" 
which implied that the regime was planning to prosecute the protesters. Sheikh 
Nasser differentiated 'us' as the regime and its supporters from 'them' the disloyal 
people who stood up against the regime. He praised the panellists for their efforts by 
saying "thank you, well done, and good efforts". At the end of With the Event, the 
host commented saying that: "We got to the conclusion of this programme by 
receiving the phone call from His Highness Sheikh Nasser, may God protects him. 
That phone call reassured us and soothed the hearts of those who are watching us as 
some will be held accountable" (02:58:03). The host also announced in the last 
minute that Al-Muharraq Club decided to suspend all those who participated in the 
Pearl Roundabout part of the protest, and that the player Mahmood Alojaimi from 
Al-Riffa Club was suspended. It was also announced that the next day an urgent 
meeting would be held by the Al-Hala Club and other clubs to discuss what was 
shown during the With the Event programme.  
 It should be noted that using "Amen" by the hosts or the studio guests during 
the phone call does not give sanctity on the issue or the person as religious 
expressions such as "Amen", "God Willing", and "Thanks God", are part of the local 
social culture and they are commonly used by all people in Bahrain even those who 
do not practise Islam. However, using verses of the Quran or Hadith (the prophet's 
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saying, teachings and deeds) in speeches frequently would give sanctity to the issue 
being discussed and to the spokesman.    
 From minute 02:57:08, a film clip of a Bedouin song about the king was 
played while displaying scenes of the king dancing Ardha (Figure 67). The lyrics 
said in Arabic " تسلم لنا يا حمد، للمملكة وللرعية، الكل غنى وقصد، تسلم لنا يا حمد للمملكة والرعية، اللي
، وان انتخت يا حمد بحريننا العربية، لعيون داره حمد، درع البالد األبية، ونعم ونهضة قوية وفى بالعهد إصالح
  :which can be translated as "الخليفي حمد دنوا له المعلقية 
May God protect you Hamad for the kingdom and the 
people. All sing and recite may God protects you Hamad for 
the kingdom and the people. Who fulfils his promise, 
reform and strong renaissance, who fulfils his promise, and 
if our Arabic Bahrain seek help O Hamad, and for the sake 
of his eye Hamad the shield of the proud country. What a 
Khalify you are O Hamad, approach him the poetry.  
The programme ended before the song ended. The lyrics of the song portrayed the 
king once again as a popular and loveable leader and prayed to God to protect him 
for the kingdom and the people. The lyrics of the song also pointed to the army when 
the performer sang "the shield of the proud country" implying to the power possessed 
by the king.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 67: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 02:59:29 shows the king carries 
a sword. the Arabic writing states:"What a Khalify You Hamad" (Bahrain Sports 
Channel, April 4, 2011)  
 
5.7.9 Special Event: Use of the characterization frame for the protests   
 The analysis examined the use of the characterization frame by the panellists, 
the sports figures, and the report of the opening sequences during the selected time of 
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Special Event (35 minutes). Key phrases of the characterization frame were used 31 
times including 24 times (77.4%) neutrally and 7 times (22.5%) negatively (Figure 
68). Key phrases of the characterization frame were not used before minute 02:30:00 
to minute 02:35:00 and neither in the closing sequence between minute 02:50:26 to 
minute 02:55:26. "The march" that indicated The Athletes' March was the most used 
key phrase 14 times or (45.1%). While key phrases of the characterization frame 
such as "The Athletes' March", "The March" and "The Sports March" portrayed the 
uprising neutrally, these key phrases were followed or preceded with negative 
notions. For example, the voiceover of the opening sequence report said that The 
Athletes' March was organized by the athletes on the sideline of "the unfortunate 
events" (00:01:53).      
00:00:00 to 00:05:00 
00:00:36 The security crisis  
00:00:41 The Athletes' March 
00:00:47 The sit in the GCC roundabout  
00:01:03 The march 
00:01:04 The Athletes' March 
00:01:53 The Athletes' March 
00:01:58 The unfortunate events 
00:02:20 The spiteful march 
00:02:21 The anti-regime march 
00:03:28 The security crisis 
00:30:00 to 00:35:00 
/ / 
01:00:00 to 01:05:00 
01:01:44 The march 
01:02:02 The crisis  
01:02:09 The crisis  
01:02:50 The sports march 
01:03:01 The Athletes' March 
01:03:13 The march 
01:03:15 The march 
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01:03:29 Sports march 
01:03:34 The march 
01:03:39 The march 
01:04:00 The march 
01:04:08 The march 
01:04:15 The march 
01:04:17 The march 
01:04:47 The march 
01:04:57 The march 
01:30:00 to 01:35:00 
01:30:37 The Athletes' March 
02:00:00 to 02:05:00 
02:00:13 The march 
02:02:04 The march 
02:02:08 The march 
02:02:14 The Athletes' March 
02:30:00 to 02:35:00 
/ / 
02:50:26 to 02:55:26 
/ / 
Total 
31 times: (0 time: 0% P); (7 times: 22.5% N); (24 times: 77.4% Neu) 
Figure 68: Special Event: Key phrases of the characterization frame of the uprising. (/)= no key 
phrase of frame was used. (P)= positive, (N)= negative, (Neu)= Neutral.  
 
5.7.10 Special Event: Use of the characterization frame for the Al-Khalifa family 
 Key phrases of the characterization frame of the Al-Khalifa family were used 
22 times (calling the family members by their real names or positions were 
excluded). Unlike the With the Event, the king was not framed individually in Special 
Event. The most used key phrase was "the wise leadership" that referred to the King, 
the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince. Other key phrases including "the regime", 
"the leadership", and "the leadership of Bahrain" were also used to point to the Al-
Khalifa family (Figure 69). During the programme, a member of the Al-Khalifa 
family threatened the protesters saying that that his family members would not 
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tolerate "the insult". Sheikh Khalid bin Abdullah Al-Khalifa (the President of Al-
Riffa Club) also said in a phone call that his family members have military skills as 
many of the Al-Khalifa family male members are subjected to military training and 
join the Bahraini army or special forces (02:30:24 and 02:30:29). 
 
00:00:00 to 00:05:00 
00:02:20 The regime 
00:02:46 The leadership 
00:30:00 to 00:35:00 
/ / 
01:00:00 to 01:05:00 
01:00:22 The regime 
01:00:23 The nation's figureheads   
01:01:09 The Khalify regime 
01:03:01 The regime 
01:30:00 to 01:35:00 
01:30:08 The leadership  
02:00:00 to 02:05:00 
/ / 
02:30:00 to 02:35:00 
02:30:16 The royal family 
02:30:24 Most of us are soldiers  
02:30:26 We are not luxuriant 
02:30:29 Soldiers 
02:50:15 to 02:55:15 
02:50:30 Our leadership 
02:51:28 The leadership 
02:52:01 Our Sheikh 
02:52:02 Our figureheads   
02:52:35 The wise leadership 
02:53:18 The wise leadership 
02:53:34 The leadership 
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02:54:20 Our wise government  
02:54:21 Our wise leadership  
02:54:50 Our wise leadership  
02:54:55 The leadership of Bahrain 
Total 
Frequency  22 times 
Figure 69: Special Event: Key phrases of the characterization frame of the Al-
Khalifa  family. (/)= no key phrase of frame was used.   
 
5.7.11 Special Event: Use of the unpatriotic frame for the protesters and the 
supporters    
 While the Al-Khalifa's supporters were labelled positively 6 times (100%) in 
Special Event, their opponents were labelled 38 times; once (2.6%) positively, 10 
times (26.3%) neutrally, and 27 times (71%) negatively (Figure 70). Neutral key 
phrase such as "protesters", "some players", and "athletes" were used to frame the 
protesters. However, these key phrases were followed or preceded with negative 
notions. "Brother" was the only positive key phrase used in the two programmes to 
portray the protesters. This key phrase was used sarcastically by the host to point to 
the participants in The Athletes' March who were interviewed in the previous 
programme. On the other hand, negative key phrases of the unpatriotic frame of the 
protesters included "ungrateful people", "dupes", "abusers", "offenders", "criminals" 
and "traitors". In a phone call with Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, an 
Honorary Member of Al-Riffa Club framed the participants of the Athletes' March as 
"criminals and worthless". Sheikh Khalid also called on the local clubs to punish the 
athletes as he called them "sons of Bahrain who fought Bahrain and brought shame 
to themselves". Although the programme paid more attention to the protesters, the 
Al-Khalifa family supporters were praised once again for their attitude during the 
uprising. The supporters were framed as "sons", "brothers" and "lovers".  
00:00:00 to 00:05:00 
           The Al-Khalifa family's supporters  The protesters  
00:01:57 / The protesters 
00:02:19 / Ungrateful people  
00:02:46 / Offenders 
00:03:30 / Participants in the security 
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events 
00:03:39 / Athletes 
00:04:26 / Dupes  
00:30:00 to 00:35:00 
/ / / 
01:00:00 to 01:05:00 
01:00:15 / Athletes  
01:00:22 / Abusers 
01:00:30 / The Athletes  
01:00:38 / Managers and referees   
01:01:44 / Athletes  
01:04:33 / Brothers 
01:30:00 to 01:35:00 
01:30:06 / Criminals  
01:30:14 / They do not deserve greeting 
01:30:25 / They must be suspended for life 
01:31:10 / He is worthless  
01:31:12  We made him 
01:31:15 / We made him a name 
01:31:40 / Sons of Bahrain fight Bahrain 
01:3144 / They must be suspended for life  
01:31:49 / Clubs must be forced to 
suspend them for life 
01:31:53 / They must be suspended for life 
01:32:04 / Some players 
01:32:27 / They must be expelled  
01:32:27 / Shame on them 
01:32:28 / They do not deserve greeting 
02:00:00 to 02:05:00 
02:02:17 / The traitors athletes  
02:30:00 to 02:35:00 
02:30:10 / Opposition  
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02:31:12 / What so-called opposition 
02:31:17 / The opposition  
02:31:52 White Black 
02:31:57 White Black 
02:32:36 / The opposition  
02:33:25 Our brothers  / 
02:33:26 Our lovers / 
02:33:27 Our sons / 
02:34:38 / What so-called the roundabout 
group 
02:50:15 to 02:55:15 
02:51:01 / The abusers  
02:52:00 / Vandals  
02:52:01 / Abusers 
02:53:06 / Players 
02:54:54 May God protects them / 
Frequency 6 times : (100% P) 38 times: (1time: 2.6% P); (10 
times: 26.3% Neu); (27 times: 
71% N) 
Figure 70: Special Event: Key phrases of the unpatriotic frame. (/)= not key phrase of frame was used. 
(P)= positive, (N)= negative, (Neu)= Neutral.  
 
5.7.12 Special Event: The opening sequence report   
 The host started Special Event by presenting his guests before showing a 
report about With the Event that pointed to the feedback from With the Event that was 
broadcast the previous week (Figure 71). The voiceover commented that the 
justifications of the participants in The Athletes' March who were interviewed in the 
previous programme were not convincing as they had no legitimate reason to protest 
and therefore they deserved to be convicted by public opinion in Bahrain. The 
voiceover of the report suggested that the majority of the people of Bahrain were 
against the uprising. It also suggested that the protesters committed a sin by rallying 
"against the regime". The voiceover said that With the Event revealed the "real face" 
of the protesters who participated in "the spiteful people's march" that offended the 
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country and its leadership. The report vowed that Bahrain Television would not 
hesitate to reveal all facts and stand up against the demonstrators in the uprising.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 71: Special Event: Screenshot of minute 00:01:05 the opening 
sequence report (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)  
 
 
  Several edited digital images of The Athletes' March were displayed during 
the opening sequences of Special Event. Figure 72 shows an edited digital image of 
The Athletes' March that was taken during the speech following the end of The 
Athletes' March. The speech was delivered by A'ala Hubail on a stage that was set in 
the Pearl Roundabout. This stage was also used by other protesters and political 
activist in their speeches during the activities that were held in the Pearl Roundabout. 
appearing in the lift of the image is the football player A'ala Hubail during his 
speech. The Arabic written stated "عالء حبيل يلقي الكلمة ويطالب بإسقاط النظام" which can be 
translated as "A'ala Hubail during a speech that called to overthrow the regime". 
A'ala's face was circled in blue beside Sayed Mohammed Adnan who appeared in the 
middle of the image with Arabic writing that stated "العب المنتخب الوطني" which can be 
translated as: "a national team player". The third circled player was " صادق علي العب
 which can be translated as "Sadiq Ali, Handball Player". Other athletes "كرة اليد
appeared wrapping their bodies with the flag of Bahrain while holding a banner 
which stated "مسيرة الر" which can be translated as "The march of". The second 
banner (on right side) stated in Arabic that " شعبنا للوطن كان تفهم " which can be 
translated as "Understands our people (out of frame) for the country". It should be 
noted that the text in both banners in this image was out of frame.  
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Figure 72: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:01:36 of the 
opening report (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)  
 
 
 The next edited digital image of The Athletes' March (Figure 73) shows nine 
athletes' faces were circled in blue but only seven of them were identified. Appearing 
from left to right are Mahmood Mirza Al-Ajami, Hamad Abdulla Al-Hamad, Sayed 
Ali Ashoor, Ibrahim Ahmed Abbas, Yaseen Almail (assistant manager), Mirza Ali 
(volleyball player), Ali Abdulamir. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 73: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:02:30 (Bahrain 
Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)  
 
 
5.7.13 Special Event: Use of the background 
 Unlike With the Event, images of the Al-Khalifa family members were not 
displayed in the background set for Special Event. The programme dedicated the 
background to the three dimensional digital waving flag of Bahrain. As shown in 
Figure 74, the panellists appeared while the giant flag of Bahrain was waving in the 
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background of the screen. This background set reinforces the 'patriotic' message and 
credentials of the panellists and the programme.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 74: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 02:00:27 shows the waving 
flag of Bahrain in the background (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)  
 
5.7.14 Special Event: Use of the crawler    
 There were 49 messages that were placed 59 times during the selected 
minutes from Special Event (Figure 75). The crawler was displayed from minute 
00:02:50 before and was stopped in minute 01:13:30 when the phone line was 
opened to the audience. The crawler was 100% positive toward the Al-Khalifa family 
and their supporters, while it was 100% negative toward the protesters. The messages 
prayed to God to protect the King, the Prime Minister, the Crown Prince and all the 
Al-Khalifa family from "all evil" and also praised the sagacity of the leadership and 
prayed God to keep Bahrain Khalifya forever. The pro-regime supporters who sent 
the messages displayed in the crawler framed themselves as soldiers who were ready 
to redeem themselves for the Al-Khalifa family and Bahrain. For instance, message 5 
stated "May God protects His Highness the King. We are your soldiers and at your 
own sweet will" (00:30:00 to 00:35:00). On the other hand, the protesters were 
framed as "evil", "plotters" and "malicious". For instance, message 2 stated "What 
happened is a lesson that identified the friend from the enemy. We thank God for 
everything. May God protects Bahrain, our government and the loyal people amen 
amen" (01:00:00 to 01:05:00). 
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The protesters The Al-Khalifa family and their supporters 
100% negative 100% positive 
Evil, enemies, must be persecuted, must 
be punished, lack of awareness, 
punishment, they do not deserve 
clemency, violators  
The wise leadership, your soldiers, long life, blessing, at 
your own sweet will, sacrifice ourselves for you, Crown 
of the head, blooming, champion, greetings, The wise 
father, the noble Prime Minister, Bahrain is Khalifya, 
Bahrain will remain Khalifya, patriotic, longevity, loyal 
people 
Total no. and frequency of messages 49 messages; 59 times 
 Figure 75: Special Event: The use of the crawler  
 
5.7.15 Special Event: Use of the news ticker  
 There was only one news headline displayed during Special Event and it was 
placed 51 times (Figure 76). The news announced an extension of an event that was 
called "سيوف الوالء" or "Swords of Allegiance" that relocated to Bahrain Stadium 
because of a large turnout. The event was a symbolic declaration of solidarity with 
"the wise leadership". The use of swords implied refers war. The regime called on its 
supporters to join the campaign against the protesters by declearing their loyalty to 
the ruling family. The Swords of Allegiance event was considered sports news 
because it was held in a sports field under the auspices of Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad 
Al-Khalifa and involved pro-regime athletes. This event was not discussed by the 
panellists of the programme.   
 
No. Time News Frequency 
1 00:00:00 to 00:05:00 Under the guidance of His Highness 
Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-
Khalifa, the signing Swords of 
Allegiance to the wise leadership has 
been extended to Saturday. The event 
is being held in Bahrain Stadium 
because the large turnout 
7 
2 00:30:00 to 00:35:00 17 
3 01:00:00 to 01:05:00 17 
Total frequency: 51 times 
              Figure 76: Special Event: The use of the news ticker  
 
 To sum up, the findings show that the television coverage of the uprising 
divided the people of Bahrain into two parties: the legitimate party represented by the 
Al-Khalifa family and their supporters and the illegitimate party represented by the 
protesters. The analysis shows that the coverage used the characterization frame of 
the uprising to portray the uprising as an "illegitimate movement". Unlike the 
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newspaper coverage, the television coverage did not explicitly use the consequences 
frame. However, the overall aim of the television coverage was to deprecate the 
uprising as a political movement and its consequences on the society. Additionally, 
the characterization frame was used to portray the Al-Khalifa family as the 
"legitimate authority" interlinked with the traditions and the history of the country. 
The King and the Al-Khalifa family were at the centre of the television coverage. 
While With the Event focused on the personal qualities of the King who was shown 
as a courageous and wise leader, the Special Event focused on "the wise leadership" 
and paid attention to the Prime Minister and the Crown Prince. The language used to 
vilify the protesters by using the unpatriotic frames in the television coverage was 
more direct than the language in the newspaper coverage. For instance, while the 
protesters were framed as unpatriotic citizens in the newspaper coverage, the 
television crawler and several of the Al-Khalifa family members framed the 
protesters as "evil", "vandals" and "worthless". The television coverage praised the 
Al-Khalifa family's supporters who were labelled as "Bahrain lovers" and "loyal" 
citizens for their behaviour during the protests. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion  
 
 Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the newspaper data from two pro-regime 
newspapers during the Bahraini uprising in 2011. Chapter 5 provides an analysis of 
two television programmes broadcast during a key period of the protests. The 
analyses in both chapters demonstrate that sports media and politics are inextricably 
linked in Bahrain. This present chapter explains in detail how  the characterization 
frame, the consequences frame, and the unpatriotic frame were used to vilify the 
political movement.                                                                                                
 The characterization frame and the consequences frame were exploited by the 
sports coverage to calumniate the uprising, while the characterization frame was 
exploited to glorify the ruling family, and the unpatriotic frame was used to 
undermine the protesters while praising the supporters of the ruling family. These 
three frames were accompanied by other propaganda techniques which involved a 
reliance on official sources and the selective use of photographs in the newspaper 
coverage. For the television coverage the techniques involved the strategic 
arrangement of the studio's background set, the use of the crawler and the news 
ticker across the screen during the broadcast, the manipulation of photographs taken 
of individuals participating in The Athletes' March, and the use of background music 
during key sections of the programme.  
 While newspapers and the main state-controlled television channel started 
covering the uprising days after it began, the sports newspapers and the sports 
channel were silent on the uprising until the broadcast of the special programme With 
the Event on April 4, 2011. On April 6, 2011 local sports newspapers began to 
explicitly report on the demonstrations including The Athletes' March that was 
organized on February 21, 2011. The campaign against the anti-regime sports figures 
was officially launched during this first television programme in a phone interview 
with the king's son Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa who is the President of the 
Bahrain Olympic Committee and also the Commander of Bahrain's Royal Guard.  
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6.1 Strategy of vilifying the demonstrations  
 The strategy of undermining and declaring the demonstrations illegal 
involved the use of two frames: the characterization frame and the consequences 
frame.     
The characterization frame 
 The characterization frame is used to define a political movement and its 
objectives in order to impede it (Brasted 2005, p. 383). It is also exploited to 
undermine the legitimacy of  an uprising and question its motive (Kaufman et al. 
2013). The purpose of using this frame is to either legitimize or disorganize the 
movement to raise questions such as why the uprising occurred and to question its 
goals. The campaign intended to vilify the demonstrations by framing them as 
"unlicensed marches", "illegal gatherings", and "disgraceful acts". The Al-Khalifa 
regime used the characterization frame in both its newspaper and its television sports 
media propaganda campaign to encourage the public to condemn the protest and to 
prevent the public from joining the movement. The demonstrations were presented as 
an erroneous choice by radical individuals and suggested that the protesters did not 
represent the interests of the good citizens of Bahrain. The protesters' demands for 
political reforms including reducing the powers of the ruling family were not covered 
or pointed to. 
The consequences frame 
 People tend to form their view about an issue based on how it is framed in the 
media (Iyengar 1990) as framing influences how the audience think about an event 
(Kim and Willis 2007, p. 359) and who is responsible for it (p. 360). The public's 
evaluation of the cause of the event is also influenced by how it is presented in the 
media (An and Gower 2009, p. 107). The newspaper coverage of the protests focused 
on the consequent upheaval and threat to national security and on the social threats 
posed by the demonstrations in public spaces. At the same time, the newspaper 
coverage ignored any specific information about the cause of the uprising and the 
demands for political reform, a move towards democracy, and transparency about the 
corruption of the regime. Overall, the newspaper coverage induced the public to 
stand against the uprising that was argued would harm the country and divide the 
people of Bahrain. Linking the uprising with instability and fear was intended to 
encourage the public to maintain the status quo. The two television programmes, 
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With the Event and Special Event, were a response to the uprising that called for 
political reforms. While, the consequences frame was not addressed explicitly in the 
television coverage, the two programmes incited public opinion to disagree with the 
uprising that was led by protesters who were not loyal to their country or their 
leaders. Overall, vilifying the uprising would result in vilifying its consequences.     
 
6.2 Strategy of glorifying the Al-Khalifa family 
 The strategy of aggrandizing the Al-Khalifa family involved the use of the 
characterization frame that was employed to favour the ruling family.  
The characterization frame 
 The uprising questioned the legitimacy of the Al-Khalifa family. In response, 
the sports media coverage employed the characterization frame to enhance and 
preserve the sacredness of the ruling family led by the king. The Al-Khalifa family 
was framed in the sports coverage of the uprising as the figurehead for the nation and 
the guarantors of stability of the country. The rule of the Al-Khalifa family over 
Bahrain is a tradition and historic right (El-Khury 1983, p. 322) and the tribal regime 
believes that its powers must not be challenged, nor shared with others (Al-Naqeeb 
1989, p. 148) as the family represents the legitimate alternative to lawful democratic 
institutions (p. 151). The ruling families of the Gulf States were placed at the heart of 
the emergent state-building project after independence (Partrick 2009, p. 4). The 
identity and loyalty of the state are conflated with the identity and loyalty of these 
families (p. 9). To justify their rule, a "civic myth" was created by the ruling families 
to propagandize themselves as the heritage and an extension of the country's cultural 
history and tradition (Kamrava 2013, p. 123).  
 The sports coverage of the uprising drew a mythical portrayal of the ruling 
family in Bahrain and, particularly, of the king. Erin Bream (2004) points to two 
features of a leader's personality cult that can be seen during demonstrations. These 
are the spread of the cult figure's image and the portrayal of the leader as a hero who 
can solve all problems. This leads the public to believe in the superiority of the 
leader and consequently to protection from questioning of his policies (p. 134). After 
the king's power was challenged during the uprising, the King of Bahrain wanted to 
regain his position and his prestige and gain legitimacy; thus the television coverage 
focused on his charisma.  
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 Non-democratic regimes propagandize their leaders as the protector of the 
nation and its people (Byman and Linda 2010, p. 52). To retrieve their legitimacy 
during an uprising, autocratic regimes employ several methods to repress the 
protesters (Schedler 2012, p. 16). When a protest occurs, regimes assess the threat 
posed by the protest by questioning who the protesters are and what their target is 
and who they threaten and why (Davenport et al. 2011, p. 153). In the Bahraini 
context, the regime is the ruling family and the king is the leader of the regime. 
There was a major focus in the two television programmes on the power and prestige 
of the king and the royal family. The opening sequence of the With the Event report 
showed the king riding a horse, wearing military dress and dancing the Ardha The 
purpose of these scenes was not just to present the charismatic personality of the 
king, but also to protect his status from being questioned in the future. In other 
words, the coverage was intended to make the public believe that the king's 
personality is sacred, his decisions are always correct and he must not be challenged. 
He leads the nation and his supporters love him and believe that he is the "saviour" 
who would do whatever it takes to protect his country and his people.      
 
6.3 Strategy of undermining the protesters and praising the supporters  
 The unpatriotic frame was used by the sports media to target the anti-regime 
protesters on the one hand and to praise the supporters of the regime on the other.   
The unpatriotic frame 
 The unpatriotic frame is used to distort protesters' images and to isolate 
protesters from their society (Di Cicco 2010). The Bahraini protesters were framed as 
a group that did not represent the majority of the people who believed in the 
legitimacy of the regime and did not oppose the rule of the royal family. This frame 
aimed to create boundaries between the protesters and the rest of Bahraini society. 
These boundaries ease the targeting of the protesters by society, and hence protect 
the community from the intruders. For instance, key phrases of the unpatriotic frame 
in the newspaper coverage portrayed the protesters as "disloyal" and "offenders" who 
insulted the nation, and its figureheads, and who aimed to harm Bahraini society and 
the country. The government vowed that these "offenders" would be held 
accountable for their activities during the uprising. In the television coverage, key 
phrases of the unpatriotic frame such as "vandals", "traitors", "hypocrites", and "evil" 
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were used to depict the protesters. The coverage incited emotions against the 
protesters by framing them as "against us" in With the Event (00:33:06) and as 
"against the regime" (00:34:01). Additionally, in minute 02:04:50 of Special Event, a 
journalist interviewed on the phone, praised the local newspapers for the dismissal of 
journalists who participated in the uprising and called these journalists non-
Bahrainis. The protesters were considered outlaws who should be fought. On the 
other hand, the regime supporters were framed as "patriotic", as "noble" and as 
members of the king's army. The sports media coverage of the uprising praised the 
regime's supporters for their acts during the uprising as they refused to participate in 
the protests, attacked the protesters, condemned the political movement, and declared 
their loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family. In this context, the regime exploited the sports 
media to delude the supporters into being the first line of defence in the face of the 
protesters. The regime encouraged its supporters in every possible way to confront 
the protesters. The supporters of the regime were motivated to become involved 
physically by protesting against the uprising physically and in an online campaign to 
'expose' those who participated in the demonstrations. These actions were promoted 
by both the newspaper and television coverage as national missions.  
 
6.4 Techniques to implement the strategies 
 Television was more influential medium than newspapers because of the 
added visual and audio content in the coverage of the uprising. The common 
denominators in the coverage were the reliance on official sources and the use of 
photographs. In addition, the television coverage was characterized by the use of the 
studio's background set for the two programmes, the use of crawlers and news tickers 
across the screen, and the employment of background music.   
 
6.4.1 Reliance on official sources  
 The findings in Chapters 4 show that all of the newspaper coverage was 
based on official and pro-regime sources including sports federations, sports clubs, or 
Al-Khalifa family members. The news supplied by official sources was subject to 
bias in favour of the regime as official sources neutralised the perspectives of the 
power challengers (McLeod 2007, p. 187). The official sources worked to support 
the agenda of the regime (Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2008, p. 207) and protect the 
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status quo (Dardis 2006, p. 118). In the beginning, the newspaper sports coverage 
ignored the uprising and The Athletes' March. For weeks when the protests were 
taking place, the sports supplements of the local newspapers avoided publishing any 
explicit news about the protests. It was only after the broadcast of With the Event that 
the newspapers began to cover the protests and it was from the regime's view of the 
events. The newspaper coverage avoided interviewing the sports figures who 
participated in the protests. It was not known whether this was due to an official 
directive, or because of self-censorship.  
 However, the television coverage, included a live phone interview of three 
sports figures during With the Event to 'justify' why they participated in the uprising, 
while more than 60 sports figures identified in Special Event were not given the 
opportunity to speak about why they participated in The Athletes' March. During the 
phone interviews, the panellists did not tolerate the views of the participants of The 
Athletes' March. The host and his studio guests interrupted the interviewees several 
times. They treated the interviewees as defendants who had to justify their 
participation and had to answer questions such as why they visited the Pearl 
Roundabout and why they participated in The Athletes' march. The interviewees 
seemed confused and they often asked to be given time to speak. The panellists 
reproved and confused the interviewees to an extent that implied to the audience that 
the protesters had no cogent argument. In one case, the national football player 
Mohammed Sayed Adnan apologized for visiting the Pearl Roundabout and declared 
his loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family. On the other hand, pro-regime athletes were 
confident and intrepid. They were given time not only to express their views, but also 
to attack the protesters while the panellists praised them. The studio and the guests of 
the two programmes were amicable to the pro-regime sports figures who said the 
athletes whose images were shown on television and in social media should be 
punished.      
 Official sources also distracted attention from the protesters' demands in 
regard to other marginal issues. The sports coverage distorted the 2011 uprising and 
ignored the demand of the protesters who were called "vandals" and "criminals". 
During the 2011 uprising, the regime strictly controlled coverage of the events. A 
number of journalists reported that they were arrested, tortured, and detained for not 
adopting the official interpretation of the uprising (Bahrain Independent Commission 
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of Inquiry 2011, p. 307). Social media was also used by pro-regime activists to 
identify and reveal the personal information of the journalists who were considered 
to be anti-regime (p. 391). By doing that, the regime instilled fear in journalists to 
prevent them from using their own observations or sources to cover the political 
activities. It was important for the regime to control the flow of information by 
controlling the local mainstream media and the Internet in order to prevent the 
protesters from communicating with the people of Bahrain through the media.  
 
6.4.2 Background of the two television programmes    
 The use of studio background sets distinguished the television coverage from 
the newspaper coverage. The background of With the Event and Special Event 
programmes displayed official digital images of the ruling family; particularly of the 
King, the Prime Minster, and the Crown Prince. These official images are usually 
found in the Bahrain News Agency website and they are often accompanied by 
official news articles published in the local newspapers. The background also 
displayed a three dimensional digital waving flag. The use of the flag and the images 
was not arbitrary as images communicate a message (Lacey 1998, p. 5) that targets 
the audience. Both the images of the ruling family and the flag symbolize the identity 
and sovereignty of the country. Flag-waving symbolizes strong patriotism that shows 
support for the nation and its agenda (The Chambers Dictionary 1998, p. 609; Dreier 
and Flacks 2003, p. 397). It is also used to express citizenship and civic virtue 
(Marmo 2010, p. 52).  
 The flag aimed to characterize the party of the Al-Khalifa family and their 
supporters. Patriotism, according to the ideology of the regime, is associated with the 
Al-Khalifa family. Because the uprising was portrayed as a movement that targeted 
the ruling family, the panellists framed themselves as the lovers of the country and its 
leadership and framed their acts (vilifying the demonstrations and calling to punish 
the protesters) as patriotic. The ruling family also encouraged such behaviours. 
Sheikh Nasser stated in his phone interview that the performance of the With the 
Event panellists was evidence of "loyalty and love to the Kingdom of Bahrain, its 
leadership and its people".  
 Interestingly, the protesters also carried the flag of Bahrain in their protests to 
express their loyalty to Bahrain. The flag displayed in the background symbolized a 
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form of conflict between the opposing sides where each side believed that the flag 
belonged to them. The two programmes showed the protesters carrying the flag of 
Bahrain or wrapping it around them during the demonstrations. It was important then 
for the regime to retrieve the national symbol by displaying the giant flag in the 
background set.  
 The background was also used to strengthen the bond between the party 
members; particularly the Al-Khalifa family's party. The size of the flag covered the 
screen and shaded the individuals who appeared in the programmes. The message 
sent through the background suggested that the ruling family was the legitimate 
authority and called for the supporters from the audience to interact with the event. 
The background epitomized the country as the flag represented the borders, the 
images of the ruling family represented the legitimate rulers, and the loyal people of 
Bahrain were represented by the panellists.    
   
6.4.3 Crawlers and news tickers 
 The technique used by the two programmes to manipulate the audience 
included the crawlers that displayed 'live' messages from the audience at the bottom 
of the screen during the two television programmes and news tickers that displayed 
scrolling text from news headlines in another bar below the crawler bar. For the 
crawlers, the content of the messages from the audience was controlled by the 
producers. All messages were allowed to appear in the two programmes. The crawler 
was available to the audience to express their views about the uprising during With 
the Event and it was stopped in the second half of Special Event when the phone line 
was available to the audience. While in normal practice the protesting about political 
events was condemned and considered an unpatriotic act, the television programme 
actually solicited the audience's reaction and commentary. It is probable that because 
it was demonstrating against the uprising and its demands, protesting in this case was 
considered politically neutral. The comments that appeared in the crawler did one of 
two things: either the comments praised the Al-Khalifa family or they condemned 
the protesters. The ruling family appeared in the majority of the 162 messages that 
were placed 223 times during the selected minutes of the two programmes. The 
messages declared the loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family and prayed to prolong their 
lives and keep Bahrain evermore under their rule.  
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 The messages called for the suppression of the protests and punishment for 
the protesters who were described as "evil", "enemies", "plotters", and "violators". 
While the messages were accompanied by names, it could not be confirmed whether 
these names were of 'real' people or just propaganda by the regime. Only 22 
messages (19.4%) were not accompanied by a name, and of these, several called for 
the protesters to be punished. The messages included "All those players who were 
involved in the events must be prosecuted", "All ungrateful athletes particularly 
Hubail and Sayed Adnan must be held accountable", and "The people demand to 
punish the players. The people demand to punish the players. They do not deserve 
clemency". These three messages explicitly incited the audience and the regime to 
take action against the protesters.  
 The news tickers of the two programmes placed two news headlines that were 
related to the uprising. The two headlines covered two events that were held at the 
time to respond to the involvement of the athletes in the uprising. The first event was 
titled "It is only for Hamad" and indicated how the Al-Khalifa family interprets their 
rule of Bahrain. Bahrain is a private property that is owned and must only be ruled by 
the ruling family members. The event was about signing a kit of the National 
Football Team. The kit symbolized the athletes while the signature was evidence of 
the loyalty of the athletes to the regime. Through this event the ruling family 
suggested that sports figures love and support the regime. The second event was 
titled "Swords of Allegiance" and it was about signing a petition to declare loyalty to 
the ruling family. Swords symbolized force and war and they were used in this 
context as an explicit threat to the protesters. This threat of force was used to create a 
sense of fear among the anti-regime audience and a sense of security among the pro-
regime audience. These two events showed how the Al-Khalifa family took notice 
and made sure they showed that athletes and sports figures were still supporting the 
regime and its agenda.     
 The overall pro-regime tenor of the messages and the two news headlines 
implied that pro-regime sentiment represented the majority while the protesters were 
the deviant minority. The crawlers and the news tickers suggested that the call for the 
suppression of the uprising and subsequent punishment of the protesters was from 
the public, rather than from an oppressive government. The impact of the crawlers 
and the news tickers reinforced an anti-protest sentiment and, by seemingly 
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representing the 'public' opinion, gave authority for the punitive action taken against 
the protesters in the following days and weeks.  
  
6.4.4 Exploitation of the images of the protests   
 The fourth technique was the manipulation of the images of the protests. The 
newspaper coverage avoided publishing photos of the protests except for four news 
articles published in Al-Bilad. Three of these articles published four photos of The 
Athletes' March while another news article published a photo which showed players 
carrying a banner where they vowed to be soldiers of the king and remain loyal to 
him. The three photos of the march were presented to the readers while the text of the 
news articles vilified the uprising and the protesters. The other photo represented the 
atmosphere within the regime and its proponents to depict the uprising as a 
battlefield that required soldiers who were willing to sacrifice themselves for the 
king and the country. The news articles of Akhbar Al-Khaleej did not publish any 
photographs related to the uprising during its coverage of the events.   
 The two television programmes, however, displayed 38 edited digital images 
of The Athletes' March. Most athletes' names and sport were identified, their faces 
were circled in blue and a black arrow was used to point to them. Nick Lacey (1998, 
p. 20) argues that everything is put in a picture intentionally to communicate a 
message. Using a circle aimed to direct the audience's vision to the sports figures' 
faces. Drawing a circle on a face is used in experimental studies to focus the 
attention on the target (Allen and Gabbert 2013, p. 1984). Colours are also a method 
used to draw the audience's attention to the content of the image (Lacey 1998, p. 38). 
Studies show that colours influence people's perceptions of an object (Singh 2006; 
Roberts et al. 2010). Blue is a positive colour (Sorokowski and Wrembel 2014, p. 11) 
that is used to focus the audience's attention inward and to suggest quietness and 
agreement (Elliot and Maier 2007, p. 250). Faces were selected from among several 
athletes in each image and the blue circle was used not only to disclose The Athletes' 
March participants, but also to identify them. As revealed later, the regime used the 
same technique of circling faces to capture the protesters when the Bahrain 
Independent Commission of Inquiry (2011) reported that pro-opposition university 
students were shown pictures with circled faces and asked to identify individuals in 
the images during investigations.  
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 The other graphic symbol was the black arrow. There are several referential 
functions for the arrow symbol including fighting crimes (Monk 2013, p. 76). It is 
used by the sign maker to send instructions that are expected to be followed by the 
sign receiver (p.79) because the sign maker anticipates that the receiver will interpret 
the message the way in which it was framed. The use of a black arrow gives a 
negative perception about the athletes. Black often has a negative connotation. For 
example, it has a negative connotation in religion (Singh 2007, p. 784), a connection 
with anarchism (Sorokowski and Wrembel 2014, p. 13) and evil and death (Elliot 
and Maier 2007, p. 250), law enforcement (Nickels 2007), and aggressiveness in 
sport (Frank and Gilovich 1998). 
 The use of  a blue circle and black arrow was intentional and the symbolism 
of the two marks cannot be ignored. The television producers employed two different 
colours, one for the circle and one for the arrow instead of employing the same 
colour for both signs. The edited digital images of The Athletes' March were 
displayed in With the Event for the first time beginning from minute 01:10:44 after 
framing the protesters as "spiteful people", "unpatriotic people", and "hypocrites". 
The edited digital image of the football player Mohammed Sayed Adnan was 
displayed before he was interviewed on the phone and the edited digital images of 
The Athletes' March were displayed during the phone conversation with the other 
football player A'ala Hubail in minute 02:00:00. A day after With the Event was 
broadcast, A'ala Hubail and about 100 athletes were arrested or suspended from 
playing for their teams (Lulu 2011).  
 The images of The Athletes' March were taken out of context and set in 
another context; what can be described as framing within framing. The first frame 
was created by the programmes and the panellists to portray the uprising. The second 
frame was created by the symbols. The protests were framed as a threat that must be 
confronted while the black arrow and the blue circle framed the protesters as outlaws 
who do not belong to Bahrain. These two signs were an intimation to the protesters 
that their images and personal details would be identified and revealed and they 
would be physically penalized. Displaying the images was the first phase of the 
punishment applied to the protesters. It was a warning for those who had already 
been involved as well as to those who had not yet been involved at the time in the 
demonstrations.  
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 It can be argued that sports media was used as a means of surveillance and 
punishment. The pro-regime audience of the two programmes and the sports 
newspaper readers were encouraged to send any evidence they may have collected 
about the protests to the commission of inquiry, including photographs, video 
footage, and any personal information about individual protesters. While it is not 
possible to determine if there was any follow-up by audience with solicitation of 
information by the authorities, social media campaign established by pro-regime 
supporters showed that incitement against the protesters and the invasion of their 
privacy became relatively common place and was presented as national imperative.   
This brings us back to Jones' (2012) observations about the role of pro-regime online 
activists who are involved in trolling, naming, and shaming. It is clear, the campaign 
was not limited to social media as sports media played a significant role in trolling, 
naming and shaming the protesters. Overall, the images of the protests symbolized 
the war of ideas as alluded to by Khalaf (2013) in the literature review in Chapter 2. 
The Al-Khalifa family proposed that by manipulating the protests' images it was 
fighting the malefactors who deserved to be penalized, while the same images 
symbolized the determination and the ambition of the protesters to change the 
political situation.  
 
6.4.5 Use of music  
 Music was the fifth technique used by the two television programmes. A 
soundtrack of National Treasure was used while the edited digital images of The 
Athletes' March were displayed. According to Kelly Lawler (2014) and Samantha 
Wilson (2013), National Treasure is considered a patriotic movie. Although the 
soundtrack was chosen because it was composed for a patriotic movie, music 
communicates particular messages. It is an important source of emotion in movies 
(Cohen 2001, p. 249). In addition, it has the ability to focus attention (p. 258), to 
affect attitudes and the mood (Allan 2007), to elicit a specific emotional response 
(Parke et al. 2007, p. 1), and to win the consumer's loyalty (Ballouli and Hutchinson 
2013). According to the Hollywood director George Lucas (2015) music and sound 
are 50% of the entertainment in a movie.   
 Playing the soundtrack of National Treasure while displaying the edited 
digital images alluded to something interesting happening. It created an atmosphere 
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of excitement and a dramatic scene that integrated with other symbols. The 
soundtrack was used during the two programmes as a means of communication. It 
exploited the sensationalizing effect to engage the audience with the content and, 
particularly, the edited digital images of The Athletes' March. The soundtrack was 
also employed to induce the audience to interact with the message the way it was 
framed. The music may not have framed the individuals who appeared in the images 
as 'outlaws', but it played an important role in drawing the audience's attention to the 
images and the symbols that portrayed the protesters as criminals.  
  Overall, there were three messages construed in the two television 
programmes to convince the audience to believe in the regime's propaganda: the 
uprising was an illegal and harmful movement, the Al-Khalifa family was the 
legitimate authority, and the protesters were unpatriotic citizens whereas the 
supporters of the family were true patriotic citizens. These messages were identified 
after examining the visible text represented in the scenes of the television reports, 
The Athletes' March edited digital images, the background, the readable text (the 
crawlers and the news tickers), and the audio text (the dialogue of the panellists and 
the soundtrack).  
 
6.5 Implications of the propaganda campaign  
 The intention of the regimes propaganda was to divide the people of Bahrain 
into two parties with no neutral zone between them: the party of the Al-Khalifa 
family and their supporters on the one hand, and the party of the opposition and their 
supporters on the other. The television coverage, for instance, insisted that it was a 
black/ and white issue where Bahrainis were either with or against the regime. It was 
a case of 'us' or 'them'. The 'us' represented the regime and its proponents; the 'them' 
represented the opposition and its supporters. The regime's policy aimed to identify 
the boundary between those who protected the country and those who endangered it 
(Kluknavská 2014, p. 1). This policy was based on inherited collective identities that 
define the enemies and the confederates (Tarrow 2011, p. 31).   
 The use of 'us and them' identities endeavoured to encourage the people of 
Bahrain to endorse the regime's agenda and not be considered an enemy of the state. 
According to Kimberly A. Powell (2011), the U.S. media adopted the us and them 
policy during the coverage of the September 11 events. The coverage of the terrorist 
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attack fostered the political climate of support for the invasion of Iraq by dividing the 
world into two parties: the us, the good people represented by the United States and 
its allies,  and them, the terrorists represented by enemies of the United States. 
Framing the conflict as a war between good and evil is a dehumanization process 
where the opponents are framed as enemies and therefore the enemies who do not 
deserve moral consideration (Maiese 2003). In other words, dehumanization is a way 
to justify crimes or abuses against the opposing party (Steuter and Wills 2009). 
Protesters who target the legitimate authority are more likely to persecuted through 
arrest, dismissal from jobs or school, torture or death (Chang and Vitale 2013, p. 36). 
 Thus, the sports media coverage of the 2011 uprising in Bahrain attacked the 
uprising and the protesters so as to justify the regime's action against them. It was 
vowed that the sports figures and other society members involved in the protests 
would be held accountable. Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad said in his phone interview 
"They will be held accountable". This threat was repeated six times by Sheikh Nasser 
and the panellists and was followed by another threat by Sheikh Nasser who said 
"May a wall collapse on" those who demanded the toppling of the regime. This local 
expression means that Sheikh Nasser wished bad on the protesters. This tone of 
language had never been used by the Al-Khalifa family members in the media as 
they are trained to communicate with diplomacy and tact. Sheikh Nasser's phone 
conversation indicated that the predicament, which the regime was facing, meant that 
the regime would be willing to do whatever it would take to defend their rule. The 
king's son threatened the protesters explicitly in saying that "Bahrain is an island and 
there is nowhere to escape". The military position held by Sheikh Nasser as the 
Commander of Bahrain's Royal Guard could not be ignored. The With the Event was 
used by a strong figure in the royal family as a platform for the threat of force. For 
Sheikh Nasser, there were two types of people: the outlaws who would be held 
accountable and the good citizens who would be rewarded.    
 According to Paul Y. Change and Alex S. Vitale (2013) extreme demands by 
protesters play a role in determining the level of repression (p. 23). Repressive 
actions are increased when protest-activities exceed the boundaries drawn by the 
regime (p. 36). Therefore, the uprising was framed by the coverage and by the Al-
Khalifa family members as an intention to topple the regime. A'ala Hubail who 
delivered The Athletes' March speech on the Pearl Roundabout, denied in the With 
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the Event phone interview that he had demanded the downfall of the regime. 
However, the panellists of With the Event and Special Event insisted that he had. 
Hubail's edited digital image was displayed in the two programmes with a comment 
"A'ala Hubail delivers a speech and demands to topple the regime". The host Faiz Al-
Sada spoke "on behalf of the people of Bahrain" when he commented on Sheikh 
Nasser's phone interview "Maybe this is what the people of Bahrain were waiting to 
hear that everyone spoke about toppling the regime will be held accountable. This is 
what we thank you for. This reassured us and soothed our hearts." 
 The Al-Khalifa family used all possible weapons including sport and sports 
media to confront the social movement. Sport is often employed by authoritarian 
regimes as a powerful force to control people. It is also used to propagate the 
regime's values and ideology by taking advantage of the engagement of sport in 
people's daily lives (Pujadas 2014, p. 10). In addition, controlling sports institutions 
allow authoritarian regimes to prevent pro-opposition activities and provide support 
to the regime's agenda (Byman and Linda 2010, p. 48). Garth S. Jowett and Victoria 
O'Donnell (1999) define propaganda as "the deliberate and systematic attempt to 
shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response 
that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (cited in Black 2001, p. 127).  
 The political use of sports media was a form of the Al-Khalifa family's 
hegemony over Bahrain. During the uprising, sports media was exploited to 
propagandize the regime's ideology and impose the regime's agenda on the people of 
Bahrain. It is noted that the coverage of the two newspapers were very similar. 
Although newspapers in Bahrain are privately owned, they adopt the regime's 
propaganda. The propaganda of the sports media coverage of the 2011 uprising was 
intended to create an atmosphere of fear of the social movement and the political 
change that may occur as a result. The Propaganda Model (PM) discussed earlier was 
developed to explain the modus operandi of the U.S. media, but it can be applied in 
to the state-controlled media in Bahrain. Several elements of the PM can be 
identified from the performance of the sports media during the 2011 uprising.  
 The first element is the concentration of the ownership of media and its 
consequences on the modus operandi of the Bahraini media. Television in Bahrain is 
owned and controlled by the regime and although newspapers are privately owned, 
the regime keeps its dominant control over the media. The second element is the 
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reliance on official and pro-regime sources to cover the uprising which led to the 
reinforcement of the regime's agenda. The third element is the notion of the media 
sports coverage elucidates the ideology of the regime and its attitude to democracy. 
The forth element is "flak" which is negative responses to journalists' reports. State-
controlled media institutions were employed in the context of the 2011 uprising to 
censure journalists. The Al-Khalifa family members and pro-regime figures rebuked 
and threatened sports figures and journalists who were involved in the uprising. The 
pro-regime figures, in this case, were the culprits. The fifth element of the PM points 
to the ability of dominant powers to unite the nation against 'enemies' who threaten 
the status quo. The sports media coverage framed and targeted enemies who 
demanded political reform. Although the PM was developed in the 1980s, the model 
can be used to examine media under the authority of autocratic regimes.    
 To sum up, the 2011 uprising in Bahrain which challenged the sacredness of 
the king and his family had questioned the legitimacy of the rule of the Al-Khalifa 
family. The Al-Khalifa family responded by wielding their power and control over 
the sports media to quell the protests. They countered their opponents by targeting 
the protests and by vilifying the protesters as "vandals" who destabilized the country. 
The coverage of the protests correlated the stability of the country with the Al-
Khalifa family. In other words, adhering to the rule of the Al-Khalifa family meant 
the salvation from the 'crisis'. The institutional structure of the media in Bahrain 
resembles theoretical components of the propaganda Model developed by Herman 
and Chomsky. The discussion illustrates the significant role played by the sports 
media in Bahrain to propagandize the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime during 
the protests. It also elucidates the use of sports media as a means of communications, 
manipulation, and for the maintenance of order. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
 This thesis has examined the role of Bahraini sports media in the uprising at 
the Pearl Roundabout that began on February 14, 2011 when the autocratic rule of 
the Al-Khalifa family was threatened as never before. While previous demonstrations 
in Bahrain, including the protests between 1994 and 1999, were limited to the 
involvement of opposition elites, political activists, labourers and students, the 2011 
uprising involved Bahraini celebrity athletes and sports figures who previously had 
not been particularly politically engaged. The unprecedented involvement in politics 
by sports figures motivated the regime to engage in a propaganda campaign that used 
the sports media to manipulate public opinion for its own ends. 
 To understand the role of the sports media during the protests, this thesis has 
examined how sports media framed the 2011 demonstrations in Bahrain and 
discussed the general strategies and specific techniques used to manipulate the 
coverage of the events. The analysis was first informed by Herman and Chomsky's 
Propaganda Model and then drew on content analysis of the news frames to show 
that the Bahraini sports media coverage had portrayed the uprising as an illegal 
movement that caused a conflict between legality and illegality, and between good 
and evil. Seeking to justify the repression of the political protests, sports media was 
exploited by the Al-Khalifa regime to vilify those who were involved in the protests. 
The content analysis of newspaper and television sports coverage during a key period 
of the political uprising (from March 31 to May 31, 2011) reveals how the 
propaganda campaign relied on the cult of personality to frame the king and the Al-
Khalifa family as the figureheads for the nation, while framing the uprising as a 
threat to the national identity of Bahrain. The sports media coverage suggested that 
the leader himself was the state and that he was "the central means by which the will 
of the masses is translated into the power of the state" (Kamrava 2011, p. 306). This 
thesis has shown how sports media played a particularly strong role in Bahrain to 
grant the Al-Khalifa family the legitimacy to carry out repressive actions on behalf of 
the nation.   
 The sports media of Bahrain was employed to propagate the regime's 
interpretation of nationalism which is strongly associated with loyalty to the ruling 
family and which suggested that protests had threatened the stability of the country. 
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By exploiting and manipulating media outlets, the Gulf State regimes regularly try to 
convince public opinion about the disadvantages of democracy (Davidson 2013, p. 
45). This was particularly effective in Bahrain, where sport plays a significant role in 
the communities, and where public opinion is influenced by sports figures' 
achievements and public activities. Given the dominance of sports in the culture in 
Bahrain, using sports media was central to the regime's public communication 
strategies.  
 This thesis has examined two major pro-regime sports newspapers in Bahrain 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad. The findings show that both newspapers relied 
heavily on official sources to report on the uprising. It also investigated two main 
television programmes With the Event and Special Event, which were specially 
broadcast on Bahrain Sports Channel to undermine the political movement.     
 The main role of sports media prior to the 2011 uprising was not only to 
entertain but also to influence public opinion. However, after the 2011 uprising, the 
role of sports media changed when it became involved in the suppression of the 
uprising. Sports media played several tactical roles during the uprising including 
humiliation, monitoring, threatening, punishing, and prosecuting the protesters. 
Although most of the protesters who appeared in With the Event were arrested on the 
second day, Special Event, which was broadcast a week later, continued incitement 
against the protesters. Edited digital images of the protesters were displayed again 
during the second programme, while the newspaper coverage continued reporting the 
'abuses' committed by the sports figures and athletes. Humiliation is a social means 
used to oppress other groups (Klein 1991, p. 93) and to pass orders that have to be 
followed (Klein 2005). Sports media was used by the regime as a tool of humiliation. 
Sports media was requiring those who participated in the uprising to declare their 
loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family, apologize for participation in the protests, and 
confess their unpatriotic actions in public.  
 In order to imply that the regime was still strong and in control of the 
situation, sports media played a monitoring role by publishing images and the 
personal information of the protesters. This was obvious when the two television 
programmes published the full names, places of work and images of the participants 
in The Athletes' March. This also signified that the regime was both watching and 
recording the activities organized by the protesters. Using sports media to troll, 
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shame and name the protesters communicated a message to the anti-regime protesters 
as well as the pro-regime supporters. The regime's propaganda campaign implied to 
the demonstrators that protesting was a crime against the state would not be 
tolerated. In this context, sports media was a substitute for the criminal code because 
participation in political activities resulted in the arrest and the punishment of those 
who were involved. Additionally, sports media played the roles of public prosecution 
and jurisdiction. Anti-regime protesters including sports figures and athletes, were 
interrogated before they were physically arrested. Sports figures and athletes were 
accused of committing a crime and sentenced to prison and their penalties were 
published in the local newspapers or announced on television. Overall, the regime's 
propaganda transformed the sports media from being an entertainment medium to an 
explicit political tool. The content analysis shows sport media was used as a 
propaganda tool by the regime to victimise and suppress the protesters. While some 
of the protesters were shot in the streets by military force, others were targeted by the 
sports media in television and newspaper reports.   
 The effectiveness of the sports coverage in changing public opinion has to be 
taken into account because the 2011 uprising has failed to attain its goals. The 
analysis of the behaviour of sports media during the 2011 uprising in Bahrain was 
informed by the "protest paradigm" in political media as theorised by previous studies 
of protest coverage (McLeod and Hertog 1992; De Vreese 2004; Boykoff 2006; 
Brasted 2006; Jha 2007; Di Cicco 2010). While these studies examined the 
undermining of protests by political media in order to maintain the status quo, the 
present thesis shows how sports media can also be used by authoritarian regimes as a 
propaganda tool to maintain the status quo and suppress political dissidents. For 
instance, sports media was used during the first weeks of the 2011 Egyptian uprising 
to back up the former regime of Hosni Mubarak (Zamalek's channel 2012). Sports 
media at time had called on protesters to give up their political activities that 
detribalized the country and harmed the economy. The Egyptian pro-regime sports 
figures also sustained the former president's policies and reproved the protesters who 
were framed as "infiltrators" for demanding the downfall of the regime. Nonetheless, 
sports media in Egypt and those who stood against the uprising changed their position 
after the fall of the former regime. Conversely, the regime in Bahrain has overcome 
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the dilemma of the uprising while sports media continued to serve the regime's 
agenda.  
 Sports media in Bahrain reflects the essence of the regime where the Al-
Khalifa family dominates and controls all aspect of the state. The sports coverage of 
the 2011 uprising elucidates the regime's views of democracy. The structure of the 
regime accepts only those who believe in the ideology that certifies that the Al-
Khalifa family is the legitimate alternative to lawful democratic institutions and that 
the ruling family must not be challenged by any means. In other words, the coverage 
of the uprising is an echo of the political environment that only allows the voice of 
the ruling family and its supporters to be heard. The regime motivates the public 
opinion not to think about the political and economic situations and to never question 
the ruling family's policies. The regime identifies good citizens as only those who 
follow the regime's instructions and interacts positively with them.  
 The Al-Khalifa family has a close relationship with sport and sports media. 
The ruling family members preside over the strongest federations and sports clubs. 
They involve themselves in sport and their activities receive considerable attention as 
their sports news is published in the local sports newspapers on a daily basis. News of 
the ruling family are written and sent to sports media by their official offices not just 
for informational purposes, but most importantly to communicate political messages. 
The ruling family realized early the importance of sports media and they have been 
directing and occupying high positions in sport in Bahrain including the Bahrain 
Olympic Committee and Bahrain Football Association. The regime also make it 
mandatory that sports news is edited to frame the Al-Khalifa members to the public as 
athletes, champions and supporters of sport and sports figures. There is an unwritten 
understanding between sports journalists about how to deal with official sports news 
articles. These articles, sent by email or fax, must be published. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, official sports articles that cover the Al-Khalifa family's activities occupy 
whole pages and are accompanied by several photographs.   
 As a research student in exile, the coverage of the sports media during the 
uprising aroused my attention. I have worked in journalism for more than ten years 
including five years with sports journalism. Political media rarely published official 
statements about protests occurring across the country whereas sports media had 
always refrained from covering political issues. Pointing to political issues in sports 
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newspapers had always been subjected to restrictions even when these activities were 
unrelated to local issues. I recall an event in 2010 when I worked as a sports journalist   
with Al-Bilad. The Bahrain National Football Team had intended to visit the West 
Bank to play a friendly match with the Palestinian National Football Team. The 
Bahraini team had planned to travel to Jordan and then to the West Bank where the 
match was to be held. That visit was controversial as citizens of Bahrain, which did 
not have diplomatic relations with Israel, had to obtain approval from the Israeli 
authorities who control the West Bank crossings with Jordan. For several days prior 
to the visit, Al-Bilad sports newspaper had criticised the travel to the West Bank and 
then it was prevented from writing about the issue. I remember asking the Al-Bilad 
sports editor-in-chief about the reason and he answered that he was told not to mix 
sport with politics. However, news articles that praised the visit and its positive 
political impacts were allowed to be published in other local newspapers.   
 Therefore, I was surprised when Bahrain Sports Channel broadcast live the 
programme With the Event and discussed the political events particularly The 
Athletes' March. The performance of sports media during the 2011 uprising opened a 
new era in the history of sports media in Bahrain as the propaganda employed to 
serve the ruling family had finally been used without equivocation after being in the 
background of sports coverage for decades. This explicit involvement of sports media 
in politics encouraged me to examine closely the regime's propaganda.  
 The ruling family could not afford to lose the political game as the success of 
the uprising would have meant the end of the rule of the Al-Khalifa family or 
reduction of their powers. Television coverage of the protests took the lead as the 
regime's propaganda campaign was launched officially by Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad. 
Bahrain Sports Channel coverage was more effective than the newspaper coverage 
because of the explicit imageries framed in the programmes to support the Al-Khalifa 
regime and victimise the protesters. Although the studio set of the two programmes 
looked unprofessional, the producers succeeded in delivering the pro-regime 
messages to deliver via the edited digital images accompanied by background music 
to stir the audience's sense of loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family.    
 There is a considerable scholarly effort that has examined social media during 
The Arab Spring; however, the role of mainstream media during this period has been 
overlooked. This thesis shows that mainstream media should not be neglected as it is 
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still an important tool in the hands of autocratic regimes. It shows that mainstream 
media play a significant role in communicating with a mass audience. This thesis also 
shows that national television in the era of social media remains as an effective means 
for influencing public opinion and imposing a regime's propaganda. Mainstream 
sports media can also be as repressive as political media. This thesis shows that 
authoritarian regimes believe in the importance of justifying their actions to the public 
regardless of how these regimes view the will of their people. Sports media is 
considered a significant element of force for autocratic regimes and a way to reflect 
their ideologies. The role that sports media play is complicated. It is not only 
exploited to legitimize political regimes and impose their ideologies, but it is also 
exploited to disorganize opponents of autocratic regimes and to preserve the state's 
power.   
 Further research can examine the extent that the sports media have influenced 
the political process during The Arab Spring revolution where autocratic regimes 
were compelled to step down and new regimes established such as in Tunisia and 
Egypt where sport and sports figures are popular as they are in Bahrain.         
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APPENDIX 1: Newspaper data translation samples 
No.  Arabic My translation to English 
 The unlicensed marches المسيرات غير القانونية 1
 Offending the nation's figureheads and our  dear اإلساءة إلى قادة الوطن ومملكتنا الغالية 2
kingdom 
 The unlicensed and illegal marches المسيرات غير القانونية وغير المرخصة 3
 Marches that breach security المسيرات المخلة باألمن 4
 Acts of sabotage أعمال التخريب 5
 Offending the nation and the leadership اإلساءة إلى الوطن والقيادة الرشيدة 9
 The unfortunate events األحداث المؤسفة 7
إلى اإلساءة إلى رموزنا وقيادتنا الرشيدة هدفت 9  Aimed to offend our figureheads and our wise 
leadership 
 Destabilizing the security and stability in our زعزعة األمن واالستقرار في مملكتنا الغالية 8
dear kingdom 
للقيادة الرشيدة و الوطن  والمسيئونن ئوالمخط 12
 العزيز
The wrongdoers and the offenders of the dear 
nation 
 Security disturbances التوترات األمنية 11
  Political events األحداث السياسية 10
  Political crisis األزمة السياسية 13
 Targeting civil peace استهداف السلم األهلي 14
 What is called The Athletes' March ما يسمى بمسيرة الرياضيين 12
 Breaching the law خرق القانون والنظام 19
 Inciting sectarian strife إثارة التوترات الطائفية 17
 Suspending of the sports activity توقف النشاط الرياضي 19
أو القيادة الرشيدة إساءة يتعرض لها الوطن 18  Abuse the nation or the wise leadership 
 The sit- in the GCC roundabout االعتصام في دوار مجلس التعاون 02
 The political march المسيرة السياسية 01
 Disloyal to their nation and its wise leadership عدم والئهم لوطنهم وقيادته الرشيدة 00
 The Athletes' March that was called to المسيرة الرياضية المطالبة بإسقاط النظام 03
overthrow the regime 
 Crisis األزمة 04
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APPENDIX 2: Television data translation samples 
No.  Arabic My translation to English 
 (The great Bo Salman (The King's agnomen العظيم بوسلمان 1
 Security events الظروف األمنية 2
  Treachery الخيانة 3
   Clouds of fear غيوم الخوف 4
 Malice and greed أطماع الحاقدين 5
 Chaos االنفالت 6
 Harsh lesson درس قاس 7
 Patriotic people ناس وطنيين 8
 who is with the regime and who is against من مع النظام ومن ضد النظام 9
 Ungrateful people ناكرو الجميل 10
   The regime and the nation's figureheads النظام ورموز البلد 11
 The abusers المسيئون 12
 Spiteful people الحاقدون 13
 Many masks fell أقنعة كثيرة سقطت 14
 Unpatriotic ال ينتمون لهذه الديرة 12
 The security circumstances الظروف األمنية 19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
APPENDIX 3: Television data translation samples (Crawler) 
No. Arabic My translation to English 
اللهم احفظ مليكنا حمد، وولي العهد ورئيس الوزراء والبحرين  1
 وشعبها الوفي آمين
May God protects our King, our Crown Prince, the 
Prime Minister, Bahrain and its loyal people 
 البحرين تاج على رؤوسنا وبوسلمان غالي على قلوبنا 2
 
Bahrain is the crown of our heads and Bo Salman is 
our sweetheart  
من  اللهم أدم علينا نعمة األمن واألمان واحفظ بحريننا الغالية 3
كل شر ومكروه، واحفظ يا رب مليكنا ورئيس الوزراء وولي 
 العهد واجعلهم ذخراً لنا لألبد
 
May God protects and keep our dear Bahrain secure 
from all evil and may the lord protect our King, the 
Prime Minister, the Crown Prince and keep them 
for us forever 
حبك بابا خليفةأ 4  I love you baba Khalifa 
 We are all your soldiers Bo Salman حنا جنودك يا بوسلمان  5
 Bahrain will remain Khalifya وتبقى البحرين خليفية 6
رب اجعل هذا البلد آمنا مطمئناً سخاء رخاء ورد عنه كيد  7
بحريني الكائدين يا رب احفظ ملك القلوب احفظ حبيب قلب كل 
خليفة بن سلمان يا رب طول في أعمارهم وارزقهم الصحة 
 والعافية
 
May God secures and bless this country and protect 
it from the plotters' maliciousness O my Lord and 
protect the king of hearts and each Bahraini's 
sweetheart Khalifa bin Salman. O God prolong their 
lives and keep them well 
ما حدث في البحرين نعمة من هللا لنفرق فيه بين الصديق  8
والعدو فنحمد هللا ونشكره على كل شيء وهللا يحفظ لنا البحرين 
 وحكومتنا وشعبنا الوفي آمين آمين
 
What happened is a lesson to identify the friend 
from the enemy. We thank God for everything. May 
God protects Bahrain, our government and the loyal 
people Amen Amen 
هللا يحفظ البحرين ومليكنا ورئيس الوزراء وولي عهده من كل  9
 مكروه
May God protects Bahrain, our King, our Prime 
Minister and the Crown Prince from all evil 
أسمى آيات الحب والوالء واإلخالص للقيادة الرشيدة نرفع  10
لصاحب الجاللة الملك المفدى ورئيس الوزراء الموقر وولي 
العهد األمين سائلين هللا تعالى أن يحفظهم من كل سوء ويرجع 
 البحرين الحبيبة كما كانت وأفضل
 
We declare our love, loyalty and trust in the wise 
leadership: His Highness the king, the distinguished 
Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince. May God 
protects them from all evil and renovate Bahrain to 
the best 
 
